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ABSTRACT 
The Western approach to understanding mental disorder, as indicated in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, is based on a bio-medical perspective which sees 
mental disorders as 'natural kinds' or discrete entities which manifest as dysfunction within 
individuals. Following from this is the view that its primary syndromes are ubiquitous world-
wide, based on the assumption that this dysfunction is similar across diverse human 
populations. However, the cross-cultural literature reveals significant differences in the 
manifestation of these syndromes across ethnic groups, thereby challenging the universalist 
position. In response to this shortcoming, of the predominant contemporary conceptualisation 
of mental disorder, a constructivist understanding is offered which, it is argued, has a number 
of important advantages over the traditional view. In particular, a constructivist view can 
acknowledge the important role of social factors in the manifestation of mental disorder. 
And, importantly, it lends itself to a variety of alternative approaches to diagnosis and 
treatment which are culture-sensitive, and which therefore may prove advantageous in cross-
cultural clinical contexts. 
VI 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of mental disorders goes back centuries yet it was not until about 30 years ago 
that their manifestations across cultures received serious attention. Earlier studies, of 
which there were only a handful, were strongly influenced by racial prejudice with many 
seeking only to confirm the assumed superiority of Western Caucasian peoples (e.g. 
Carothers, 1951 & Smartt, 1956). But while the past three decades of research have 
yielded some interesting findings there is much that remains to be discovered and 
understood. One of key questions in the area of cross-cultural psychology is to what 
extent mental disorders are contingent on biological factors on the one hand and socio-
cultural factors on the other. This question is reminiscent of the 'nature verses nurture' 
debate which has fascinated psychologists for years. But notably psychologists are no 
longer interested in which of these factors is more important, but in understanding the 
complex interaction between them. Human development involves a dyn~ic process 
wherein biology and sociology come together in the emergence of various 
characteristics and abilities. 
It will be argued herein that within the fields of clinical psychology and psychiatry, this 
interaction and interconnection has been largely overlooked. Mental disorders are 
typically viewed as socio-environmentally impenetrable, with too much attention paid to 
the bio-medical dimension of mental disorder. This traditional view is exhibited in the 
latest Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM -IV) in its definition 
of mental disorder and in its general format. This has implications both for the treatment 
of psychopathology and for research. For example if schizophrenia is viewed as 
essentially biological in nature then there is a greater tendency to use 
psychopharmacological treatments and to ignore the socio-cultural context of the 
condition. And with regard to research, there has been an emphasis on the search for 
cross-cultural universals based on the view that all human beings are physiologically 
equivalent. 
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I will argue that the prima-facie acceptance of the bio-medical approach to the 
understanding of psychopathology is problematic in light of the cross-cultural findings 
which demonstrate that mental disorders vary significantly, in their clinical 
manifestations, across cultures. While the DSM-IV has attempted to extend its scope by 
aclmowledging cultural factors, it is impeded by notions of biology and associated 
ubiquity which are at this time highly speculative. Research in this area has been greatly 
influenced by the views of general medicine which rely on the disease model of illness -
a model which is arguably, out of place within psychology. While medical research has 
made and continues to make a significant contribution to the understanding of 
psychopathology, this must be coupled with social analysis in order to provide a 
balanced and complete understanding of the field. 
As mentioned, the focus of the discussion is the cross-cultural manifestation of mental 
disorder. This focus serves to highlight and exemplify the problems with the traditional 
bio-medical understanding of mental disorder. The DSM-IV assumes that its primary 
disorders are universal in contrast to the list of culture-bound syndromes provided in an 
appendix. Western disorders are given a different status, but this is not only because it is 
intended for use among Westerners. Rather the DSM is used in a variety of ethnic 
environments and there is an assumption that the primary disorders are actually 
ubiquitous phenomena. However as will be shown herein this is yet to be established. 
There are some very important cross-cultural differences in the presentation of disorders 
such as depression and schizophrenia which challenge the traditional view. 
In response to these difficulties I introduce constructivism as an alternative conceptual 
framework for the understanding of mental disorder - alternative to the traditional bio-
medical model. Constructivism emphasises the interpersonal context of human 
experience and behaviour, hence it can acknowledge and explain cross-cultural 
diversity. Constructivism is used as an alternative conceptual approach, yielding a 
number of important proposals and implications for the development of more culture-
sensitive clinical and research practices. The purpose of this application is to consider 
the various ways in which an alternative conceptual framework may impact on the 
understanding of mental disorder generally and the understanding of its cross-cultural 
dimensions in particular. 
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As shown in the contents, the chapters are grouped in three parts. Part one looks at the 
contemporary approach to the understanding of mental disorder. The first chapter 
discusses the definition of mental disorder, paying particular attention to the definition 
provided in the DSM IV and chapter two examines the process of classification, once 
again focusing on the DSM IV, with a detailed analysis of its theoretical foundations. 
The aim in these first two chapters, which comprise part one, is to outline and explicate 
the prevailing approach to the understanding of mental disorder and to identify its 
limitations. 
Part two consists of four chapters which cover the cross~cultural literature. Chapter 
three looks at the history of cross~cultural psychology, showing in particular the various 
factors which have been influential throughout its development. The following chapter 
brings the analysis up to date .with a comprehensive discussion of contemporary issues, 
sketching the breadth of the field, and providing some examples of the interface 
between culture and mental disorder. Chapter five examines the cross-cultural 
application of the DSM IV including an analysis of the recent culture~oriented 
modifications, a study of some of its so-called culture-bound syndromes, and lastly a 
look at the cross-cultural manifestation of depression. Chapter six, which is the final 
chapter in this section, provides a detailed discussion of schizophrenia across cultures. 
Part three presents a constructivist approach to mental disorder beginning with chapter 
seven which introduces COll..o;;tructivism by way of an historical narrative, looking 
chronologically at the various theorists who have been influential in its emergence. 
Chapter eight offers a COll..o;;tructivist definition of mental disorder and chapter nine 
discusses the implications of this definition for classification, diagnosis and treatment. 
And finally chapter ten looks at the implications for research and presents a brief 
evaluation of the constructivist approach. 
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PART ONE 







WHAT IS A MENTAL DISORDER? 
As indicated this opening chapter will discuss the definition of mental disorder. While 
this definition may seem apparent and straightforward, as the following explication will 
demonstrate, it is neither of these. Many people would probably respond quite 
spontaneously to the above question with comments such as, "a sickness of the mind", 
or "that which afflicts people who are in mental hospitals", "what some people have 
who behave strangely" or perhaps "a disorder of the brain" or simply "insanity". 
Combined, these ideas make up the many-faceted lay concept of mental disorder with 
which most of us are familiar. Within this lay concept are a number of important 
elements which can also be seen in more formal discussions of the definition. For 
example the idea that a mental disorder involves a dysfunction in the brain and that it 
involves behaviour which is outside the range of what is considered 'normal'. Also 
important is society's response to the phenomenon which may be to put the mentally 
disordered individual in an institution. 
Central to this discussion is the question of whether mental disorders are essentially 
physiological or social or both. If they are simply a matter of social value then one 
would expect them to vary significantly across cultures according to the diverse 
manifestation of socio-cultural beliefs, values and traditions. If on the other hand they 
are the result of physiological dysfunction then there may be striking similarities in their 
presentation across many different social groupS.l While the relevant empirical 
literature will be evaluated later, it is important at the outset to discuss the definition of 
mental disorder and to look in particular at contemporary definitions which have been 
l For the purposes of this introductory discussion, this point has been simplified and hence it requires 
qualification. Firstly as will be noted in detail later, there may be physiological variation between ethnic 
groups meaning that a physiological element will not necessarily denote universality. And secondly 
social factors should not be seen as divorced from physiological ones but rather as interacting with 
them. 
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and continue to be influential in this area. Hence this chapter will discuss in detail the 
definition found in the latest edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association 
[APA], 1994) and the definition provided by Wakefield which has received widespread 
support. 
'Mental disorder' is today the term of choice for psychological disturbances. In the past 
there have been others such as 'mental illness' and 'mental disease' which imply a 
breakdown of psychological systems which is analogous to the disruption or disease of 
biological systems (Reber, 1985). This approach relies on the idea that most mental 
problems could be traced back to a particular point of malfunction which would be 
similar to the lesion or germ of the 'medical model'. The malfunction would bring 
about some type of systemic failure and this would result in psychological symptoms. 
'Mental disorder', on the other hand, is believed to be more neutral in this regard 
(Reber, 1985). The.notion of disorder .carries fewer misleading connotations. It has no 
special affiliation with the 'biological' or 'medical' approach or with any other 
particular position. 
While the notion of 'disorder' is relatively straightforward in that it carries little 
conceptual baggage, the concept of 'mental' is more problematic. It unfortunately 
suggests a distinction between disorders which are 'mental', and disorders which are 
'physical' as if the two categories are mutually exclusive ( Reber, 1985; AP A 1994 ). 
Arguably each arena impinges on the other; many physical problems are believed to be 
affected by psychic phenomena and many psychological problems are believed to have 
a physiological component. For example hypertension and heart disease are two 
medical conditions which are believed to be influenced by mental states (Schneiderman, 
Chesney & Krantz, (1989). And likewise dementia is a psychological condition which 
is associated with neural damage. It is stated in the DSM N that the primary reason that 
the term 'mental' has endured is because no adequate substitute has been found. 
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THE DSM-IV DEFINITION 
The DSM-IV, which is today the most widely used Western diagnostic and 
classificatory system (Maser et aI., 1991), provides a multifaceted definition of mental 
disorder. By way of elucidation and perhaps justification of this approach, it sites 
examples of somatic disturbance, all of which are recognised medical conditions, but 
none of which are alone, entirely representative of the concept of physical disorder. For 
example some physical ailments are manifested simply as subjective distress ( e.g., 
migraine ) while some occur as structural damage ( e.g., tumour ). Others such as 
hypel1ension are measured in terms of deviation from a prescribed norm. 
Similarly mental disorders, can occur in many fOlIDS, and involve different criteria for 
abnormality. The DSM-IV (APA, 1994) lists a number of criteria of psychological 
abnormality including: distress, disability, etiology and statistical deviation. 
Considering the diversity of these concepts it is difficult to produce a definition of 
mental disorder which incorporates all presentations. The definition given in the DSM-
IV reflects the variation in mental disorder, stating explicitly the aspects of 
psychological functioning which may be affected. The key elements of the DSM-IV 
definition are as follows: 
... each of the mental disorders is conceptualised as a clinically significant 
behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual 
and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability 
(i.e., impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a 
significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important 
loss of freedom. In addition, this syndrome or pattern must not be merely an 
expectable and culturally sanctioned response to a particular event, for example, 
the death of a loved one. Whatever its original cause, it must currently be 
considered a manifestation of a behavioural, psychological or biological 
dysfunction in the individual...(American Psychiatric Association (AP A), P xxi). 
This definition has remained relatively unchanged since its original appearance in the 
DSM-ill. The central criteria of the definition are the notions of distress, disability, 
expectability and dysfunction. The concept of distress captures the more subjective and 
experiential aspects of mental disorder while the concept of disability has a closer 
affiliation with things behavioural or observable. These two concepts, which 
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incidentally should not be interpreted as mutually exclusive groups, capture two 
important domains of psychological pathological phenomena. These are, instances of 
subjective experience, such as thoughts and feelings, and instances of overt behaviour, 
such as tremors (e.g. in Parkinson's disease) and catatonic withdrawal (e.g. in 
schizophrenia). Conceiving of these psychological realms as relatively distinct, provides 
a useful way of understanding psychological symptoms; some disorders will involve 
one area of functioning more than the other while some might involve each equally. Of 
course disability will usually have an experiential element; most disorders involve some 
degree of subjective modification and mental disorders are after all, disorders of the 
psyche. The distinction is useful however in that it acknowledges that psychological 
impairment may be purely experiential or purely behavioural or both. 
Another significant part of the defmition is the concept of expectability. This is 
construed in terms of statistically detel111ined norms. Anything unexpectable will be that 
which is statistically speaking, unlikely, and therefore outside the range of 'normal' 
phenomena. Wakefield (1992) has been highly critical of this criterion of abnormality. 
The problem with such an analysis, he says, is that many statistically unexpected 
conditions are functionally normal and many expected conditions are not. He cites the 
example of anaclitic depression which arises from a lack of contact with a caregiver 
during infancy. Considering the circumstances, such a response is expectable and yet it 
is nonetheless a disorder. Similarly, chronic depressed mood which also appears as a 
disorder in the DSM-IV can also in some contexts be expected; for instance, when it 
occurs in response to sexual abuse. 
Describing mental disorder as deviation from statistical normality fails to capture the 
essence of the concept and moreover adds yet another indetenninate expression to the 
discussion. As Wakefield rightly points out, something that is unexpected or unusual is 
not necessarily abnormal. In certain extreme environmental conditions, dysfunction 
such as that evidenced in post-traumatic stress disorder could reasonably be expected 
and within a sub-group of the population such as veterans of war these SOlis of 
symptoms could be quite common. If the concept of expectability is to be used 
effectively in the definition of mental disorder, it, itself, will require clarification. As 
mentioned above, in particular populations, some disorders can be likely, which would 
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he unlikely in the wider community. It is not clear whether discrimination between a 
sub-group and the wider population is allowable according to the DSM-IV definition. 
The other important component of the DSM's definition is the notion of dysfunction 
which may be 'behavioural, psychological or biological'. Dysfunction is, according to 
the Oxford English dictionary (1991) "an abnormality or impairment of function". In 
other words it denotes a breakdown or disruption of a system wherein the system fails 
to perform as it would ordinarily. The term dysfunction then, suggests that something 
has 'gone wrong' within the organism. This conception of mental disorder is consistent 
with the medical model wherein mental disorders are construed as diseases requiring 
diagnosis and treatment (Blashfield, 1984) just as purely physical conditions are. 
According to Blashfield, the medical model has had a powerful influence on 
contemporary understandings of mental health. This influence has been reflected in the 
various DSMs which list a variety Qf discrete diagnostic entities each of which is 
associated with a particular treatment approach. This conceptualisation of 
psychopathology is rooted in the notion of dysfunction which denotes a specific disease 
or breakdown within the organism. 
The DSM definition of mental disorder relies on the notion of dysfunction to provide an 
objective 'scientific' means of identifying psychopathology (Klein, 1978; Thakker & 
Ward, in press; Wakefield, 1992). In this way a mental disorder may be distinguished 
from a purely socio-cu1turally or perhaps socio-politically motivated labeL So while the 
DSM-IV acknowledges the influence of culture in its definition, it states that mental 
disorder is not solely a matter of social judgement. As noted by Wakefield (1997) this 
aspect of the definition is intended to prevent the use of labels of psychopathology for 
the purposes of social control. It is not sufficient that society expresses disapproval of a 
particular behaviour through the application of a diagnostic labeL Rather, there must be 
a problem within the individual which interferes with his or her ability to function. 
But importantly the social dimension of disorder is also acknowledged by the latest 
DSM. Included in the definition is the phrase, 'culturally sanctioned' referring to 
psychological disturbance which is, for whatever reason, accepted by society. Within 
the definition this phrase is linked with the term expectability, conveying the view that 
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psychological anomalies which are accepted or expected in one culture may not be in 
another. This is indicative of the general acknowledgement of the influence of culture 
on at least some aspects of some of the disorders which are listed in the diagnostic and 
statistical manua1.2 Illustrating this point the DSM gives the example of grief which 
may be characterised by an extreme emotional response but is not considered a mental 
disorder. This is because it is a culturally accepted response to 'the death of a loved 
one'. So mental states or behaviours which are unusual or excessive are not necessarily 
signs of mental disorder. Rather they must be evaluated in terms of their context, 
including their relation to significant life events and socio-cultural environment. 
The acknowledgement of a social aspect of mental disorder seems inconsistent with the 
idea that mental disorder involves intra-organismic dysfunction. If such dysfunction 
exists then social judgement may be seen as irrelevant with regard to the demarcation of 
psychopathology. According to Klei~an (1988) this apparent inconsistency can be 
explained with a reductionistic conceptualisation wherein dysfunction is seen as the 
basis or heart of mental disorder and social factors are seen as variables which intrude 
peripherally - subtly changing symptoms and perhaps influencing the way in which the 
symptoms are explained in various social groups. 3 
SOME ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 
Considering the importance of the term 'mental disorder' in the diagnostic process and 
its theoretical underpinnings, it is surprising that few theorists have analysed it. Spitzer 
(the primary editor of the DSM-III and DSM-IV) and Endicott (1978) made a 
significant contribution to the field with their attempt at an operational definition. In 
breaking down the concept of disorder, which was used in connection with both 
physical and mental conditions, they identified a number of key elements, the most 
fundamental and problematic of which was the term 'dysfunction'. The analysis which 
ensued was therefore focused primarily on the operationalisation of this concept. The 
2 The DSM's approach to the social dimension of mental disorder will be examined in detail in chapter 
five. 
3 This conceptualisation will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
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main criteria of Spitzer and Endicott's definition of 'organismic dysfunction' are as 
follows: 
1. Distress- acknowledged by the individual or manifested. 
2. Disability- some impairment in functioning in a wide range of activities. 
3. Disadvantage- certain forms of disadvantage to the individual in 
interacting with aspects of the physical or social environment because 
of an identifiable psychological or physical factor. 
4. The controlling variables tend to be attributed to being largely within 
the organism with regard to either initiating or maintaining the 
condition. 
(Selected excerpts from Spitzer and Endicott, 1978, pp 2~21 ). 
The term 'distress' refers to the discomfort which is experienced by the individual and 
as .noted above can be ascertained according to subjective or overt data. Like the DSM-
N definition this criterion captures the experiential information. The second criterion -
disability - which is described as 'impairment in functioning' is similar to the third 
factor of disadvantage which is .construed in telms of problematic interaction with the 
environment. The last factor is elaborated in the original excerpt with such words as 
'atypical' and 'impairment', conveying the idea that the condition is due to some sort of 
malfunction. Disability can also be incorporated under this conceptual umbrella as this 
also is described in terms of systemic failure. The fourth criterion simply says that the 
disorder must be a problem of the individual and not a problem of the environment. So, 
with regard to either the onset or maintenance of the problem, it must stem from within 
the person. 
To summarise then, a dysfunction is understood by Spitzer and Endicott to be a 
disruption of functioning, which occurs within an individual and which is evidenced as 
either distress, disability or disadvantage (or combinations of all three). So it may 
involve the disruption of psychological functioning or behavioural or both. 
ill a comprehensive analysis of Spitzer and Endicott's definition of dysfunction, 
Wakefield (1993) both commended and criticised aspects of their work. Wakefield 
appreciated the detail which their definition provided, which sought to incorporate the 
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many different ways in which a dysfunction might arise but he noted that such detail 
also brought about restrictions meaning that the definition was not fluid enough to 
capture all instances. The detail in question which included statements such as, "lack of 
ability to reproduce" and "marked impairment in the ability to form relatively lasting 
and non-conflictual interpersonal relationships", (Spitzer and Endicott, 1978, pp20-21), 
introduced a precise delineation between a disorder and a non-disorder. This precision 
proved problematic and Wakefield presented a number of powerful counter-examples 
which clearly showed the inadequacies of this particular operational approach. In fact, 
Wakefield believes that any operational approach would fail because of the nature of 
the concept (dysfunction). Dysfunction he says, is a theoretical concept which is only 
loosely related to particular internal mechanisms. These mechanisms are more often 
inferred than observed, meaning that little might be known about the detail of their 
operations. Hence an operational definition is difficult, if not impossible. It seems apt, 
as . Wakefield suggests, to leave this. sort of detail to the description of particular 
disorders. 
At the heart of Spitzer and Endicott's definition is the concept of malfunction or 
functional impairment, a focus which Wakefield sees as the definition's main drawcard. 
This concept is demonstrated by terms such as disadvantage and disability; suggesting 
some sort of interference with the usual order. However although they give examples of 
the disturbance of this order, they fail to clarify its nature. The order in question is quite 
simply, normality. Spitzer and Endicott offered no definite criteria of normality 
meaning that terms such as disability were less informative than they might otherwise 
have been. A disability is described by Spitzer and Endicott as impairment of a 
particular system or structure and this impairment must simply be construed in contrast 
to the way in which the system usually functions. 
For Wakefield the 'usual' way is that which has been developed by the process of 
natural selection; that which over the years has proved advantageous and has therefore 
enhanced survival. So, rather than elaborating on the idea of normal and abnormal 
functioning by giving detail of diverse instances, Wakefield prefers a theoretical 
approach presenting the theory of evolution as a foundation for understanding normalcy 
and deviation from this normalcy. 
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Wakefield expands the work of Klein (1978) who presented a similar approach to the 
definition of mental disorder, relying heavily on biological processes. When discussing 
this topic Klein uses the term 'mental illness' conveying the view that mental 
disturbance is simply a subset of other physically based illnesses. Klein's use of this 
concept is intimately connected with his emphasis on "involuntary impairment", which 
is seen to playa key role in his definition. According to Klein, a functional disturbance 
of the kind evident in mental disorder is entirely unintentional and uncontrolled in the 
same way that physical disturbance is. Klein sees this as vital to the general conception 
of mental illness whereby people who are given this label are often excused for actions 
which are harmful or socially inappropriate. Illness, whether it be physical or mental is 
understood by Klein as deviation from evolutionally determined norms. Normal 
biological function, on the other hand, is that which conforms to evolutionally 
prescribed standards. These standards are the result of natural selection which of course 
has the goal of maximising reproductive fitness. So, mental illness is something which 
stands in the way of this process; something which disrupts biological systems and 
inhibits reproductive success. 
The demands of the functional definition appear less rigorous than those of the 
operational one; we can look at the role or function of a particular behaviour within the 
context that it originated without having to determine its intricacies; the intricacies 
being the detail of its operational systems. The function of a mechanism can be 
determined even if the mechanism itself evades detailed inspection. 
Like Klein, Wakefield presents the view that mental mechanisms, like physical ones, 
are products of natural selection. Mechanisms which promote fitness are more likely to 
be passed on to successive generations and hence to survive and develop over time. 
Mental mechanisms which we all utilise today are products of this lengthy selection 
process. A problem with one or other apparatus can be described in terms of its 
deviation from this evolutionaUy developed norm. So, according to Wakefield a 
dysfunction is said to occur when a mechanism fails to perform its natural 
(evolutionally designed) function. The notion of function is vital to Wakefield's 
definition. Using an analogy with artefacts, such as chairs, he says, " ... the function 
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explains why the artefact was made, why it is structured the way it is, why the parts 
interact the way they do, and why we can accomplish certain things with the artefact", 
(1992a p 382). According to Wakefield much can be learnt about a mechanism by 
looking at its function. For instance the main function of a chair is for sitting. The 
function explains why chairs are designed in particular ways; by understanding the 
function of chairs we can determine what it means for a chair to be normal and 
functional and according to this we can determine what would be classed as a 
malfunction or impairment of that function. Wakefield believes that functional 
explanations have tremendous explanatory power; by understanding the function of a 
particular mechanism we can gain insight into its developmental history and its current 
state. 
In contrast to Klein, whose definition of mental disorder (mental illness) is dominated 
by the notion of physiological dysfunction, Wakefield's definition attributes equal 
significance to the social realm. He defines mental disorder as "harmful dysfunction" 
(Wakefield 1992a & 1992b), wherein harm is ascribed according to societal standards. 
In order for a problem to demand the label of disorder it should not only interfere with 
natural functioning, but also cause this sort of harm. To illustrate the relevance of this 
notion, Wakefield describes a physical condition called albinism which is a reversal of 
heart position. This condition which is clearly a deviation from the norm - a norm 
which is set by nature - does not actually have any apparent negative effects. It would 
be inappropriate, therefore to call this a disorder because although it is clearly abnormal 
in the statistical sense, it is not a problem. 
Similarly a person who presents with mania may not view the condition as problematic. 
Although a condition might appear to be deviant in telms of what is 'normal' or 'natural' 
according to biologically determined standards, it would not be called a disorder unless 
there is some degree ofharnl. Wakefield says that only dysfunctions which are "socially 
disvalued" are disorders. For instance last century there was a disorder referred to as 
'drapetomania', which was said to afflict slaves who escaped from their masters. Along 
with this Wakefield gives a number of other equally absurd examples (at least they 
seem so now), all of which highlight the significance of value judgements in the 
perception and understanding of mental disorder. So Wakefield's construal of the 
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'harm' criterion is purely social; a problem will only be described as harmful if it 
socially undesirable. If catatonia is a state which is viewed as desirable by a particular 
community then it will not be classed as a condition worthy of treatment; it will not 
therefore be described as disordered. 
A disorder then, for Wakefield, involves the disturbance of both biological and social 
order. He succinctly states: "A disorder exists when the failure of a person's internal 
mechanisms to perform their functions as designed by nature impinges harmfully on the 
person's well-being as defined by social values and meaning" (l992a, p. 373). These 
two components are believed by Wakefield to be both necessary and sufficient for 
mental disorder. This to date, is one of the most comprehensive analyses of mental 
disorder and it is for this reason that it is being discussed herein, in detail. Although 
many other theorists have been critical of contemporary definitions, few have attempted 
like Wakefield, to provide viable alternatives. Another important reason for discussing 
it is that it is very similar to the DSM definition of mental disorder in that it combines 
the notion of dysfunction with a social component. However Wakefield extends and 
explicates this approach through the presentation of an evolutionarylbiological 
perspective. 
The main strength of Wakefield's definition lies in the inclusion of both biological and 
social dimensions. He states that, "a disorder lies on the boundary between the given 
natural world and the constructed social world" (l992a, p. 373). A disorder or "harmful 
dysfunction" occurs when both of these dimensions are disturbed. Only a disruption of 
functioning which results in socially disvalued experiences or behaviours will be called 
a disorder. Most of the criticisms which follow refer not to this aspect of the definition 
but rather to the reliance of the concept of dysfunction to demarcate mental disorder. 
Hence much of the critique which is directed at Wakefield's definition applies also to 
the definition given in the DSM-N. 
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A CRITIQUE OF WAKEFIELD 
There are a number of problems with Wakefield's definition. Firstly mental disorders 
are not obviously the result of a breakdown of evolutionally designed mechanisms. 
Rather some are arguably associated with adaptive responses. For instance PTSD may 
be in part due to the normal· functioning of adaptive mechanisms. The stressful life 
event which is believed to play a key role in the development of the condition is 
typically a dangerous one, often with the threat of death. Such an event is not easily 
forgotten and in the case of PTSD there are recurring thoughts and images and intense 
anxiety in response to situations which evoke memories of the event. That people are 
often hypervigilant and very sensitive to cues which they associate with the stressful 
event, could be seen as adaptive. Perhaps they would respond more quickly to a similar 
danger. Such individuals often experience a rush of adrenaline during periods of anxiety 
which may be useful in confronting or avoiding danger. 
Similarly dissociative identity disorder (previously known as multiple personality 
disorder), a rare disorder which is typically linked to traumatic experiences during 
childhood may also be viewed as adaptive. It is possible that the process of splitting up 
ones personality provides a way of assimilating feelings and memories which might 
otherwise be difficult to accommodate. Perhaps the fragmentation of the person creates 
a unique way of processing the horrific experiences of early childhood. It is conceivable 
that this sort of developmental response could be advantageous, especially if it 
promotes the individual's ability to carry on with the demands of everyday life. 
In their comprehensive analysis of Wakefield's definition, Lilienfeld and Marino (1995) 
also make this point. Drawing an analogy with purely physical conditions they give the 
examples of influenza and gastro~enteritis. The primary symptoms of the former -
coughing and sneezing, and high temperature - are adaptive responses to infection. 
Similarly the vomiting which occurs in response to food poisoning indicates that the 
digestive system is operating as it has evolved to, in expelling the toxic substance. 
Lilienfeld and Marino argue that, similarly, the symptoms of some mental disorders 
may be understood as adaptive responses to aversive phenomena. They note, citing 
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Seligman (1971) and McNally (1987), that simple phobias of stimuli such as 'snakes, 
heights, water, and darkness' are likely to be excesses of fears for which humans have 
been 'evolutionarily prepared'. Lilienfeld and Marino propose that a more accurate 
description of what is occurring is that mechanisms are carrying out their adaptive 
functions in inappropriate contexts, rather than failing to carry out that function. 
Relatedly, they propose that some phobias could be seen as adaptive relative to the 
environment in which they would have evolved. For example, stimuli such as blood and 
injury would have represented significant danger to primitive peoples. They claim that 
phobias of this kind are associated with changes in the autonomic nervous system, such 
as reduced pulse and blood pressure, which have the effect of minimising the loss of 
blood. Lilienfeld and Marino suggest that in modern society wherein there are effective 
methods for dealing with injury, a fear of blood is less appropriate. An example of a 
similar phenomenon in the animal kingdom is provided by Dawkins (1982). Many of us 
have observed the obviously dangerous practice of moths flying into the flames of 
candles. Dawkins suggests that before the widespread use of candles, small points of 
light in the darkness would typically have been small openings in caves or other 
enclosures, or distal celestial objects. Interestingly the latter are often used by insects as 
compasses hence moths will often circle the light source in an attempt to keep the light 
at a fixed orientation. With a distal object this fixed orientation would enable them to 
travel in a straight line. So, in stark contrast to Wakefield Lilienfe1d and Marino 
propose that " ... some phobias may actually be the product of fear systems performing 
too similarly to the way they were designed" (p. 416). This raises the question of how 
useful an evolutionary approach is in distinguishing normal from abnormal functioning. 
As the context of human existence has changed, touchstones of adaptiveness may have 
also changed, blurring the distinction between adaptive and non-adaptive function. 
Further complicating the application of an evolutionary understanding are exaptations, 
which are adaptively neutral mechanisms. While all features of an organism are 
products of the process of natural selection, exaptations differ from adaptations in that 
they function in ways which differ from those for which they were originally 
'designed'. According to Lilienfeld and Marino some examples of these are "religion, 
political beliefs, arithmetic ability, music, art, literature, and specific athletic and motor 
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skills" (p. 412). They suggest that these capacities have not been selected for, but have 
rather developed out of the presence of general mechanisms which have been designed 
for other purposes. Considering the general plasticity of the brain such exaptations are 
not surprising. Dennett (1991) speaks of 'a complex brain of unrivalled plasticity' (p. 
190). And he goes on to say that, "Our brains are equipped at birth with few if any 
powers that were lacking in the brains of our ancestors 10 000 years ago" (p. 190). He 
claims, therefore, that the remarkable advancements of human kind over the last 
decamillenium must be due almost entirely to the novel application of old systems. 
Explicating this notion, Dennett introduces a computer analogy wherein these novel 
uses are likened to software which may be run on the same old hardware. 
According to Dennett, language is a good example of this process. He states that the 
brain of the first Homo sapiens was in telIDs of both size and shape almost identical to 
tha,t of human beings alive today. And yet he proposes that language probably emerged 
within the last 150 000 years, subsequent then to the development of the brain of 
modem hominids. Dennett suggests therefore that the emergence of language did not 
correspond with changes in neuroanatomy but rather made use of systems which were 
already in place. He writes, citing Calvin (1989a): "The innate specialisation's for 
language, hypothesised by the linguist Noam Chomsky and others, and now beginning 
to be confmned in details of neuroanatomy, are a very recent and rushed add-on, no 
doubt an exploitation of earlier sequencing circuitry" (p. 190). Dennett adds that the 
most impressive development of human psychological processes, as evidenced by the 
emergence of 'civilisation' including activities such as agriculture and cooking, 
occurred even more recently, within the last ten thousand years. 
The central point here is that the context of modem life may requIre the novel 
functioning and novel application of mental mechanisms; functioning which differs 
from that for which the mechanisms were 'designed' through the process of natural 
selection. As Dennett argues, monumental changes have taken place during the last ten 
thousand years in the way that human beings live and these changes may be correlated 
with changes in psychological functioning. Hunter-gatherer societies would have had 
different intellectual demands. So if the so-called nOlIDal operation of mental 
mechanisms diverges from what Wakefield would refer to as its natural function then 
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Wakefield's analysis of dysfunction is problematic because it then has no marker for 
normal function. And more generally, considering the enormous changes in human 
societies it is reasonable to question the relevance of delineating the optimal 
functioning of psychological processes of modem Homo sapiens according to ancient 
touchstones of normality. As demonstrated by the seemingly dare-devilish behaviour of 
moths, what is adaptive in one context may not be in another. 
Another difficulty with Wakefield's analysis of dysfunction, identified by Lilienfeld and 
Marino, is that the evolutional approach demands a sharp distinction between normal 
and abnormal function, however some researchers argue that a number of mental 
disorders are best understood as extremes of ubiquitous psychological dimensions. In 
this case normal and abnormal are conceived of as lying at opposite ends of a 
continuum wherein each merges in gradually with the other somewhere in the middle of 
the spectrum. This conceptualisation has been applied, in particular, to personality 
disorders and some mood and anxiety disorders. This poses difficulty for Wakefield's 
theory because one would expect a precise and qualitative difference between the 
correct operation and dis operation of a mechanism according to the yardstick of 
adaptive function. While Wakefield has responded to this problem by suggesting that 
deviation from adaptively normal function may be gradual, as Lilienfeld and Marino 
note, this seriously undermines his theory. The central purpose of the theory being to 
establish a precise way of ascertaining abnormal function. If evolution provides no clear 
marker for deviance then there must be other more significant factors involved in the 
explication of mental disorder. 
Another problem for Wakefield's definition of mental disorder is the analysis of harm 
which he utilises. As mentioned earlier, this is said to be intimately connected with 
social values and expectations. Something which is harmful is only harmful in so far as 
it contradicts these values. The key difficulty with this approach is that it assumes too 
much commonality between people and diminishes the significance of purely SUbjective 
variables. There is more to harm than the social dimension. Harm is first and foremost, 
something which is experienced. The social evaluation of harm must include an 
evaluation of the experience. And the experience is not just a social one. With regard to 
psychological diagnosis, the evaluation of harm will be heavily influenced by social 
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forces but these may still be distinguished from individual or subjective factors. The 
point here is that Wakefield fails to acknowledge in his definition the personal 
component of mental disorder. The DSM includes this with the notion of distress, but 
for Wakefield distress is a socially determined phenomenon as opposed to a personally 
experienced one. 
And while Wakefield addresses the social as well as the biological dimensions of 
mental disorder, Wakefield's analysis relies on a link between evolutionally determined 
biology, and society, both of which must correlate according to his definition. However, 
societies are not always controlled by evolutionary design, and do not always value 
behaviours which enhance survival. It has, for many years, been fashionable in a 
number of Western societies, to bathe oneself in the sun. For whatever reason, being 
tanned has been highly valued. So much so, that people sometimes expose themselves 
to the sun until their skin becomes burnt, in order to darken their skin colour. In the 
long term this behaviour can have serious effects on health. Thinness is also valued and 
attaining the extreme thinness which is considered to be desirable can cause physical 
harm. These behaviours are valued yet their value is not clearly tied to evolutionally 
directed goals, in other words they have no 'natural' benefits. In his book, "The Sane 
Society", Erich Fromm (1956) states: 
The fact that millions of people share the same vices does not make these 
vices virtues, the fact that they share so many errors does not make the errors 
to be truths, and the fact that millions of people share the same forms of 
mental pathology does not make these people sane (p. 15). 
There is a tendency to equate commonality with sanity. As if to say that commonality of 
value is evidence of the acceptability of that value. Similarly Wakefield asserts that the 
normal and natural operation of mental mechanisms will correlate with common social 
value, but there is no reason why it must. The lives of human beings have changed 
markedly. Hence it can be assumed that the mental mechanisms which would have been 
utilised by our ancestors several millennia ago are the same ones which human beings 
are using today. Evolutionary change is slow; much slower than social change, and 
hence it could not possibly match the whimsical changes in value which occur in social 
groups. Arguably human nature is constrained to some extent by evolution, however 
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unlike other animals we can use our innate abilities in novel ways, hence manipulating 
the basic predetemlined capacities with which we were endowed, in search of rewards 
which may have little or nothing to do with procreation. 
The point which is obviously related to one made earlier, is that there is no reason to 
believe that biology and society converge in the manifestation and understanding of 
mental disorder. According to Wakefield psychopathology involves disruptions of both 
biological and social order thereby assuming that there will be commonality. However 
based on the argument outlined earlier, detailing the relative stasis of the hominid brain 
throughout a period in which there were many important social changes, there may be 
no such commonality. It is possible, then, that a behaviour which is dis valued or 
considered to be deviant will not necessarily have a corresponding biological basis.4 
Supportive of this view is the appearance and subsequent disappearance of some 
disorders in various diagnostic manuals. Obviously the condition termed 
'drapetomania' had no biological basis and was strongly socio-politically embedded. 
More recently homosexuality was removed from diagnostic manuals and in the most 
recent edition of the DSM, passive/aggressive personality disorder was removed. Oddly 
though Wakefield uses these examples to support his argument. He suggests, though 
not explicitly, that in retrospect drapetomania was not a mental disorder, but rather a 
convenient label for a behaviour which was at that time disvalued. Obviously nobody 
wanted their slaves to escape. Homosexuality is treated similarly - as not a genuine 
mental disorder. Homosexuality does not appear to be characterised by dysfunction, 
therefore its inclusion in previous diagnostic manuals would seem to be due entirely to 
socio-political factors. Wakefield's interpretation of such examples discounts the very 
important fact that at one time these conditions were valid diagnostic categories. This 
clearly demonstrates the opposite argument - that mental disorders do not depend 
primarily on biological indicators, but rather may be strongly influenced by societal 
norms. 
4 The biological basis referred to here is not necessarily manifest in physiology. Wakefield (1997) 
explains that mental dysfunction is not dependent on, or rooted in, brain dysfunction. Rather mental 
disorder involves the disruption of psychological mechanisms which mayor may not be associated with 
malfunction in the brain. The term biological above is used only to describe the evolutional aspect of 
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Wakefield attempts to distinguish these 'bogus' disorders from genume ones by 
claiming that 'real' disorders are out there in the world regardless of the explication and 
understanding of them. So drapetomania was never a mental disorder because it had no 
dysfunction component. A genuine disorder, on the other hand, is believed to have a 
natural instantiation. Lilienfeld and Moreno argue that this is Wakefield's central error. 
They state that his conceptualisation of disorder, " ... may actually prolong scientific 
debate on a fundamentally non-scientific issue" (p. 418). They suggest that disputes 
concerning which conditions require intervention should be settled according to the 
application of social values and social need, rather than on the basis of poorly defined 
criteria of dubious scientific standing. 
SUMMARY 
As demonstrated, there are a number of problems with contemporary defmitions of 
mental disorder. The definition provided in the DSM-N has two main weaknesses. 
Firstly it fails to provide sufficient detail of the concept of dysfunction - it states only 
that the dysfunction may be behavioural, psychological or biologica1. And secondly in 
describing the cultural dimension of disorder it utilises the concept of expectability 
which is determined according to statistical norms. Essentially what is meant by the 
term dysfunction (in the DSM definition) is the breakdown of physiological systems. 
This captures the biological dimension of mental disorder. But there is no explanation 
of what normal function is and how normal and abnormal function can be understood. 
In terms of the social aspect, normality is determined by statistical frequency, but as 
argued, this is problematic because something which is unusual is not always harmful. 
Wakefield circunmavigates this problem by focusing on the concept of 'harm'. 
According to Wakefield, the social dimension of disorder is manifested in the ascription 
of social value, which determines when and if something is harmfu1. So in line with the 
beliefs and customs of particular cultures, certain behaviours will be considered 
harmfu1. But this need not rest on a statistical analysis of expectability. What is believed 
Wakefield's definition. For more detail on the role of evolution in the understanding of psychological 
mechanisms refer to Buss (1995) who presents a comprehensive analysis of it. 
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to be hannful will probably also be epidemiologically rare, but this is not an essential 
criterion. In response to the other weakness of the DSM definition, Wakefield 
construes the notion of dysfunction as the failure of 'internal mechanisms' to operate 
according to their evolutionary 'design'. In this way he ties dysfunction finnly to 
biology and he uses the idea of adaptive function to detennine nonnality. But as argued, 
Wakefield's definition also has some drawbacks. His analysis of dysfunction, while 
more detailed than the DSM's, runs into difficulties at the point at which it evokes 
evolution as a way of demarcating nonnal function. On investigation, evolution has 
little explanatory depth and seems to result in more questions than answers, in response 
to the various issues. 
Also, Wakefield's definition fails to acknowledge individual variables. This, in 
contrast, is one of the strengths of the DSM definition. With the concept of distress, the 
DSM definition pennits a personal, subjective dimension which is overtly absent in 
Wakefield's analysis. According to Wakefield mental disorder is a 'hannful 
dysfunction' wherein hann is necessarily dependant on social consensus. But hann is 
not only a social phenomenon. The experience of hann, while mediated by social 
forces, retains an important core of that which is quintessentially personal. It is 
important to allow for individual variables in the definition of psychopathology. Above 
all, mental illness is something that is experienced and whether it is essentially 
biological or social, it manifests in people and different people will experience it 
differently. 
Another problem with Wakefield's definition of mental disorder is its inflexibility with 
regard to its two key components. According to Wakefield, a disorder has two 
necessary and sufficient conditions - hann and dysfunction. Both of these must be 
present for a condition to be classed as a disorder. As argued this is problematic because 
it entails that these two aspects will converge however this remains an unsubstantiated 
assumption. This analysis does not allow for the possibility that some disorders may not 
have a biological origin and a corresponding dysfunctional mental mechanism. 
Wakefield clearly supports a bio-medical model of psychopathology even though he 
appears to give equal status to the concept of hann. 
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According to both Wakefield and the DSM, mental disorder is rooted in mechanistic 
dysfunction, in other words it has a natural instantiation. It involves a breakdown of 
mental processes in the same way that medical disorders involve the breakdown of 
physiological processes. As discussed earlier this approach has been characterised as 
following the medical (or bio-medical) model of psychopathology which views mental 
disorders as discrete diagnostic entities. The following chapter examines how this 




THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
MENTAL DISORDER 
Like all sciences, psychology relies on classification to systematise knowledge and 
enable explanation and understanding of the field. Old Hindu Scriptures suggest that as 
long ago as 1000 BC, attempts were made to classify mental disorders (Scharfetter & 
Stassen, 1995). Classification is fundamental, not only to scientific endeavours, but also 
to the undertakings and understandings which lay people execute during everyday, 
mundane activities. And Sokal (1974) suggests that even before the evolution of Homo 
sapiens, an ability to classify would have been of general adaptive significance across 
many animal species. Without classification our thoughts and memories would be a 
hotchpotch of complex and perhaps meaningless data. Classification provides a way of 
organising information, so that we can learn, and communicate about, the world around 
us. Millon (1991) describes classification (in the field of psychopathology) as " ... a 
procedure for constructing groups or categories and for assigning entities (disorders or 
persons) to these categories on the basis for their shared attributes or relations (p. 246). 
Systems of knowledge use classification to divide objects and phenomena into particular 
groups according to certain principles or theories, so as to allow explanation and 
understanding of them. For example, in order to explain a meteorological phenomenon 
it would be necessary to divide up the different sorts of matter, and for ease of 
communication, to ascribe labels to them. Things which might be important would be 
clouds, air pressure, and precipitation. The weather system would be described 
according to these sorts of concepts, so different types of matter and events would be put 
into the appropriate categories and the weather would be explained in tenns of these 
particular labels and the interaction between them. As expressed by Millon, the 
grouping principle is commonality; objects or events are categorised according to 
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similarity so a category will consist of objects or events which share common "attributes 
or relations". 
Although similarity plays a key role in categorisation, this role is guided by the overall 
goal of the classification process. This point is succinctly expressed by Medin (1989). 
He states: "Categorisation involves treating two or more entities as in some way 
equivalent in the service of accessing knowledge and making predictions" (p. 1469). 
The equivalence which is noted is not arbitrary; rather it is construed in terms of certain 
preconceived goals, although these goals might be altered according to information 
which is yielded by the classification procedure and the utilisation of this procedure. 
Categories and their boundaries, will be created according to knowledge which is 
already available and the type of knowledge and predictive power which is desired. To 
put it simply, the apprehension of similarity occurs within a theoretical framework, one 
that adheres to basic scientific principles (or at least aspires to). 
Like the natural sciences, although classification in psychopathology is to some extent a 
theoretical exercise, it should be noted that its goals are predominantly pragmatic, as 
explained by Bassett and Beiser (1991). They state: "The primary goal of a diagnostic 
classification system in a clinical setting is to communicate information useful in 
making treatment and management decisions about patients" (p. 273 ). Poland, Eckardt 
& Spalding (1996) suggest that there are two main purposes for psychiatric nosologies: 
to improve the efficacy of clinical activity and to optimise scientific research 
programmes which are concerned with the understanding and treatment of mental 
disorder. According to Edlund (1986) there are three main uses of psychiatric 
classifications: to elucidate causal mechanisms, to predict the course of illness, and to 
determine public health requirements. Perhaps the ultimate objective of classification in 
this field, is the successful treatment of people who have mental disorders. Hence the 
supreme test of the categorical system's efficacy will be a measure of this success. 
Although this chapter will be largely concerned with theoretical issues, it is important 
not to lose sight of the 'human' objectives. 
The impetus of classification is usefully, although simplistically, illustrated by the 
example of meteorological phenomena. Imagine a weather forecast which does not 
26 
utilise classification. Such an image is difficult to generate. Different cloud names, such 
as cirrostratus and cumulonimbus are necessary because different cloud types have 
different environmental effects. Without classification, it would be difficult to explain 
the relationships between phenomena and moreover it may be impossible to 
communicate anything at all, about the event considering that language itself relies on 
categorisation. The utility of this type of classification, which is common in the general 
sciences, where empirical phenomena provide the basis of the categorical system, is 
obvious. Unfortunately infonnation within the social sciences is by its very nature, more 
difficult to classify. This is particularly true of psychiatry and psychology where the goal 
is to explain human behaviour with reference to subjective states and internal 
mechanisms which are not readily amenable to empirical study. As described by Millon, 
diagnosis involves the identification of 'clinical attributes', the ascertainment of which 
is rather more complex than say, the identification of a cloud or a bolt of lightning. The 
difficulty of acquiring empirical infonnation of this kind is only one problem for 
psychiatric classification. Others include establishing thresholds of clinical significance 
and delineating one disorder from another, although both of these problems are in part 
due to empirical issues. 
Historically classification in clinical psychology and in medicine has been notably 
under-researched (Parshall & Priest, 1993) and probably under-discussed. However in 
recent years topics in this area have received more attention (Spitzer, 1991; Stein, 1993). 
Taxonomy in psychopathology, remains though, a complex and challenging field, 
distinguished by a number of unresolved conundrums. The goal of this chapter is to 
elucify the workings of classification and to outline and discuss some of the primary 
Issues. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
As explained above and explicitly stated by Barlow (1991): "Classification is at the 
heart of any science". Understanding the way that it operates is therefore vital to the 
comprehension and advancement of knowledge. It may seem on the face of it, that the 
process of classification is straightforward. All that is required is an analysis of the 
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characteristics of say, objects, and the allotment of these objects to particular categories, 
based on the nature of the characteristics. Needless to say, there is more to it - as already 
noted this type of process is difficult when the subject-matter is human mental disorders. 
To understand why this subject-matter is problematic it is helpful to look at the 
theoretical underpinnings of classification. 
This theoretical basis is not immediately obvious. Classification has become so 
commonplace that its philosophical roots are often forgotten. There has however been a 
revival of interest in the subject in recent years, yielding several enlightening analyses. 
One such analysis by Schwartz and Wiggins (1986) discusses the influence of logical 
empiricism on psychiatric classification. The focus of the paper is on the ideas of Carl 
Hempel, who at the invitation of prominent psychiatrists of the day, wrote extensively 
on the theoretical foundations of systems of classification in the context of 
psychopathology. According to Schwartz and Wiggins, Hempel's logical empiricism has 
had an enormous influence on recent editions of the DSM. As a particular philosophy of 
science and a guiding metatheory, logical empiricism has been widely endorsed as the 
best approach for the taxonomy of mental disorders (Kendell, 1975 &1983), and 
Hempel is one of the theory's more recent and most rigorous advocates. 
Hempel claims that scientific terms have two primary functions. Firstly, to provide 
descriptions of observable data and secondly, to carry out functions within the context of 
"general laws and theories" ( Hempel 1965, pp 139-140 ). He relates this view to the 
classification of psychopathology, claiming that like other sciences, this field also 
utilises these two conceptual functions. Within the field of psychopathology, descriptive 
or observational data is symptomatology. Diagnostic categories generally consist of 
symptom lists which specify particular cognitive, emotional or behavioural conditions. 
The laws and theories which Hempel refers to are involved in the postulation of 
etiologies and etiological mechanisms. Hempel claims that an analysis of etiology must 
be interpreted as a quest for theories which will predict and explain disorders. While this 
process should be tied to descriptive data, it is fundamentally theoretical, involving the 
formulation of theories which can explain empirical phenomena. 
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So logical empiricism claims that scientific tenns should not only be closely linked to 
empirical phenomena but should also fit into a theoretical framework. The process by 
which this is achieved is referred to, by Hempel as explication (Hempel, 1970). As 
stated by Schwartz and Wiggins (1986): "An explication of a tenn combines a meaning 
analysis with an empirical analysis of it" (p 105). A meaning analysis consists of what 
the tenn 'means' to the people who use it, and includes the different ways and contexts 
in which it is used. An empirical analysis, on the other hand, is concerned with the 
description of characteristics which anything must have in order to be allocated a 
particular label. These factors can be viewed as different sorts of verification. The 
meaning analysis measures the extent to which a particular tenn is successful in 
conveying particular infonnation. It detennines whether or not a concept embodies the 
meaning for which it was intended. The empirical analysis measures the connection or 
correlation between the concept and its corresponding worldly manifestations. This 
analysis looks at the empirical data which the concept is supposed to represent. 
Notions of both observable and theoretical data are considered to be equally important. 
This theme is further elaborated with Hempel's concepts of "empirical import" and 
"systematic import" which he says ensure that tenns are entirely scientific (Hempel, 
1965). The fonner refers to the match between tenns and their empirical correlates and 
should ensure that diagnostic criteria refer to specific symptoms. The latter refers to the 
place that particular tenns have within a theoretical network and should ensure that 
diagnostic criteria are embodied within general laws and theories. Hempel believes that 
empirical import is best achieved through the use of operational definitions although he 
states that within the field of psychiatry (which is not conducive to the delineation of 
exact boundaries and readily observable mechanisms) these definitions will exhibit less 
precision than in the general sciences. 
Systematic import, on the other hand, is established by ensuring that concepts perfonn 
functions within general laws and theories. For instance a concept which has a narrow 
focus should be interconnected with the broader theoretical picture of similar or related 
phenomena. For example the way that different symptoms are clustered together to fonn 
particular disorders exhibits systematic import. This is done according to laws and 
theories about symptoms and the relationship between symptoms. It is useful at this 
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point to postulate a circular model in order to understand Hempel's conception of this 
relationship. The theoretical system creates a framework within which new theories and 
new observations are understood. The observations in tum shape the theoretical 
framework, giving rise to a dynamic process wherein the advancement of knowledge 
involves repeated modifications to the status quo. With regard to this dynamic process 
McHugh and Slavney (1983) state that, " ... concepts and operations live in reciprocal 
relationship, and progress comes as each enhances and modifies the other" (p. 8). 
As already mentioned, Schwartz and Wiggins (1986) claim that Hempel's logical 
empiricism has been influential in recent editions of the DSM . The development of the 
DSM-III represented a significant shift towards a more empirically based classification 
system. Previous editions relied more heavily on theory, especially psychoanalytic 
theory. The recent emphasis on descriptive information in the form of more accurate 
symptom lists, allows extensive use of the DSM by clinicians who have a diverse array 
of theoretical beliefs. Its practical use can be divorced from the issues related to 
theoretical explanations of mental disorder, which are many and varied. ill fact, the 
DSM-III and III-R make their position on this matter explicit by stating that they are 
atheoretical. The DSM-N on the other hand avoids any reference to theory. However, 
clearly this position is problematic. According to a logical empiricist approach, which 
developers of the third DSM were apparently following, theory must play an important 
role in the formation of taxonomies. The way that various symptoms are grouped 
together should be representative of prevailing theories about syndromes and the 
particular mental and physiological mechanisms which these syndromes are thought to 
involve. 
It seems that those involved in the development of the DSM-III were so focused on the 
need for a more strongly empirically based manual that they overlooked the significance 
of theory and in so doing, failed to uphold their logical empiricist ideals. Follette and 
Houts (1996) write: " ... while adopting the accoutrements oflogical empiricism such as 
"operational definition" and "scientific progress" the modem DSMs have also 
abandoned the substance of that philosophy of science" (p. 1126). The failure to 
explicate theory in recent editions of the DSM amounts to a serious shortfall In 
scientific rigour. Theory is central to all forms of scientific endeavour. Hypotheses can 
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not be adequately tested if they have not been adequately expressed. And if they can not 
be tested then they can not be falsified; falsifiability being an important and perhaps 
essential component of progress in science (Lakatos, 1974; Popper, 1969).5 
It is a mistake to assume that a classification system is atheoretical simply because it 
touts a foundation of empirical fact (Blashfield & Livesly, 1991; Millon, 1991). 
Arguably no classification system can be entirely atheoretical. Discussing the 
development of the DSM-N Spitzer predicts that " ... when fmal decisions are made 
about the DSM-N, they will still be based primarily on expert consensus, rather than on 
data, as was the case with the DSM-III and DSM-IIl-R" (p. 294). Having had a leading 
role in the development of the DSM-III and its revised edition, Spitzer is one of few 
theorists in this field with intimate knowledge of his subject matter. Elaborating on the 
above comment he claims that most of the proposed modifications to the manual are 
based on 'conceptual concerns' rather than on new empirical data. He provides some 
examples such as the proposal to exclude from the manual, the category of organic 
mental disorders, the proposal to give greater weight to negative symptoms in the 
delineation of schizophrenia and the proposal to incorporate pain disorders in the 
manual in the form of a major diagnostic class. Interestingly the DSM-III-R, in 
describing the decision-making which was involved in produCing the manual openly 
states: 
"Most advisory committee decisions were the result of consensus that emerged 
among committee members. However, several controversies, particularly in the 
areas of childhood, psychotic, anxiety and sleep disorders, could be resolved 
only by actually polling committee members" (AP A, 1987, p. xx). 
Clearly, the investigative process which culminated in the DSM-N was dependant on 
both theoretical and empirical issues and that is exactly as Hempel would have it. 
Hempel admits that the application of logical empiricism within psychiatry gives rise to 
some unique difficulties. For example, in relation to the use of operational definitions he 
states that the concept of 'operation' should be interpreted in a liberal sense (Hempel, 
1965); probably because many diagnostic criteria are not readily observable, but are 
rather as Poland et. al (1995) point out " ... highly inferential in character (e.g. 
5Palsifiability will be discussed more extensively in chapter 10. 
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hallucinations, delusions, loss of interest, depressed mood)" (p. 240). Hempel claims 
nonetheless that strict operational criteria for all diagnostic categories should be the aim 
of psychiatric nosology. 
Whether this goal is attainable is debatable, however it seems that this is one view 
which has influenced contemporary approaches to the classification of 
psychopathology. But what other philosophies have contributed to recent DSMs? 
Broadly speaking, these manuals adhere to a positivist position wherein knowledge is 
seen to depend on the facts of the world and accordingly the ultimate test of truth is the 
fit between theory and data (Stein, 1991). This philosophy has its roots in the writings 
of Comte, Mill, Berkeley, and Hume all of whom can be described as empiricists.6 
Positivism and empiricism are consistent with the bio-medical, disease model of mental 
disorder outlined in the previous chapter. As explained therein, mental disorders are 
seen as discrete entities which are materially instantiated in the form of 
psychophysiological dysfunction. This conception of mental disorder is evidenced in 
the DSM's categorical approach wherein syndromes are presented as distinct entities 
with their own unique pattern of objective signs7 (Nelson-Gray, 1991; Salzinger, 1986). 
Positivism is just one way of describing the DSM's medical-oriented approach to the 
understanding of psychopathology. Follette, Houts & Hayes (1992) describe this 
approach as following the 'discovery narrative' of science. This narrative, they claim, is 
one way of explaining historical and social events. Essentially, different narratives are 
simply different ways of understanding and interpreting science. The discovery 
narrative sees science as the uncovering of objective truth which can be achieved 
through the application of specific rules and procedures. Follette et al. contrast this with 
the invention narrative which views science as a 'constructive' activity dependent not 
only on matters of 'fact' but also on social judgement and social need. According to the 
authors, it is the discovery narrative which has shaped and continues to shape the field 
of psychopathology. They claim: "Mental health professionals are steeped in the 
discovery narrative" (p. 326). Their point is that this particular understanding of the 
6 The positivist tradition is typically contrasted with the hermeneutic tradition which sees knowledge as 
necessarily dependent on subjective understanding (Stein, 1991). In this respect and many others 
positivism is indistinguishable from empiricism (A dictionary of philosophy, 1979). 
7 The DSM's categorical approach will be discussed in more detail later. 
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study and application of clinical psychology and psychiatry has become so profoundly 
entrenched that it is rarely challenged or even noticed. 
According to Follette et al. (1992), the discovery narrative was formally accepted in the 
field of psychopathology with the inception of the DSM -ill - the first diagnostic manual 
to adopt the methodology of medical science. Like purely physical conditions, mental 
disorders were theorised to have biological underpinnings whether or not these had yet 
been 'discovered'. And thereafter this approach became the accepted one perhaps with 
the promise, Follette et al. suggest, " ... That ... medical science will yield the same 
remarkable results for behaviour problems that it has with heart disease and 
tuberculosis" (p. 325). Obviously this remains to be seen. 
HOW DOES CLASSIFICATION WORK? 
As mentioned earlier classification is based on relations of similarity, and similarity is 
perceived or perhaps construed according to a specific set of characteristics and the 
proposed association between them. It is not simply a matter of noting observable data. 
Rather, the procedure involves the application of theories of ontology and the influence 
of practical objectives. To ensure that concepts function correctly Hempel claims that 
their empirical and systematic import must be regularly evaluated; that is, one must 
check that they have a clear empirical basis and that they convey the intended meaning. 
Concepts should refer to the objects or phenomena which comprise their categories. In 
his comprehensive analysis of concepts and categories, Medin (1989) makes the 
following important points: 
Roughly, a concept is an idea that includes all that is characteristically 
associated with it. A category is a partitioning or class to which some 
assertion or set of assertions might apply. It is tempting to think: of 
categories as existing in the world and of concepts as corresponding to 
mental representations of them, but this analysis is misleading ... The world 
could be partitioned in a limitless variety of ways, yet people find only a 
minuscule subset of possible classifications to be meaningful. Part of the 
answer to the categorisation question likely does depend on the nature of the 
world, but part also surely depends on the nature of the organism and its 
goals. Dolphins have no use for psychodiagnostic categories (p.1469.). 
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Medin's comment is cruciaL We should at all times note, that although concepts and 
categories are often based on empirical facts, they are also powerfully related to human 
nature and human objectives. We use categories of mental disorders to understand and 
treat particular conditions. The delineation of categories is as much dependant on these 
factors as it is on simple empirical data. Moreover the interpretation of empirical data is 
itself influenced by such factors. The way that phenomena are perceived and interpreted 
is dependant on the conceptual systems which are already employed. For instance when 
a test of neurophysiological functioning is carried out, results are interpreted according 
to the way that the brain is currently understood. Different areas of the brain are 
believed have different functions and particular neuro-chemicals are thought to be 
involved in particular types of cognitive activity. For example the hippocampus is often 
implicated in memory dysfunction and therefore studies of memory function often focus 
on changes to this brain structure. The interpretation of raw empirical data will 
inevitably be significantly affected by this prevailing understanding of brain structure 
and functioning. 
In his discussion of conceptual structure, Medin takes a close look at similarity, showing 
that it is more complex than one might intuitively believe. It is guided by often elusive 
principles and theories which reveal a profound and intriguing conceptual framework. In 
an examination of this framework, Medin claims that there has recently been a shift 
from the classical view to the probabilistic view of concepts. The classical view claims 
that members of a category share some basic characteristics and that a mental 
representation of a category consists of a list of characteristics which are necessary and 
sufficient for membership. Medin identifies a number of problems for this view, two of 
which are stated below: 
1. Some examples of concepts are believed to be more typical than others, 
e.g. A robin is a more typical example of a bird than a penguin. 
2. It is often impossible to list defining features and when achieved this can 
preclude prospective members: it is extremely difficult to determine 
necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The classical view can not account for typicality effects, such as that expressed by the 
first point; its approach, it seems, incorporates a rigidity which is not representative of 
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common conceptual practice. Concepts do not always have precise boundaries; they are 
often only loosely defmed (Smith, Rips and Medin, 1984). The possibility, therefore, 
that extensive lists can be devised which include all features is remote. Characteristics 
can vary greatly across members; a robin and a penguin are both types of bird but a 
robin is believed to be more representative of that class. This type of discriminatory 
effect can not be explained by the classical approach. 
The downfall of the classical view is related to the rise in popularity of the probabilistic 
view. This view states that category membership utilises the notion of typification, a 
notion which poses difficulty for the classical account. 8 According to this theory, 
categories are organised around prototypes or exemplars which typify the category, by 
incorporating all the most essential characteristics. Categories and their boundaries are 
in this case only loosely defined, and members may have all or only few of these 
important characteristics. Hence a penguin may be described as a less typical or 
exemplary type of bird, than a robin. The approach to categorisation, of the DSM-IV -
and its recent predecessors - is an example of the probabilistic view (Medin, 1989; 
Frances et aI, 1991; Carson, 1991). Many disorders consist of symptom lists which may 
be manifested in a number of different ways. For example, depression may be diagnosed 
if dysphoric mood occurs with any five of the other nine possible symptoms. So two 
people with the same diagnosis may have quite different symptom patterns, and one 
person who is depressed may be described as a more typical case than another with the 
same diagnosis. 
Typicality, like similarity is related to theories and objectives as expressed in the 
following excerpt from Schwartz and Wiggins (1987): 
Typifications, in general terms, are situation tied or project determined ... 
Typifications are one sided. One set of typifications will give access to only 
certain features of things and people. A Different set of typifications will 
have to be applied in order to gain access to other features of the same things 
and persons (p.72). 
8 A detailed account of typification is given in an article of the same name by Schwartz and Wiggins, 
1987. 
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Something is deemed typical in relation to a particular aim or theoretical view. Killing a 
human being in the context of war is not classed as a criminal act, however killing 
during times and places of peace will bring a charge of murder and severe punishment. 
The context of objects, behaviour and events is important to typification and the 
categorisation process. As explained by Medin a category consisting of " ... children, 
money, photo albums and pets," may seem strange, until it is revealed that the category 
consists of things which should be removed from a house when there is a fire risk. 
Notice that generally these things have little in common, yet they can all fit into one 
category. It is this type of example which is problematic for the view that similarity 
alone is the driving force of conceptual organisation. 
Medin presents the view that similarity should include "attributes, relations and higher-
order relations." So, similarity is not simply a matter of noting observable or other 
equally tangible features. Rather it involves perceiving and interpreting properties 
according to conceptual organisation and structural systems. For instance, Medin and 
Shoben's (1988) investigation of this process, found that grey hair and white hair were 
believed to be more similar than grey hair and black hair but that grey clouds and white 
clouds were believed to be less similar than grey clouds and black clouds. One 
interpretation of this is that grey and white hair are interrelated by the theory of ageing 
while grey clouds and black clouds, may both be a sign of bad weather. This simple 
example captures the thrust of the present exposition; that the postulation of similarity is 
guided by theory, and hence so too is categorisation. 
THE DSM CLASSIFICATION 
As mentioned above the DSM takes a probabilistic categorical approach to the 
classification of mental disorder.9 Poland et al. (1996) refer to the DSM classification as 
a " ... mixed monothetic/polythetic, lenient, categorical approach" (p. 240). In a 
monothetic taxonomy, each category is associated with a distinct group of criteria which 
are individually necessary and together sufficient for category membership. In contrast a 
polythetic taxonomy allows for the differential grouping of criteria. In this case no 
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individual criterion is considered necessary and several different combinations of 
criteria are sufficient for category inclusion. The DSM uses both monothetic and 
polythetic criteria in its delineation of mental disorders, meaning that there is a 
combination of both essential and nonessential conditions in its various categories. For 
example, as explained above, a diagnosis of depression requires the presence of 
dysphoric mood or loss of interest and pleasure, however either of these primary 
symptoms may be coupled with any five of the other listed criteria. 
The categorical approach to classification requires little explanation. Most importantly it 
is non-quantitative and absolutist; that is categories are seen as discrete entities with 
particular criteria sets which determine in an all-or-nothing sort of way, whether 
category membership is met. Rosch and Lloyd (1978) describe this as the "in or out" 
model - as compared to the prototypical model - of categorisation. Importantly, the 
categorical approach embodies the bio-medical model of mental disorder, wherein signs 
and symptoms of particular disorders are thought to indicate the presence of a disease 
entity (Clementz & Lacono, 1993). Proponents of this approach assume that the various 
disorders are qualitatively different from each other and also that they are qualitatively 
different from normal functioning. 
Poland et al. (1996) describe the DSM's approach as a 'lenient' categorical one, as there 
is some overlap between some of its diagnostic categories and there are some 'mixed' 
and 'residual' categories. An example of a mixed category is schizo affective disorder, 
which allows for the combination of the primary symptoms of schizophrenia and 
depression. A residual category refers to conditions which have some of the features of a 
disorder but not enough to warrant the formal diagnosis of that syndrome. For instance, 
depressive disorder not otherwise specified and psychotic disorder not otherwise 
specified. Another example of the DSM's flexibility is the fact that there are in some 
cases numerous ways to meet the criteria for diagnosis. For example there are apparently 
93 different ways of meeting the criteria for a diagnosis of borderline personality 
disorder (Frances, Pincus, Widiger, Davis, & First, 1990). 
9 I will be referring throughout, indiscriminately, to the 'DSM' as most of the researchers in this area 
discuss the general approach of recent manuals without reference to anyone in particular. 
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Also central to the DSM classification is the multi-axial organisation of the manual, 
which groups disorders into a number of general kinds and encourages clinicians to 
simultaneously consider alternative dimensions of pathology when formulating a 
diagnosis. This means that an individual may be given multiple, yet not contradictory 
diagnoses. This approach allows for the consideration of a wide range of factors in the 
process of clinical assessment. While this and other changes, represent advances in 
recent decades, in the DSM's approach to the taxonomy of mental disorder, a number of 
researchers claim that it falls short of what is required (e.g. Carson, 1991; Poland et aI., 
1996). One of the main criticisms refers to the continued use of an essentially 
categorical approach. Carson writes: " ... what evidence do we have that the objectively 
seamless bleedings of disordered behaviour actually presented to clinicians are 
manifestations of the fmite and discontinuous set of underlying dysfunctional entities 
envisaged by a taxonomic system of the classical categorical variety?" (p. 302). 
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Figure 1. The growth of successive editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM). Versions I, II, III, m-R, and IV are the fIrst, second, third, 
revised third, and fourth editions, respectively. 10 
Similarly Follette et al. (1992) note the proliferation of diagnostic categories in the 
DSMs and question the supposition that this represents the discovery of more and more 
disorders. Figure I shows the expansion from each manual to the next in the number of 
pages, and the number of diagnostic labels. Follette and colleagues suggest that 
'discovery' in science should lead to simplification in classification, and hence a 
10 This graph is copied from the article by Follette and Houts (1996). 
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reduction in the number of categories rather than a proliferation of new labels. 
Comparing psychiatry to another science, they note Hempel's observation that as biology 
has progressed, with the incorporation of evolutionary theory, there has been a reduction 
in the number of categories. With the appearance of evolutionary theory classification 
was no longer dependant on external features but on phylogenetic and genetic 
characteristics. Within psychiatry such internal structures and internal mechanisms are 
typically unknown. 
The categorical system is organised according to the view that there are clear boundaries 
between disorders but generally this is not the way that things occur in nature (Frances et 
aI, 1991; Thakker, in press). As pointed out by Carson, this is especially apparent in the 
domain of psychopathology. This problem is acknowledged in the DSM-IV with the 
proposal that although disorders are presented as apparently distinct entities, this may 
not be the case. Clinicians are requested to exercise discretion in this regard, and also 
with respect to the delineation of the therapeutic range of a disorder. Boundaries between 
different disorders and between the manifestation or non-manifestation of disorders are 
believed to be "fuzzy". ill this sense, as noted by Poland et al. (1996) the DSM's 
approach is not 'strictly' categorical. 
The issue of whether the categorical model is the best way to conceptualise mental 
disorders has been widely discussed. ill recent years there has been burgeoning interest 
in the prospect of adopting a dimensional rather than a categorical approach (Widiger, 
1992). Dimensional systems of classification assume that there are no dichotomies, 
groups or types. Rather, the symptoms of various mental disorders are thought to reflect 
quantitative deviations from normal functioning. This deviation is measured along a 
number of different dimensions, such as affective stability and anxiety. Proponents of 
this approach to the classification of psychopathology claim that present systems, such as 
the DSM, employ arbitrary cut-off points (Clementz & Lacono, 1993). And they propose 
that diagnosis would be more accurate and effective if patients were, rather, rated along 
the continuums of a number of dimensions. 11 
11 Dimensional approaches to the delineation of mental disorder are discussed in more detail in the last 
chapter. 
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Whether or not the DSM is on the whole, an ideal or simply adequate classification 
system is not of primary concern here, although some of these issues will be discussed 
again in the final chapter. What I have attempted here, is not an in-depth analysis of the 
applicability or efficacy of the predominant contemporary approach, but rather a 
straightforward description of it. In order to gain an understanding of the utility of this 
approach in cross-cultural contexts it is first necessary to explain and elucidate its 
theoretical underpinnings. The following section looks at the intersection of 
classification and cross-cultural psychology. 
CLASSIFICATION AND CULTURE 
As mentioned earlier, the classification of mental phenomena is difficult because the 
subject matter is complex and diverse, and difficult to measure. Rather than looking at 
biological structure or chemical reactious, the objects of psychiatric investigation might 
include a subjective report of a 'feeling' or a cognitive state. There are probably different 
ways of reporting the same emotion and similar ways of reporting different emotions, 
because people can feel, think, and behave differently in the advent of similar external 
and internal stimuli. Conversely, in the case of a chemical reaction, it is possible for all 
aspects of an event to be readily observable, resulting in an analysis which is 
representative of all possible occurrences of the same chemical process. For example if 
sodium hydroxide is combined with hydrochloric acid the resulting reaction produces 
sodium chloride and water. In a controlled environment the experimental outcome can 
be predicted with complete certainty. In contrast, when the subject of study is human 
behaviour such predictability is usually impossible. 
However despite the complexity of 'mind' -related information and the idiosyncrasies 
that might accompany it, there is of course commonality. Human beings are 
physiologically very similar; we share similar historical backgrounds, as our ancestors 
were faced with the same basic challenges, such as acquiring food and getting along 
harmoniously with one another. All people developed language to communicate, all 
people experience emotion, and all people can think. Admittedly these are quite broad 
assumptions; the commonalities probably run deeper. Hence a cross-culturally applicable 
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classification of mental disorders should be straightforward, if mental phenomena and 
the disturbance of them are expressions of this 'natural' and common heritage. 
There are however strong social influences on many dimensions of human functioning. 
As the analysis of mental disorder in the previous chapter revealed, disorders also 
involve the disruption of socially determined norms. So a disorder has both 
physiological and social elements. A classification system which is utilised by a 
particular culture may therefore, to some extent, express the values of that culture. The 
inclusion of the disorder labelled depression, in the DSM-IV, suggests that this 
condition is devalued in western societies. However depressive symptomatology may 
not necessarily be viewed as disordered in other cultures. What is described here is the 
problem of relativity which is concisely expressed in the following statement by 
Schwartz and Wiggins: "We may say, then, that typifications provide only a perspectival 
apprehension of realities" (Schwartz and Wiggins, 1987, p.72). 
The way in which the world is conceptually carved up is dependant not only on 'hard' 
data but also on socially embedded objectives. What is deemed typical of an object or 
phenomenon is contingent upon the perspective of the decision makers. Accordingly it 
can be argued that those involved in classifying mental disorders in the West have a 
particular perspective which is representative of Western culture. Even if depression 
exists in other cultures, it may not manifest itself in the same way. The symptoms, 
including subjective understandings of the problem, could be different. The proposition 
here is that different symptoms could signify the same underlying disorder. This raises 
the question of whether it is conceptually possible for a disorder to have different 
symptoms considering that it is generally the symptoms themselves which signify or 
delineate the disorder. Furthermore, symptoms which are in fact alike across diverse 
cultural contexts may be interpreted dissimilarly by different cultures yielding different 
"perspectival apprehensions". 
Psychological phenomena may vary or show similarity at different levels. What is 
similar at the physiological level may vary at the behavioural or social level. This is 
because people can react to physiological and environmental stimuli in a variety of 
ways, according to societal expectations and etiquette. It is important when discussing 
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mental disorder to be aware of multilevel functioning and avoid generalising from one 
level to another. In a discussion of the heterogeneity of schizophrenia Tsuang et al 
(1990) presented several models showing the different levels of functioning which may 
be involved in this disorder. The discussion which was primarily oriented toward 
answering the question of whether schizophrenia is actually one disorder or a 
combination of several, proposed the view that heterogeneity at one level does not 
necessarily signify heterogeneity at another. What is relevant to this discussion is the 
idea that a disorder can vary at different levels. The aforementioned article presents a 
number of models depicting the possible relationship between three levels of 
psychological variables, which are: 
III Level I - etiology 
• Level 2 - pathophysiology 
til Level 3 symptoms 
Two of the proposals presented in Tsuang et aL's analysis of possible models, are: 
1. - that two different etiologies may utilise one common 
pathophysiological pathway 'enroute' to symptomatology. 
2. - that two different etiologies may be similar pathophysiologically but 
have some exclusive and some divergent symptoms. 
These suppositional models are presented as a framework for, developing understanding 
of schizophrenia, and planning investigations of it. It is likely that the same sort of 
model will be useful in the understanding of cross-cultural differences in 
psychopathology. In this case the addition of a fourth level may render it more 
appropriate. This level would be called something like 'socio-interpretal' and would 
refer to the interpretation and understanding of symptoms by particular social groups. 
This level allows for the possibility that symptoms of a particular disorder could be 
similar across cultures, but that the way the symptoms are understood could vary cross-
culturally. 
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Similarly Kapur (1987) states: 
Human mind and behaviour are very complicated phenomena; at whatever 
level we examine these, a variety of patterns can give rise to the same 
experience and many different kinds of experiences may be related to the same 
pattern depending on how it relates to other patterns which exist at that 
particular level at that particular phase in the person's life. 
Here again is the idea that one level of explanation does not map directly on to another. 
Rather different phenomena at one level may give rise to similar phenomena at another. 
Figure 2. shows Kapur's illustration of this proposed view of the connection between 
phenomena at different levels of analysis. Depicted are three neurotransmitters, NTI, 
NT2 & NT3. In this diagram, three different neurotransmitters have led to seven 
different types of distress experience. What is important here is the pattern of 
connections between various neurotransmitters. Kapur proposes that the symptom 
response produced by a particular neurochemical change, will depend on its interaction 
with other neurochemicals within the same system. In this way, a specific phenomenon 
at one level may give rise to a quite different phenomenon at another . 
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Figure 2. Diagram showing three neurotransmitters producing seven 
types of distress experience. 12 
12 This diagram has been copied from Kapur (1987, p. 45). Kapur suggests that a more accurate 
representation of the phenomenon would require a multidimensional image. Note the number eight at 
the lowest point of the diagram, which should read seven. (The misprint is in the original). 
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What I want to emphasise here, is the difficulty that classificatory systems face in 
dealing with multilevel phenomena. An analysis of one level may reveal very little 
about another. As explained in detail in the previous chapter, mental disorders exist in a 
social context. If social contexts vary then it is possible or perhaps even likely that 
mental disorders will vary cross-culturally. Using the proposed four level model (i.e. the 
modified version of Tsuang' s model), as a framework for understanding this variance, it 
is interesting and potentially revealing to ponder the depth of the differences. Perhaps 
similar events at the pathophysiological level could lead to quite different symptom 
patterns, as symptoms are more likely to be influenced by social value and expectation. 
For instance, in response to a stressful event a person in community 'x' could exhibit 
neurochemical changes and feel dysphoric and become withdrawn. In community 'y', 
however, the same stressful event could lead to the same pathophysiological changes 
and feelings, but the person could become aggressive. Obviously these sorts of 
differences could just as easily occur in two people from the same social group, the 
point though, is that symptom behaviour is shaped by socialisation in the same way that 
any behaviour is. Even though it is likely to be less controlled and purposeful it is still 
affected by the cultural context. 
Nikelly (1992) states: "Social class and culture influence how emotional distress is 
expressed". This is exactly the point. As psychopathology is often a response to 
environmental stressors, it is therefore, according to this view, obvious that different 
social groups will exhibit distinct symptomatological responses. It may appear that this 
argument involves the implicit assumption that lower level phenomena are most 
important with regard to the identification of a disorder and that they are more likely to 
be similar across cultures - as my example shows that this level is stable across differing 
social environments. This however is not the intention. No one level is believed to be 
more important than any other, in this regard. 
The problem of applying a predominantly mono-cultural classification system to 
persons of other cultures is openly acknowledged by the DSM-N: 
Diagnostic assessment can be especially challenging when a clinician from 
one ethnic or cultural group uses the DSM-N Classification to evaluate an 
individual from a different ethnic or cultural group. A clinician who is 
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unfamiliar with the nuances of an individual's cultural frame of reference 
may incorrectly judge as psychopathology those normal variations in 
behaviour, belief or experience that are particular to the individual's culture. 
(APA, 1994, p. xxiv). 
As noted here it is necessary, in the case of a cross-cultural diagnosis, for the clinician 
to familiarise him or herself with aspects of the client's culture. In many North 
American Indian tribes it is common to experience hearing voices of spirits calling from 
the spiritual realm to those who are living, after the death of a loved one. This 
experience is considered to be a normal part of the bereavement process (Kleinman, 
1988). This experience moreover, is not related to any subsequent problems, hence it 
would be a mistake to interpret it as psychotic. This illustrates Wakefield's view that 
mental disorders are significantly affected by social factors. Hence a classification 
system which categorises mental disorders according to the values of one particular 
culture will be of limited use in a cross-cultural diagnostic setting. The solution, as 
suggested in the DSM-IV, is that the clinician should learn as much as possible about 
the client's culture, and be sympathetic and sensitive to alternative ways of experiencing 
and understanding. This approach is supported by Nikelly (1992) who claims that in 
order to understand and diagnose 'subjective distress' and 'social impairment' one 
should be familiar with the 'language, symbols, beliefs, and values' which influence the 
person's attitude and reaction to stress. The DSM-N includes a section on culture-
specific disorders which should enable psychologists to recognise unique conditions and 
acknowledge the specificity and relativity of western diagnostic categories. 
The theoretical foundations of classification shed light on some of the issues which arise 
in cross-cultural psychology. As expressed in the previous section, the utilisation of 
theory, plays a vital role in the categorisation process. The basis of the classification 
system, which is dominated by logical empiricism shows the importance of both 
empirical and theoretical data. The analysis of categorisation and its use of similarity 
reiterated this point. With regard to the present discussion it should be noted that 
observable or empirical phenomena are apportioned according to theoretical and 
conceptual systems. Hence it is conceivable that there are other ways of categorising the 
phenomena. This is stated with the acknowledgement in mind, that such systems are 
often measured in terms of their utility. What may be valued on utilitarian grounds, in 
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one culture, may not be in another. Other cultures may have other ways of dividing up 
psychological data, yielding different but equally efficacious classification systems. 
It should be noted that the effects of classification systems are not limited to the clinical 
arena. Most people in Western societies would have some knowledge of major 
diagnostic categories and the symptoms which comprise them. Subsequently, behaviour, 
and specifically disordered behaviour may be influenced by the professional view. One 
wonders whether conditions such as anorexia nervosa would be as rife as they are today 
if they received less attention from the media. Perhaps widespread awareness of such 
conditions contributes to their manifestation; that is, individuals may be prompted, 
consciously or otherwise towards a certain type of pathological behaviour. Investigating 
the stereotypes of mental illness, Schoeneman, Segerstrom, Griffin and Gresham (1993) 
state in their conclusion: " ... that category knowledge can be possessed by and affect the 
behaviour of those who are categorised as well as those who apply categories to others" 
(p.450). 
There is an important and complex interaction between popular and professional 
understandings of psychopathology. Commenting. on this interaction Schoeneman et al. 
claim that both are "are products of social discourse" (p. 451). It is a dynamic two-way 
relationship between social convention and expert understanding which determines both 
popular and professional views on mental disorder. Arguably then, the bio-medical 
approach with its related thesis of universality can be challenged. Ifmental disorders are 
to some extent culturally embedded then diagnostic labels may not indicate disease 
entities. 
Stein (1993) states: "Cross-cultural psychiatry serves to focus us self-reflexively on the 
limitations of our nosology, but also provides a challenge to understanding the 
universality of psychiatric disorders" (p. 328). In the following chapters the cultural 
dimension of mental disorder is investigated and the DSM's approach to the 
consideration of this dimension is evaluated. 
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SUMMARY 
The classification of psychopathology is clearly a more complex task than the 
classification of biological entities such as trees and butterflies. Primarily the difference 
lies in the number and types of variables that must be considered. While the latter 
simply involves the analysis of phylogenetic relationships, the former must include the 
analysis of psychological, biological and socio-cultural variables. What makes the 
taxonomy of living things relatively straightforward is that there is a clear object of 
study and in the case of psychopathology there is no clearly delineated object of this 
sort. The boundaries between disorder and non-disorder and between various disorders 
are not sharply defined but rather indeterminate and subject to change. Hence the 
process of classification involves not only the categorisation of entities but also the 








THE WESTERN APPROACH TO CROSS-
CULTURAL ISSUES: AN HISTORICAL VIEW 
Many aspects of psychological research and understanding are complex, involving 
problems which are unique to this particular scientific realm. The brain may be one of 
the last great mysteries of our proximal universe. Along with quantum physics and dark 
matter, 'mind' and the intricacies of its structure and content, remains intriguing after 
many years of resolute investigation. And it is not that this investigation has been 
unsuccessful. Much has been discovered and theories surrounding these discoveries 
abound. But, as anyone studying this field will know, there are many obstacles. Many 
of these difficulties revolve around the fact that there are different levels of explanation. 
And the boundaries between these levels and the way that these levels interact, is 
unclear. There are physiological explanations, subjective explanations, social 
explanations and genetic explanations (to name a few), all offering plausible yet often 
incompatible narratives about human mental phenomena. Cross-cultural psychology 
traverses all four of these domains with the central question of: To what extent is human 
psychology and its pathologies a product of biological andlor social variables? And 
more precisely: Do mental disorders as judged by Western psychiatric diagnostic 
systems occur in other cultures? 
While these are important and perhaps fundamental questions, it was not until recently 
that they were being seriously addressed within psychology (Kulhara, Mattoo, Awasthi 
& Chandiramani, 1987). Cross-cultural psychology, then, is a relatively new discipline. 
However, cross-cultural issues within science and society have a long and interesting 
history. Looking at these issues reveals how attitudes within both the academic and lay 
person's worlds have contributed to the conception of cross-cultural topics within 
psychology. Although one may discuss scientific views as if they are necessarily devoid 
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of social influence, this is often more likely to be an ideal, than a realistic appraisal. The 
interaction between social and scientific realms is profound and highly complex and 
often researchers have approached the understanding of this interaction with the view 
that one must sit on one or other side of the fence. Needless to say, this approach is 
naive. It is more productive to aclmowledge their inextricable ties and admit that each 
impacts on the other. Obviously this is especially true in the domain of the social 
sCIences. 
Looking at the history of cross-cultural psychology in terms of this interaction is 
interesting and illuminating. One can clearly see that the western world has emerged 
from a much darker age which relied on prejudiced ideation to justify a predominantly 
intolerant and self-satisfying perception of cross-cultural variation, in psychology. Not 
that this metamorphic enlightenment is necessarily complete - far from it - but it is 
encouraging to look back through time and notice that beliefs about cultural diversity 
have changed in a positive direction. As mentioned previously, last century diagnostic 
manuals included a disorder called 'drapetomania' which was applied to slaves who ran 
away from their masters (Szasz, 1971, Wakefield, 1992). And more recently 
homosexuality was believed to be a mental disorder requiring correction. These 
examples suggest a significant connection between the science of diagnosis and 
classification, and societal factors. 
DEFINITIONS 
The manifestation and influence of society is usually expressed in terms of 'culture' 
while genetic or biological factors are captured by the notion of 'race'. The related 
concept of 'ethnicity' may be connected to either of these terms. At times it is used to 
suggest racial affiliations and at other times political ones, which mayor may not 
correlate with the former (Lock, 1993). 
A thoughtful discussion of the concept of race is offered by Lock (1993). Primarily she 
questions the validity of the term which on examination seems problematical. As she 
explains, the notion of race was first introduced in 1749 by a French scientist, who 
qualified his proposal with the comment that it was not intended as a scientific 
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delineation but rather as a convenient classification for pragmatic purposes. His system 
of taxonomy was based on differentiations of skin colour, and the shape of the face and 
skull. The practice of devising taxonomies of human kind proved popular with 
numerous different approaches presented throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. As 
explained by Lock, some researchers have suggested that the appearance of the concept 
of race was associated with the rise of capitalist economies and the subsequent 
exploitation of indigenous people by European colonists. During this time, theories of 
race commonly expressed beliefs of white superiority which were associated with 
Christian doctrines alleging that dark skinned people were those who had degenerated 
since their dispersal from the Garden of Eden. 
According to Lock, if the concept of race is to be scientifically sanctioned, races must 
be seen as sub-species of Homo sapiens. But few have decided that this is an 
appropriate analysis. Gould (1978) describes this as an outdated approach to within-
species differentiation. In support of his claim Gould describes the striking genetic 
similarities between so-called races. Relatedly, with regard to so-called racial conflict 
Pedersen (1993) states: "Conflict between different ethnic groups may have less to do 
with their different ethnicities and more to do with difference of age, gender, socio-
economic status, or many other affiliations" (p. 29). Pedersen's comment highlights the 
danger in generalising about between-group differences. In cases where race appears to 
be instrumental in differentiating populations, there may be other corresponding 
differences which are equally (or more) important in relation to the particular 
phenomenon in question. 
With regard to health research, Lock notes that there has been a significant increase in 
the use of both race and ethnicity as independent variables. However the definitions of 
both are still debated. One important problem is that many people with mixed ancestry 
change their racial identity over time and often it is simply self-report which delineates 
people for research purposes. As Lock asks: "How white is white?" Questionnaires 
commonly ask people to categorise themselves according to one ethnic group or another 
leading to an artificially simplistic picture of racial identity. It is important to note such 
complexities when discussing cross-cultural studies as issues concerning the concepts 
of race and ethnic identity are often ignored. When comparisons are made between say 
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Euro-Americans and Afro-Americans it is useful to note the particular criteria employed 
for category membership. 
The concept of culture, although broader and richer is none-the-less easier to define. 
There is agreement, at least, that whatever it refers to is worthy of such a label. One 
enduring definition was provided by Tyler (1871), who described it as: "That complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (Brislin, 1990). This 
definition captures the impressive scope of the concept. According to Tyler culture is 
everything which comes about through the social interaction of human beings. 
Herskovits (1948) defined culture as that aspect of the environment which is created by 
people. This view refers to the external dimension of culture which includes such things 
as houses and automobiles. Less tangible are the constituents of what Triandis (1972) 
labels subjective culture, such as beliefs, values and norms. Similarly for Fabrega 
(1992), culture means, "a system of meanings that is learned, that provides people with 
a distinctive sense of reality and which helps shape behaviour and affective responses" 
(p.91). 
Brislin (1990, p. 12) writes: "Culture is indicated by ideas that are transmitted 
generation to generation, rarely with explicit instruction, by members of the older 
generations." Obviously the ability to fit into and typify a particular culture is not 
innate. Helman (1990, p. 3) states: "Growing up within any society is a form of 
enculturation, whereby the individual slowly acquires the cultural 'lens' of that society. 
Without such a shared perception of the world, both the cohesion and the continuity of 
any human group would be impossible". Culture provides people with a framework 
within which they can relate to one another and co-exist. And through language, people 
learn a particular mode of understanding and interpreting the world - a mode which is 
common to all and which therefore facilitates communication. 
Like all other species of animal, Homo sapiens are born with a particular genetic and 
neurological make-up. This blueprint consists in a myriad of capabilities which mayor 
may not be realised during an individual's life. It is commonly argued that whether or 
not these capacities are realised and the way in which they are, depends on 
environmental factors. For instance an animal that is raised in captivity may exhibit a 
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behaviour repertoire which is very different to that of its counterparts in the wild. 
Different environments favour or bring-out different behaviours. In a valuable 
explication on cultural psychology Schweder and Sullivan (1993) state " ... that cultural 
learning is usefully conceptualised as the refashioning of what is inherited, prior, built-
in, or given. In human beings as in other species, learning processes are not 
incompatible with the existence of an inherited system of complex forms" (p. 512). 
And, "Cultural learning does not presuppose an empty organism" (p. 513). Culture is 
shaped in part by innate dispositions. An acknowledgement of culture does not entail a 
denial of biology. The activities that people engage in are a function of their physical 
form and their mental abilities, which have arisen through evolutionary pressures. 
Culture is sometimes presented as divorced from such variables but it is rather built on 
them. While the importance of socio-cultural factors will be highlighted in forthcoming 
arguments, there will be an implicit understanding of the underlying influence of 
organic forces. 
It should be noted that there are innate differences as well as innate similarities. 
Although biology and physiology are often presented (in this theoretical area) as 
creators of uniformity (Patel & Winston, 1994) this view is yet to be established. 
Despite striking similarities at the biological level there is also diversity. Such diversity 
is fundamental to the process of evolution (Darwin, 1859). It is important to recognise 
this point, especially when discussions of cross-cultural issues allude to underlying 
physical processes as examples of universality. 
Discussions of culture traverse many domains: sociology, anthropology, psychology, 
history, and others. Culture permeates and is permeated by numerous aspects of human 
existence. One of the main difficulties for investigators of culture is the fact that they 
too are permeated by that which they are attempting to study. When one studies another 
culture it is perhaps always in comparison to ones own. As the following section shows, 
early cross-cultural understanding in the modem world was dogged by problems of 
relativism and short-sightedness. 
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ETHNOCENTRISM AND PRIMITIVISM 
The history of the Western approach to cross-cultural issues has been dominated by 
ethnocentrism (Skultans, 1991). And it is not surprising; before the communication 
boom of the 20th century there were substantial barriers between many of the peoples 
and nations of the world. One can argue that unfamiliarity often leads to fear which in 
tum leads to the development of antagonistic beliefs and behaviours. This analysis may 
seem simplistic but on the other hand, it aclmow1edges the massive changes which have 
taken place over the past century. Isolation and ignorance foster ethnocentric beliefs 
which arise in part out of a desire to protect and promote the wellbeing of ones own 
people; a desire which is rooted in human evolution (Wilson, 1975). Hostility towards 
foreigners which was often in the form of genocide, has been an integral part of 
po1itica11ife for many societies (Diamond, 1991). For example, as powers such as the 
Roman and British empires sought to broaden their territories, indigenous peoples were 
exploited, enslaved and often . killed. This sort of barbarism fed on ethnocentric 
philosophies which sought justification in political and religious doctrines. As a matter 
of interest, the word barbarian has a surprising origin. It is derived from the Greek word 
'barbaroi' which was used to refer to people who were unfamiliar with the Greek 
language (Lucas & Barrett,1995) and instead frequently uttered an unintelligible chatter 
which sounded like 'barbar' (Triandis, 1990). Hence the term 'Barbarian' arose to 
describe a race who were allegedly inferior because they spoke another language. 
In the centuries, leading up to the last two millennia and immediately following the 
supposed birth of Christ, many Greek philosophers exhibited ethnocentric ideas. Much 
of this was probably related to their support of slavery which was an integral part of life 
in early Greek society (Fernando, 1988). The Greeks tended to view themselves as 
'civilised' in contrast to other less advanced societies, and hence slavery was seen as 
morally acceptable because it exposed the foreigners to a better way of living. The early 
Greek philosophers are perhaps best 1mown for their love of the intellect, or rational 
mind which was often claimed to be lacking in animals, women and savages ( as in 
Aristotle's Politics 1). 
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This sort of reasoning was also seen in the philosophy which supported the expansion 
of the British Empire. In Britain during the 15th and 16th centuries, information about 
Africa was interpreted according to the prevailing folklore about black people 
(Fernando, 1988). But such ideas date back much further. A musical work composed in 
the second century AD, called 'Epistle of Barnabas' referred to blacks as being 'born of 
the devil' (Fryer, 1984). The association of black people with the devil was commonly 
seen. It probably arose from Christian views on the correlation of white with moral 
purity and black with evil and darlmess. In fact the old testament suggests that dark 
skinned people were created separately as a stepping stone between apes and man 
(Fryer, 1984). 
More recently, the prominent 18th Century British philosopher David Hume wrote: 
I am apt to suspect the Negroes, and in general all the other species of men 
(for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to whites. 
There never was a civilised natiOli of any complexion other than white, nor 
even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious 
manufacture amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most 
rude and barbarous of the white, such as the ancient GERMANS, the present 
TARTARS, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form 
of government, or some other particular. (Hume, 1753; from Fernando 
1988, p. 10) 
This excerpt gives a useful indication of the sort of thinking which was common (even 
among intellectuals) only two centuries ago. Note that even the less advanced 'white' 
cultures were seen as superior to their black equivalents. Apart from the obvious 
prejudice, Hume's claim is now known to be factually wrong. The ancient Egyptians 
who are now believed to have been African Negroes, were the most technically 
advanced and complex society in the world at that time. Of course anthropologists have 
lmown this, or at least suspected it for centuries, however the idea was not well received 
as it was clearly inconsistent with contemporary beliefs about black people. 
Politicians and migrants needed a means of justifying the immense desecration of 
indigenous societies by various colonies. This usually hinged on the view that 
ultimately these allegedly less developed countries would benefit from the invasion. 
Colonists brought with them such things as guns and Christianity which were 
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considered adequate payment for the destruction of the world as native peoples had 
known it. In Bengal, many Indians starved as Britain took control of its industries. 
Britain wanted cheap labour for its own production lines and a market for its goods. As 
the old Bengal crumbled, wealth from this and other offshore exploits fuelled the 
industrial revolution in Britain (Fernando, 1988). 
Early in the 19th century the slave trade in Britain was abolished, however slavery 
remained an important part of British colonialism. Following the disruption, and in 
some cases desecration of the social, political and environmental infrastructures of 
indigenous societies, native peoples become dependant on the invading culture for their 
livelihoods, leaving them open to exploitation, which the British were quick to take 
advantage of. This imbalance of power fuelled beliefs about the inferiority of 
indigenous people; they were often unable to function effectively in the rapidly 
changing environment. This phenomenon is still seen today. Even in New Zealand 
which was colonised over 100 years ago, some Maori people still experience a sense of 
displacement (Hazlehurst, 1993). 
The treatment of the Maori by British colonialists was typical of their dealings with so-
called primitive peoples. Primitivism was the ultimate justification for exploitation, 
because the knowledge and technology which the British supposedly brought to the 
indigenous people were seen as priceless gifts which would lead them out of moral and 
epistemological darkness. Lucas and Barrett (1995) have looked in detail at primitivist 
themes in psychiatry. Generally, they explain, two opposing perspectives have been 
used: Barbaric and Arcadian. The Barbaric view sees primitive societies as 
degenerative, disruptive and mentally pathological. In contrast, the Arcadian view 
equates primitive societies with purity, harmony and well-being. Lucas and Barrett 
state, "As a presence within the Western self, the primitive may be either an instinctual 
disordering force which erupts as violence or madness, or alternatively, a wellspring of 
order which places us in harmonious and healthy touch with nature and our 'true 
selves' ," (p. 290). 
Relatedly these two interpretations of primitivism can be seen as either conducive to or 
curative of mental disorder. The Barbaric mind is described as lacking intellectual 
capacity and order, hence it is prone to irrationality and impulsivity - primary-symptoms 
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of some Western psychopathologies. On the other hand, the Arcadian mind is seen as 
simple and balanced - in touch with nature and uncontaminated by the artificialities of 
modem life. In this way it is viewed as healthy and harmonious. For example Seligman 
(1929) stated that he observed 'no cases of true mental disorder' among native Papuans, 
whereas in support of the antithesis, Kraepelin stated that primitive societies provided 
'natural laboratories for the study of insanity' (Hirsch & Shepherd, 1974). 
As stated by Lucas and Barrett the association of primitivism with psychopathology is 
fundamental to Western psychiatry. Mental disorder is often understood as 'an upsurge 
of the primitive within us.' According to this view, higher cognitive functions which 
usually have a controlling effect, give way to more basic and perhaps animalistic 
influences. For instance, Andreasen (1990) suggests that the positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia correspond to the overactivity of lower 'perhaps limbic' mechanisms 
which are insufficiently monitored by higher cognitive functions. This view is 
demonstrated also by psychoanalytic theory. Freud (1950) suggested that there are 
similarities between the psychology of people in primitive societies and the repressed 
and unconscious components of the minds of 'civilised' human beings (which are often 
consequential during mental illness). And Jung alerted so-called civilised beings to the 
danger of associating with 'inferior man' whom he claimed could have a powerful 
effect on their psyches - stimulating their primal minds and tempting them to 
degenerate to lower forms of living (Fernando, 1988). 
Skultans (1991) writes, "So contact with primitive man is seen as disrupting the 
delicate balancing act required for civilised society because primitive man embodies the 
untrammelled expression of desires repressed in his civilised counterpart." Fortunately, 
as noted by Skultans such ideas are now thought to say more about the theorists than 
about their 'objects' of study. 
WESTERN DOMINANCE 
What this discussion shows, is that the British, among others, have a history of a 
discriminatory approach to cross-cultural understanding. It must be noted that it was in 
this socio-political environment that cross-cultural psychology developed. The typical 
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colonising process of stamping out indigenous traditions may be reflected in Western 
views on mental and physical health. Often these ideas become so commonplace and so 
ingrained that laypeople and even educated researchers are unaware of their presence. 
There is undoubtedly a tendency for those in developed countries to view themselves 
and their beliefs as superior. English speakers dominate the world. America is the 
wealthiest nation. White people landed on the moon. Technological advancement such 
as that evidenced in Japan may overshadow the knowledge system which this country 
had prior to European influences. While Japan's modem day achievements are held in 
high regard throughout the world, their original culture is less conspicuous. In the 
modem world, economic strength is everything and to attain this, compromise seems 
inevitable. The technological and economic achievements of powerful countries 
overshadow the more subtle accomplishments of the lesser (economically) developed 
nations. 
For example there are tremendous depths of knowledge to be found in Indian, Tibetan 
and Chinese religious doctrines. Zen Bhuddism, for instance, which has its origins in 
both India and China, preaches the benefits of having a clear 'mind', or more precisely 
'no mind'. This is attained through meditation with the ultimate goal of enlightenment. 
Learning to be aware, without the constraints of beliefs and cognitive habits which have 
occurred through socialisation, is believed to create a more objective and direct 
perception. It is a process of uncluttering the mind which is claimed to lead to both 
mental and physical well-being (Barrett, 1993).1 An holistic understanding of the 
relationship between mind and body is common throughout Asia, and has an important 
influence on healing practices. 
Many cultures, for instance, North American Indian, Asiatic Indian and Chinese have 
very effective and complex methods for treating mental and physical disease in human 
beings. These are often methods with a longer history than those commonly used in 
Western countries (Fabrega, 1992). Because they usually have their roots in quite 
different theoretical beliefs, these systems of understanding are often ignored or 
criticised by the supposedly 'scientific' West. However, it is interesting to note that 
some of these 'foreign' techniques are becoming popular in New Zealand and many 
1 This is undoubtedly a very brief and simplistic description of these ideas which does them no justice 
whatsoever. However some of these ideas will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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other Anglo-dominated countries. A case in point is acupuncture, which although based 
on comparatively radical theories of physiological functioning, is an accepted and 
widely used treatment for some physical disorders. 
The efficacy of such physical treatments is easier to measure than that of mental 
therapies. Perhaps that is why little is known of the latter. Although there is increasing 
aclmowledgement of mental disorders which are culture-specific (lmown as culture-
bound syndromes), such as evidenced in the latest DSM, information on culture-specific 
approaches to the understanding and treatment of mental illness is sparse. Such 
investigation is probably left to anthropologists whose work is often discredited because 
of its qualitative style. It is to be hoped that more work will be done in this field in the 
future. 
EARLY CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Although the question of the universality of mental disorders has been of interest to 
psychologists for years, early cross-cultural studies of mental health were not 
impressive? This is primarily because it was, until recently, a field in its infancy, 
establishing the ground rules as it went along. There is nothing inherently wrong with 
this approach, but it does mean that little can be drawn from the results and conclusions 
of this early research. Many cite Kraepe1in's 1919 study on schizophrenia in Asia as the 
first significant cross-cultural investigation. Kraepelin boldly concluded after examining 
hospitalised patients in Indonesia and Singapore, that Schizophrenia is a universal 
disease (Torrey, 1973). About 20 years prior to this work (in 1897), Durkheim 
investigated the cross-cultural epidemiology of suicide (Berrios & Mohanna, 1990). He 
was interested in the relationship between rates of suicide and various societal variables. 
However the originality of the study was not matched by the quality of the 
methodological design hence the result was more like a social commentary than a 
scientific investigation. 
In 1932, Odegaard carried out unprecedented research on psychiatric admissions of 
Norwegians in their homeland, and in the United States (Westermeyer, 1989), and from 
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then on the field gained momentum with a sudden upsurge in interest in related topics. 
What seems to have been most important to researchers of this period was the question 
of the nature and extent of mental illness in so-called primitive people. For some it was 
simply another means of confirming their ethnocentric views. For instance, Carothers 
(1951) stated that" ... all the observed African peculiarities can be explained as due to a 
relative idleness of his frontal lobe." And Smartt (1956) asserted that " ... The African 
seems in some way, to be lacking the higher moral sense which is the heritage of more 
advanced civilisations." (Both quotes from Torrey, 1973, p 55 & 56). Unfortunately 
these sorts of vague generalisations were common in the field at this time. Apart from 
the racist overtones they express little else. The narrow-mindedness of these Western 
intellectuals is embarrassing and does no credit whatsoever to the establishment from 
which they have arisen. Although objectivity has improved in recent decades, it would 
be wise to note that when these statements were made they were relatively well 
received. So while our cross-cultural acceptance may have expanded, it may be difficult 
to ascertain exactly how much. We may' all be wearing tinted spectacles (metaphorically 
speaking), similar to those described in Roger McGough's poem, "Patriots are a bit nuts 
in the head.',3 
It is worth noting the changes which have taken place throughout the 20th Century. As 
mentioned, advances in communication have had a tremendous impact on most people 
of the world. They have in a sense made the world a much smaller place. Weare 
exposed to images of other cultures via television and magazines and it is easy to travel 
to far and foreign destinations. These changes have had a positive influence. Familiarity 
contributes to a greater understanding of, and empathy for, other cultural groups. There 
is also greater racial diversity in our own domestic environment which creates more 
ways and means of increasing knowledge of other races. On the other hand, these ways 
and means are not always exploited and many New Zealanders may retain old fashioned 
discriminatory views. 
The relationship between, beliefs manifest in the everyday activities of communities 
and, the so-called knowledge accrued through scientific endeavour is complex. Each 
2 The tenus psychology/psychologist and psychiatry/psychiatrist will be used interchangeably as the 
issues in question and the related literature concerns both fields. 
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influences the other, in ways that are at times so subtle that it would appear that there is 
no such relationship. That is because the people investigating the relationship are 
usually part of that relationship and hence objectivity is an impossible goal. It appears 
that over the years, beliefs about cultural diversity have changed both within science 
and within the world as a whole, leading to greater acceptance and less racially based 
discrimination. Whether this process of enlightenment has reached an end point is 
debatable. Investigators in this area must be wary of the possibility that they are still 
influenced by the racist ideologies that have strongly influenced cross-cultural relations 
for most of the past two millennia. And one must not assume that scientific endeavour 
is impervious to the effects of these ideologies. 
THEORETICAL SHIFTS 
Recent years (meaning the latter half of this century) have seen a fundamental shift in 
the focus of psychology from behaviourism to cognitivism (Pepitone, 1986). Insofar as 
this represents a change from an outward to an inward focus, this parallels a 
metatheoretical move from positivist to hermeneutic perspectives. Positivism sees 
knowledge as hinging solely on worldly and usually observable phenomena. What is 
considered to be true is that which corresponds to objects, and the relations between 
objects, in the physical realm. Hence, positivists see physics as the best model for their 
view of science (Stein, 1991). In contrast the hermeneutic tradition focuses on the role 
of subjective understanding in epistemological endeavours. Essential to this approach is 
the part that meaning plays in theory development. Hence there is a strong focus on 
language and the impact of factors such as, agency and context. 
In light of this transition it is not surprising that there has been growing interest in cross-
cultural psychology. Not that this has been a movement that has caught the imagination 
of all inquiring psychologists. Many uphold strongly positivist positions which as will 
be illustrated in forthcoming chapters, have influenced and still influence cross-cultural 
research. But one can not deny the fact that even if one aspires to objectivist methods of 
investigation, such methods are difficult in the domain of psychology. For instance, 
Freud's theories of human behaviour are best understood with reference to the context 
3 In this poem Roger McGough describes patriots as wearing " ... red, white and blue tinted spectacles 
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in which they arose. Although Freud may have claimed to have built his theory on 
robust empirical investigation, it is clear in retrospect that its scope was more limited 
than Freud himself believed. And to make a different and perhaps more pertinent point, 
psychiatric diagnoses frequently refer to subjective data. Self-report is something that 
can be observed by a clinician, however the hard data involved in this context are a 
product of the thoughts, feelings and intentions of the client. While social sciences may 
aspire to positivist ideals they are inevitably constrained by their objects of study, from 
which they get their identity, and this should not be a moot point. 
So, interest in cross-cultural issues has increased. Many psychologists have realised that 
there are differences in the way that mental disorders manifest in different ethnic groups 
and environments (Littlewood, 1990; Schweder & Sullivan, 1993). These differences 
may be realised at the levels of, neurobiology, physiology, subjective experience and/or 
behaviour. Researchers who favour positivist explanations of mental disorder often 
claim that differences found acros's cultures may reflect similar underlying 
pathophysiology. In other words, the same disorder may have a number of subtly 
varying manifestations which have the same etiology and neurobiological correlates. A 
more radical positivist view is that all disorders are in fact alike and any reports to the 
contrary are simply products of bad research wherein investigators have been hindered 
by cultural barriers such as differences in language and customs. These views would 
come under what Littlewood refers to as the 'old transcultural psychiatry' which as he 
explains began with Kraepelin's work early this century. Central to this approach is the 
assumption that differences are inherently superficial and when peeled away they reveal 
deep similarities which are evidenced in universal physiology. For instance the content 
of delusions in schizophrenia may differ across societies but their essential nature and 
underlying etiology will remain uniform. "Thus when faced with patients of different 
culture, psychiatrists complained (and still do) of the 'culturally confusing' factors 
which obscured the 'real' disease process." (Littlewood, p. 309). 
So according to this account culture is seen as a nuisance variable which obscures the 
more fundamental features of mental disorder. Littlewood contrasts this view with the 
'new cross-cultural psychiatry' which began in the late 1970s. This approach sees 
(red for blood, white for glory and blue for a boy)." 
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psychiatry as a cultural product which expresses predominantly Western beliefs and 
values. Central to this new field are epistemological issues which were often ignored by 
the 'old' tradition. These include questions about the suitability of particular 
methodologies in cross-cultural research and the nature of mental disorder. 
Kleinman, a key proponent of the 'new' psychiatry suggested the use of the distinction 
between disease and illness; a distinction which is already used by sociologists 
(Kleinman, 1978). Disease in this instance denotes biological or physiological 
malfunction and illness the personal or cultural response to disease. A primary function 
of this distinction is the acknowledgement of the role that personal and cultural 
variables play in psychopathology. The 'old' psychiatric tradition with its narrow 
medical model could not incorporate such variables and hence was (and is) cumbersome 
in cross-cultural contexts. The inclusion in the DSM N of a list of culture-bound 
syndromes suggests that there is widespread acknowledgement of cross-cultural 
differences in psychopathology .. However the addition of this section presupposes that 
all other disorders in the manual are in contrast universal. As if to say that disorders 
which arise in the West are immune to the confines of such a label. This belief may in 
part be due to the fact that Western culture has so permeated the far reaches of remote 
places that research has the added difficulty of studying people who have to some 
extent been acculturated. If anorexia nervosa is found in Indonesians it may be that it 
has been 'exported'. For some researchers however this sort of finding would be used to 
support the claim that anorexia nervosa has a pan-racial biological basis. 
Interest in the biological bases of psychopathology has been spurred on by 
developments in psychopharmacology. The discovery and use of a variety of 
psychoactive drugs has had a big impact on contemporary conceptualisations of mental 
disorders. For example the success of antidepressants in the treatment of major 
depression and antipsychotics in the treatment of schizophrenia lends support to 
biological theories of these disorders. Such theories are consistent with the bio-medical 
model of psychopathology, outlined earlier, which views mental disorders as discrete 
entities or phenomena with clear physiological underpinnings (Kleinman, 1988). But of 
course it is erroneous to infer the nature of etiology from the effectiveness of a 
particular treatment. Interestingly research on a number of disorders suggests that a 
variety of treatments may be equally effective. For example a comprehensive study of 
63 
different treatment approaches to depression found no significant differences In 
comparative efficacy (Elkin, Parloff, Hadley, & Autry, 1985). 
The use of drug treatments in psychiatry is now common world-wide. The domination 
of lesser developed nations by Western medicine is due largely to its success in the 
treatment and prevention of many diseases; particularly the effectiveness of 
vaccinations, such as that used for small pox (Leff, 1990). This had the effect of 
instilling the faith of many societies, in Western pharmacological therapies and perhaps 
also in psychopharmacological therapies. This faith should not be abused. Western 
psychiatry and psychology must heed the lessons of their chequered history of cross-
cultural understanding and employ responsible clinical methods. According to Littleman 
this is already happening, however the extent and efficacy of these changes require 
examination. The following chapter will look closely at the approach of contemporary 
psychology to cross-cultural issues. 
SUMMARY 
Historically, Western scientific and literary thought on cross-cultural issues has been 
plagued by ethnocentric attitudes; attitudes which were present also in early cross-
cultural psychology. This lead to a number of misguided assumptions about mental 
disorder in diverse ethnic groups, some of which might now be seen as simply comical. 
Early cross-cultural studies in psychology were also often poorly designed, 
demonstrating a lack of understanding of the requirements of inter-ethnic research. 
Fortunately changes in both attitudes and research methodologies mean that modem 
cross-cultural psychology produces more reliable findings. 
Also there is today a deeper understanding of the significance in human existence of 
socio-cultural variables and a growing interest in their interaction with mental disorder. 
While this is heartening, it is important to be aware of the ethnocentrism which has 
dominated much of the not-so-distant past, and to remain alert to its possible on-going 




CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACHES TO 
MENTAL DISORDER 
As the previous chapter illustrates, cross-cultural psychology embodies a diverse mix of 
topics and ideas. Since its inception (if one can call it that), although its identity has 
mutated in response to the vicissitudes of social and scientific thought, it has none-the-
less chrystallised to form a distinct area of academic study. This claim must be 
qualified however, with the acknowledgement that it is an area of research which relies 
on the contribution of several disciplines. It was philosophy perhaps that first attended 
to questions regarding human diversity but as shown in the previous chapter, these 
early views were more a product of politics and religion than of science. Empirical 
research in cross-cultural psychology is a relatively recent phenomenon. During the last 
50 years most of the research in the field has been carried out by psychiatrists and 
anthropologists. Those with training in both of these disciplines are often referred to as 
medical anthropologists. There have also been significant contributions from 
psychologists and sociologists. It seems that the differences in the theoretical 
approaches of the respective research programmes have been both a help and a 
hindrance. While there is obviously a need for an interdisciplinary approach this is 
rendered difficult by theoretical disparity between researchers. 
This disparity can be seen primarily as the polarity of social versus biological 
explanations which dominates discussions of cross-cultural psychology. The first 
section of this chapter examines the many facets of this debate in detail, sketching a 
theoretical map of the field. Then there is a discussion of cross-cultural differences, 
suggesting some of the ways in which culture may be expressed through individual 
psychologies. This is demonstrated with some clinical examples which show the impact 
of social context on mental disorder and diagnosis. The last section discusses some of 
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the main issues which arise in the application of cross-cultural psychology in the 
contexts of both clinical practice and research. 
UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM 
The introduction in the prevIOUS chapter, of the contrast between positivist and 
hermeneutic perspectives foreshadowed the present discussion. While the former 
focuses primarily on regularity the latter places an emphasis on diversity. These can be 
described as different epistemological approaches which correlate with the two 
dominant traditions within cross-cultural psychology: universalism and relativism 
(respectively). It is advantageous to note that a distinction of this sort may depict a too 
simplistic and hence misleading ontological view. Schweder and Sullivan (1993) 
include the 'universal vs. relative' distinction along with others such as 'innate vs. 
learned and 'natural vs. cultural' in a list used to illustrate their claim that " ... the social 
sciences are rife with invidious distinctions and divisive (and arguably false) 
dichotomies." (p. 505). Their central point is that the use of diametrically opposed 
concepts such as these, encourage the pigeonholing of ideas leading to gross 
misinterpretation. Peoples' views are often forced into one or other category. Many 
psychiatrists and psychologists would fall not in either category but rather somewhere 
in between. It is necessary however to attend to the universalist vs. relativist debate as it 
underpins much of the pertinent and pivotal literature. 
Fabrega (1989) provides a comprehensive discourse on the nature and influence of 
these two opposing themes within psychiatry. He explains that universalists use the 
Western biomedical framework to find similarities across cultures. This approach 
which may also be referred to as 'etic', uses explicit standard diagnostic criteria to 
interpret and classify psychopathology in diverse populations. Typically protagonists of 
this cross-cultural investigative method are traditionally trained psychiatrists. Their 
central claim is that mental disorders as defined in Western taxonomies will have 
similar, if not identical, manifestations in all cultures because they are the result of 
physiological dysfunction and human beings around the globe share a common 
physiology. Hence the universal incidence of a mental disorder would be viewed as 
evidence of biological etiology (Patel & Winston, 1994). If social and cultural factors 
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vary across populations then it is assumed that similarity in psychopathology is due to 
genotypic similarity. 
As explained by Patel and Winston, the quest for universality and (therefore) biological 
etiology represents a hope of validation of modem diagnostic systems. Psychiatry, like 
medicine seeks clearly defined illness categories which can be explained in terms of 
physiological or biological change and it is believed that cross-cultural research can 
contribute to this objective. In this sense universalists are more interested in their own 
culture than in the cultures of others. Non-Western populations are seen as testing 
grounds for Western ideas and it is only those variables within these popUlations, which 
are relevant to these ideas, which are taken into account. 
In contrast the relativist or 'emic' researcher uses a qualitative or descriptive 
methodology with the aim of understanding psychopathology within the context of its 
manifestation. This usually demands a thorough knowledge of the culture of those who 
are being studied and is therefore characteristic of an anthropological approach. 
Fabrega states: "Cultural relativism refers to the differences in beliefs, feelings, 
behaviours, traditions, social practices, and technological arrangements that are found 
among diverse peoples of the world." (p. 415). The 'emic' researcher assumes that 
these cultural constituents may have a significant impact on mental disorder, meaning 
that if culture varies across societies there will be corresponding differences in 
psychopathology. Accordingly mental disorders are conceived, to varying extents, as 
social (as opposed to biological) phenomena. 
In response to the universalist directive, relativists assert that diagnostic categories are 
essentially abstractions or constructions used to explain psychiatric phenomena within 
the context of Western culture and the Western medical tradition (Fabrega, 1989). 
Hence they are necessarily limited in their capacity to explain such phenomena in 
diverse settings. Moreover relativists question the merit of the practice of using a 
classification system devised in one culture for understanding psychopathology in a 
substantially different culture; because this sort of methodology places constraints on 
cross-cultural learning. If only those aspects of belief and behaviour that fit into the 
Western framework are noted, there will inevitably be much that is unseen or 
overlooked. Therefore the capacity for developing a deep and genuine understanding of 
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the nature of mental disorder in the context of a contrasting culture will be limited. And 
furthermore this approach may undermine indigenous knowledge systems. 
In response to these criticisms universalists would point out that the 'lost' data are 
extraneous in the sense that they do not contribute to the confirmation or 
disconfirmation of the hypothesis of universality. Because at most, cultural factors 
simply colour the content of mental disorder without influencing the physiological 
cause or structure. As Kleinman (1987) explains, this is a common view within 
psychiatry and as he astutely notes it is reductionist. Cross-cultural variation in 
symptomatology is seen as superficial; as part of the outward appearance of disease 
while underlying biological change is seen as the disease itself. But of course this view 
is problematic as many disorders are defined by symptom patterns and not by 
physiological change. At this point in time although there are some biologically based 
theories of some mental disorders, this area of research can only be described as being 
in its infancy. And in addition, few theorists would posit purely biological theories. 
Most acknowledge biology's interaction with environmental factors and favour multi-
dimensional models. 
While there may be differences in symptomatology, those who follow the universalist 
directive, look for broad underlying similarity. So, the central question would be 
whether or not a person is delusional as opposed to an inquiry into the nature and 
content of the delusion. However even if a similar symptom pattern as that defined in, 
say, the DSM-IV, is found cross-culturally, this should not be interpretedprimajacie as 
evidence that it is the same disorder. In the case of a somatic disorder this conclusion 
would require the discovery of a common 'pathology' (Patel & Winston, 1994), 
meaning a common physiological presentation. And if such pathology is considered 
central to mental disorder then surely psychiatrists involved in cross-cultural research 
should include biological measures as well as behavioural ones. Obviously this is a 
difficult requirement, but it is nonetheless essential if physiological mutation is to be 
seen as the essence of mental disorder. 
Jovanovski (1995) discusses the field of ethnopsychiatry which has grown out of the 
'psychocultural relativism' which was proposed and promoted during the 1930s by 
Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead and during the 1940s by George Sapir. Central to 
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their common view is the claim that personality is inextricably tied to culture, because 
personality is shaped by language, thoughts and folklore. Their corresponding 
deduction therefore, is that mental disorders (which necessarily involve personality in 
one way or another) must be significantly (if not entirely) attributable to cultural 
variables. Importantly, ethnopsychiatrists advance a tenet of the primacy of conceptions 
of 'self, conceptions which they see as being moulded out of socio-cultural 
phenomena. And conceptions of 'self are believed to play a key role in the 
manifestation of mental disorder. 
Scheff (1966) provides as example of the ethnopsychiatrists' perspective. He proposes 
that behaviour during periods of insanity is shaped by stereotypes in the same way that 
so-called normal behaviour is. He states: "In a crisis, when the deviance of an 
individual becomes a public issue, the traditional stereotype of insanity becomes the 
guiding imagery of action, both for those reacting to the deviant and, at times, for the 
deviant himself." (p.82). The suggestion here is that people respond to mental disorder 
in prescribed ways and this response, in tum, affects the disorder. A more radical claim 
would be that the 'initial' presentation of the disorder would itself obey societal norms. 
The relativist/universalist debate parallels the differences in approach between 
sociology and psychiatry. Cooper (1994) discusses the relationship between sociology 
and psychiatry in recent years and examines some of the central issues which arise at 
this intersection. He states, " .. .issues both of method and substance continue to divide 
the thinking of medical and social scientists, not least in the mental health field." (p. 
39). Psychiatrists have moved towards the use of 'highly structured precoded 
schedules' which require brief interviewer instruction and 'can be analysed by 
computer. During the implementation of this sort of evaluation, attention to other 
patient-related data is discouraged. In contrast sociological researchers predominantly 
use 'semi-structured interview techniques' which allow for, and encourage, the 
inclusion of complex individual detail. Interviews of this kind require highly trained 
professionals who are able to discriminate between subtle variation in responding. 
Sociologists therefore take a more qualitative approach allowing greater scope for the 
embodiment of individual context-dependent variables. 
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Cooper argues that because mental disorder can not be explained solely in 'medico-
psychological terms' but also with regard to social forces then it is essential to inquire 
into the nature of such forces. In other words it is important to investigate the rationale 
behind the stigmatisation of particular individuals and the prohibition of particular 
behaviours. Cooper sees this as an important role for sociology and social psychiatry. 
He says: "The pressure of social influences on case-recognition and diagnosis cannot be 
dismissed as of marginal importance." (p. 40). According to Cooper, social factors play 
a pivotal role in the process of psychiatric diagnosis. He goes further and claims: 
"Psychiatrists need always to keep in mind that 'mental illness' is essentially a social 
construction." (p. 40). It is apparent in his clarification of this statement that he does not 
intend to undermine the objectives of psychiatrists, but rather to remind them of their 
objectives. The ultimate goal is successful treatment, and diagnosis is the means to this 
end. It is not an end in itself and has no intrinsic value. A diagnostic label allows the 
communication and collection of relevant information and as such it is a useful tool. It 
is not an 'object' in the world like, for instance, a chair or a book. Rather it is part of a 
social epistemological system which has been formulated to achieve certain ends. 
This is an important aspect of the relativist challenge to psychiatry. Approaches to the 
understanding of psychopathology should allow for the impact of social forces not only 
on mental disorders but also on relevant taxonomies. In other words a classification 
system such as the DSM-IV may be seen to reflect beliefs and ideals which are 
characteristic of Western culture and therefore may not be applicable in different 
cultural contexts. This particular relativist claim can be distinguished from the 
suggestion that the actual manifestation of psychopathology (i.e. psychological and 
physiological variables) may vary across cultures. 
THE ARGUMENTS 
The discovery and use of a variety of psychoactive drugs has had a big impact on 
contemporary conceptualisations of mental disorders. In particular, it lends support to 
the argument that mental disorders are essentially the result of physiological 
malfunction. For example, the effectiveness of antipsychotic medication such as 
chlorpromazine has lent support to biological theories of schizophrenia. Such theories 
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typically utilise a medical model of psychopathology which views mental disorders as 
discrete entities with clear physiological correlates (Kleinman, 1988). But, as pointed 
out earlier, it is fallacious to reason that an effective treatment type points directly to an 
etiological counterpart. None-the-less there IS no doubt that success III 
psychopharmacology has provided encouragement to those who are looking for cross-
cultural universals. A major problem however is that researchers have failed to identify 
biological mechanisms to explain drug action. 
And interestingly while psychopharmacological treatments have been widely used, 
some researchers have reported differential responding across ethnic groups. For 
example a number of studies have compared the response to psychotropics of Asian and 
Caucasian individuals. Differences between these ethnic groups have been found in the 
response to antidepressants (Lin, Poland & Lesser, 1986; Sakauye, 1992) and 
neuroleptics, lithium and benzodiazapines (Lin and Poland, 1995). Lin and Poland note 
that the causal mechanisms underlying' these differences are as yet unlmown, but are 
likely to involve both physiological and psychological factors. While this remains a 
new and largely uncharted area of research, such results challenge the view that with 
respect to the understanding and treatment of mental disorder human beings are 
physiologically equivalent. 
Evolutionary based arguments which refer to phylogenetic similarity have also been 
used in support of the universalist position. One such argument claims that emotions 
operate according to 'fixed action patterns' which are essentially reflexive (Griffiths, 
1990). As noted by Smith (1993), this view of the universality of emotion has been 
investigated through studies of facial expression. Such studies reveal that the facial 
expressions which correspond to particular emotions are primarily innate, with only 
slight cultural differentiation (Ekman & Friesman, 1971; Ekman 1992). It may be 
argued that if correlates of emotion such as facial expression exhibit universality due to 
common phylogeny then the mental mechanisms involved in emotion and their 
respective dysfunctions may also be ubiquitous. 
However, there would appear to be more to emotion than neurophysiological 
phenomena. The human experience of emotion involves the invocation of cultural 
variables, especially language, which varies tremendously across peoples of the world. 
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While some theorists have promoted the thesis of universal 'basic' emotions, linguists, 
such as, most notably, Whorf (1950), have suggested that the so-called basic emotions 
are in fact artefacts of the English language. In a detailed analysis of emotion concepts 
across cultures Wierzbicka (1992) reviewed a number oflinguistic differences between 
English and other languages which suggest that the 'basic' emotions as delineated by 
the English language do not designate lexical universals. The position of Wierzbicka 
and others is controversial but raises important issues. Language may not only shape 
the interpretation of emotion but also the emotion itself (if it is possible to distinguish 
between them), forming a complex psycholinguistic mode of experience. Some 
anthropological research lends support to this hypothesis (e.g. Lutz, 1985; Rosaldo, 
1980).4 
Turning to a quite different area of research, 10vanovski (1995) argued that findings in 
perceptual psychology lend support to the relativist position. He claimed that people 
raised in urban areas respond differently, to visual tests, to people who have grown up 
in rural areas. The former respond more readily to angular and structured stimuli 
whereas the latter show more sensitivity to less regular and perhaps more "natural" 
configurations. This is due to the deterioration, early in life, of some of the cells in the 
visual cortex. It is generally proposed that there are several different types of cells 
which correspond to particular types of visual stimuli. If cells are exposed to the stimuli 
which is their particular "forte" then they will be strengthened and if not they will 
degenerate. In this way the brain develops according to the demands of a specific 
environment. 
These findings support the relativist stance. As 10vanovski states: 
" ... if cultural standards, impressions, and experiences can influence no less 
than our visual tendencies, then, indeed, we could hardly convincingly deny 
that those same social characteristics can and do give rise to context-
identifiable ideas, interpretations, worries, phobias and obsessions." (p. 295). 
This is a powerful objection to those who posit the cross-cultural similitude of mental 
disorders based on the universality of neurophysiological structure. During infancy the 
human brain is remarkably plastic, largely because compared to other mammals it is, at 
4 The important role of language in mental disorder is discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
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birth, relatively underdeveloped (Kolb & Whishaw, 1996). The human infant is born 
comparatively premature and during the first year of life its brain along with the rest of 
its body grows rapidly. This growth is to some extent context dependant, meaning that 
it is influenced by environmental factors. And this shaping continues throughout 
childhood and to a lesser extent into adulthood (Weinberger, 1987). 
Mukherji (1995) states: 
"".while there are many "hard-wired" aspects of brain function and 
development, there is a vast and relatively undifferentiated network where 
patterns of transmission are laid down as a function of the persons learning 
history. Thus, the ways in which infonnation is transmitted through the brain, 
and the actual fonn of the networks themselves are modified by learning, by 
the person's experiential history"." (p. 207). 
There is a complex and dynamic interaction between phylogenetic and socio-cultural 
factors. Although as Draguns (1995) notes, little is known of how this interaction 
produces psychological symptoms. While the above research may be convincing 
evidence for the plasticity of the nervous system, its application to cross-cultural 
psychology represents an argument from analogy. Visual systems differ markedly from 
those implicated in psychopathology and moreover, it is their nonnal functioning which 
is described here as opposed to the dysfunction of mental disorder. However, when so 
little is known of the neurobiological substrates of mental disorder, the possibility of 
cross-cultural variation needs to be acknowledged. 
In response to the claims of cultural relativism, Brown (1991) presents strong 
opposition in his book titled 'Human Universals'. His primary thesis is that although 
there is superficial variation between human beings across different societies there are 
more prominent similarities. He accuses anthropologists of effecting a bias toward the 
discovery of difference while often ignoring the blatant sameness of human cultures. In 
support of his stance he refers to biological, behavioural and social phenomena and 
offers a comprehensive list of human universals including, for example, phonemes, 
interpersonal relationships, child birth and law. His description of the UP (Universal 
People), while in some ways naive and underdeveloped is compelling and should 
remind relativists that while there is evidence of some degree of cross-cultural 
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variability in people there IS nonetheless an impressive core of that which IS 
quintessentially 'human'. 
To what extent this common humanity influences, or manifests in, mental disorder is 
unclear. It is a question which is probably best answered empirically. If, for example, 
on investigation, so-called culture-bound syndromes (or at least some of them) tum out 
to be just that, or schizophrenia is found to be absent from some populations then the 
relativist view would be strengthened. If however researchers decide that culture-bound 
syndromes are best understood as superficially coloured variants of Western disorders 
then a universalist conceptualisation of mental disorder would be supported. 
Littlewood (1990) writes: 
"Psychiatry remains balancing the two dOlninant academic paradigms: in that 
of the natural sciences, biological processes determine behaviour and 
experience; in that of the humanities and social sciences, human societies select 
out for remark, classification, and amplification certain aspects of the natural 
world. Going one way we have biological determination, going the other way 
we have social choice." (p. 311). 
This debate will be drawn out in latter chapters with an examination of the relevant 
empirical literature. 
SOME DIMENSIONS OF DIFFERENCE 
Those who champion a culture-relative view of mental disorder often cite general 
cross-cultural differences and argue that such differences must inevitably impact on 
abnormal as well as normal behaviour. Variables frequently referred to include the 
'self,' personality, language, and more generally 'world views.' A contrast which is 
frequently described is that between East and West. Laungani (1992) provides a useful 
discussion of some of the primary differences between a typical Western belief system 
and an Indian one. He lists 'four core values or factors:' 
1. Materialism .................. Spiritualism 
2. Individualism ............... Communalism 
3. Freewill ....................... Determinism 
4. Cognitivism ................. Emotionalism (p.234) 
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Materialism is the thesis claiming the existence of a 'real' world comprised of matter. 
This view is the dominant ontological paradigm of Western science and as such is 
influential in psychiatry and general medicine. Diseases are seen as discrete physically 
instantiated entities (although in psychiatry the physiological correlates of disease are 
less clear). Materialism is also evident in the beliefs and values exhibited in the 
everyday lives of many Westerners. Success in life is often equated with the 
accumulation of material objects and many people devote themselves to this end. In 
contrast Indians centre their existence around the notion of spiritualism and see the 
external world as maya (illusory). Their ultimate aim - to transcend the confines of the 
physical world and reach a state of heightened consciousness. Central to this view is a 
belief in the interconnectedness of mind and body. The transient nature of the external 
world is related to its connection with mental phenomena. Traditional Indian methods 
of healing, such as yoga, reflect this view, encouraging interactionist and holistic 
models of illness. But accounts of mental disorder may be wholly spiritualist. It may be 
attributed to spirits or witchcraft and treated by a guru, shaman or mystic. As Laungani 
explains, such practitioners in India are afforded the same respect as trained 
psychiatrists. 
Another important feature of Indian culture which distinguishes it from the West is 
communalism which is contrasted with individualism - a distinction which is central to 
much cross-cultural psychological research (Kleinman & Kleinman, 1991). Indians 
typically live with their extended family in a close-knit community. From their 
relationship with their family Indians gain a sense of identity and a place within the 
community. The status of an individual depends largely on the status of his or her 
family. The extended family network provides emotional and financial support -
problems or difficulties are often dealt with jointly (even problems which in the West 
might be considered personal) - but family members are expected to conform to 
familial and societal norms, as in the eyes of the community deviance may be seen to 
affect the entire family. The pressure on individuals to conform to the expectations of 
their family may exacerbate mental health problems (Channabasavanna & Bhatti, 
1982), however Laungani claims that overall extended family modes of living have a 
positive influence on mental health. He states that they, " ... provide inbuilt safety 
measures against mental disturbances." (p.238). 
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Western society, on the other hand, emphasises individualism. The typical nuclear 
family is insular and is not necessarily part of a distinct community. Westerners 
generally place great value on autonomy and independence and hence problems are 
often handled alone. A mental disorder therefore is usually seen as an individual 
problem and perhaps even a weakness. The mentally ill may be judged as incompetent, 
for example their illness may be interpreted as an inability to handle stress. Laungani 
explains that in individualistic societies people are conditioned into accepting others 
evaluations of them. With regard to the Western materialist conception of mental 
disorder, which favours a bio-medical model, the ascription of blame makes little sense. 
This incongruence is due perhaps to the fact that lay conceptions of mental disorder are 
typically non-biologicaL Depression would not be viewed as beyond a person's control 
in the same way that heart disease would be. 
Laungani's third dimension of difference is delineated by the concepts 'free will' and 
'determinism.' As he explains, although these notions have been the subject of much 
discussion over many years, the question of which provides a better explanation of 
human behaviour is still debated. In Western thinking both views are evident. While 
biological and medical research programmes operate on deterministic assumptions 
social scientists usually evidence a belief in the notion of free wilL And of course a 
belief in the idea of voluntary action is reflected in everyday life. There is a pervasive 
belief that people are able to make choices and hence that they may be held accountable 
for their actions. So individuals may take credit for their successes and accept 
responsibility for their failures. If therefore a mental disorder is viewed as a failing, it 
may be a blameworthy one. 
In contrast Indians generally subscribe to a deterministic construal of life. This is based 
on the Buddhist and Hindu law of karma which rewards and punishes past deeds (of 
present and past lives). In this sense current events are seen as the consequence of past 
events and therefore as predetermined (although of course one may influence ones 
future by changing ones present). As Laungani states, this philosophy of the ups and 
downs of existence may have the effect of taking away 'the sting and stigma from 
suffering.' (p.240). Misfortune is destined and therefore outside a person's immediate 
control. In this regard people may be more accepting of ill health however there is an 
associated risk of indolence. Indians who believe in karmic laws may feel ineffectual 
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and rather than take action, against disease for example, they may resign themselves to 
the inevitability of whatever is coming to them. 
Fourthly and lastly Laungani discusses the distinction between cognitivism and 
emotionalism which he says is exhibited by, ' ... the way in which British and Indians 
construe their social worlds.' (p.240). He claims, using the suggestion of Pan de (1968), 
'that Indian society is relationship centred and British society work-and-activity-
centred.' (p.240). In the former there is evidently a focus on rationality and control 
wherein the unfettered expression of emotion is discouraged. And relationships in this 
context revolve often around commonalities of occupation, because it is occupation that 
usually denotes ones status. In contrast a relationship-centred social structure is more 
likely to revolve around and value emotionality. The open expression of feelings -
positive and negative - is integral to life in an extended family and is not seen as 
weakness of character. And nor is such candour disturbing to those who receive it. 
Outbursts, even of anger, are often treated lightly and seen simply as a natural means of 
releasing emotion. 
Relatedly Varma (1986) contrasts the 'cognitive styles' of India and the West. He 
describes the predominant Indian cognitive style as 'synthetic-gestalt' and the 
prototypical Western one as analytic. The former is said to view things holistically and 
to note the relationships between them. Accordingly interactions between objects and 
phenomena are seen as central and explanations aim for an understanding of the totality 
of interrelated events. The analytic mind on the other hand attempts to explain by 
breaking objects or phenomena into their constituent parts and searching for ever 
smaller (or lower) elements. In this way explanation may involve the analysis of 
isolated constituents. Varma suggests that the differences in cognitive styles may be 
related to the dependency/independency continuum. He states that a synthetic style may 
be more compatible with an interdependent existence and an analytic one with a more 
autonomous way of life. 
On the subject of the Western focus on work, which was briefly mentioned earlier 
Varma (1986) discusses the contrasting Indian approach to performing ones job. This 
is summed up by the words 'chalta hai' (meaning 'will do') which expresses the 
apparently typical Indian attitude to work, which is to basically do as little as possible 
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without endangering ones position. On the other hand Westerners often demonstrate a 
degree of obsessionality or compulsivity in the work place, says Varma, devoting 
themselves to their jobs and pushing themselves to the edge of their ability. If his 
analysis of the Indian work ethic (if one can call it that) seems derogatory it is not 
intended to be so. In fact he speculates that perhaps in the past Indians tried the 
committed and compulsive approach to work and found it ' ... to be inadequate to answer 
the basic issues of human existence.' (p. 25). 
While these representations of various aspects of Eastern and Western cultures are 
interesting and at times insightful they are of course unreservedly simplistic. They 
involve the ascription of sweeping generalisations which explain the behaviour of 
millions of people with a single label. However whether or not such generalisations are 
accurate they are nonetheless representative of common conceptions of the primary 
differences between Eastern and Western ways of life. It is variables such as these 
which are often claimed to affect mental disorders across cultures. Undoubtedly there 
are differences between cultures in many aspects of socialisation however the depth of 
these differences and their significance with regard to the manifestation of mental 
disorder is uncertain. 
CULTURE AND MENTAL DISORDER: TWO CASES 
OF NEURASTHENIA 
The following case study was recorded by Arthur Kleinman an eminent psychiatrist 
who has worked extensively with clients of non-Western backgrounds (particularly 
Chinese). It was first reported in 1986. 
Kleinman and Kleinman (1991) relate the case of Huang Zheni, a man in his late 
twenties, residing in rural China. He reports that he feels despondent, hopeless and 
desperate and that he does not like himself. He also says that he experiences chronic 
headaches and dizziness and he attributes all of these symptoms to childhood trauma 
during the Cultural Revolution. He recounts two distinct incidents. In one he was eight 
years old. He went fishing with some classmates when he should have been at schooL 
Subsequently the boys arrived at class much later than usual. As punishment they were 
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locked in a small mud room, from which they escaped by digging a hole in the wall. 
Huang's two friends were caught by the teacher but Haung escaped. The following day 
on returning to school he was ordered by the teacher to do menial work instead of 
study, but Huang refused. As a result he was severely criticised by his teacher, in front 
of other teachers. After this incident Huang stated "my liver became small and I 
became frightened, cowardly." Since that time he said that he has felt 'paralysed' 
whenever he has had to assert himself before adults. 
The other event took place when Huang was twelve. While walking in the schoolyard 
one day during winter vacation Huang found a note, tacked to a wall, which read 
"Throw down chairman Mao." Unsure what to do about the anti-Mao message he 
sought advice from a close friend who told him to inform their commune leaders. After 
doing this the leaders called the police. The police asked Huang to tell them who had 
written the poster and when he was unable to tell them they accused him. He was told 
that ifhe did not confess he would not be allowed to go home. During this time he was 
kept in a small room on the school grounds and was not allowed to urinate even though 
he urgently needed to do so. He told the policemen again that he had found the slogan 
and did not know who had written it. Finally, late at night Huang was allowed to return 
home. His mother was distraught over his absence so he explained what had happened. 
The following morning the policemen arrived at Huang's home and took him to the 
public security building. There he was told that he would not be allowed to leave until 
had admitted responsibility for the crime, so he signed a confession. Later when he 
arrived home he told his mother that he had written the slogan, as he believed that if he 
was honest with her there would be further trouble. His mother responded by crying 
and cursing him. She stated that she would not have wanted him if she had known he 
would tum out this way. Huang recalled that at this point he broke down in tears and 
was unable to tell her the truth. He said "I felt like a coward. I couldn't tell her." 
After confessing to the crime, Huang was forced to march through the town wearing a 
dunce cap and a sign, written himself, which displayed a self-critical message. He was 
surrounded by local people who cursed him, spat on him and threw stones and soil at 
him. The next day he was sent to an adult work place where he was expected to do hard 
labour. The work was exhausting and often while he worked local children shouted 
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insults at him. Huang remembered that during periods of fierce criticism he felt numb 
and even 'paralysed.' He often wanted to declare his innocence but felt unable to do so. 
He reasoned that he would not be believed. Eventually after a full year of heavy labour, 
his work mates, who were impressed with his diligence, appealed to the local 
authorities to allow Huang to return to school. This was granted so Huang then shifted 
to another province where he was not known and continued his schooling. He later 
joined the communist party. 
Huang never told his mother the true account of what had happened. He says that he 
wanted to when she was dying but felt afraid and thought also that' .. .it would not do 
any good.' Hence Huang's mother died without knowing that her son was in fact 
innocent. Huang reports that this fact is a constant source of shame and self-loathing. 
Looking back at these events he feels utterly dejected. He expresses anger, toward his 
friend who would not admit to the authorities that Huang had only found the poster and 
had not written it, and toward the policemen who interrogated him. He says that he 
experiences an intense sense of injustice which he associates with a burning sensation 
in his head, dizziness and fatigue. He also feels afraid that someone in the Communist 
party will find out about his history and have him expelled. 
Huang states that he does not expect to recover from this event. "It has affected my 
character. I am withdrawn; I don't like to be too friendly with others. I am a coward. I 
cannot trust others." He says that he would like to write about his experiences in a way 
that would illustrate the "losses and defeat" that have befallen his generation, however 
he has no ability or training for this sort of task. And he says that, anyway, whenever he 
attempts to write anything down he is overwhelmed by feelings of weariness and 
dizziness, and by an awareness of his own inability. He often refers to this inability as 
'paralysis,' not physical, but mental; a profound powerlessness which prevents him 
from acting. He also reports feeling trapped, and continually fearful that others will 
learn about his past. 
He identifies his past experiences and present discontent with others who suffered 
during the Cultural Revolution. In this way he does not see his own suffering as an 
isolated case but rather as one of many young people who experienced trauma of one 
sort or another. However as noted by Kleinman, Huang's story is unusual in that it does 
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not revolve around the loss of loved ones. Rather Huang lost his innocence, his youth, 
his self-esteem, his confidence and his hope for the future. Of course many of his 
compatriots would have experienced trauma without consequently developing a 
disorder. Huang was probably vulnerable and his crisis therefore particularly injurious. 
According to Kleinman, Huang'S self-described symptomatology is best understood in 
terms of Chinese language and culture. One of Huang's primary symptoms is dizziness, 
in Chinese tou yun. This is often construed in Chinese medicine as the result of an 
imbalance between the mental and physical constituents of the body, and the social 
world. This imbalance is believed to arise, through changes in qi (vital energy) - its 
amount and circulation may vary - and out of past experiences. Equilibrium, both 
physical and emotional, is disturbed causing various unpleasant physical and 
psychological symptoms. Huang's other main symptom is weakness which seems to 
have both a mental and physical dimension. 
The psychosomatic nature of Huang's symptom report reflects Chinese conceptions of 
distress. Negative experiences which might in the West be seen to have psychological 
consequences, may in China be seen to manifest physically. The expression of 
responses to political oppression through such symptom patterns is widely accepted. In 
China this configuration of pathology is typically diagnosed as 'neurasthenia'. This 
disorder was first referred to by an American neurologist last century and disappeared 
from the American Psychiatric Association's classification less than 20 years ago 
(Starcevic, 1991). Today it is a diagnosis most commonly given in China, Korea and 
Japan. Neurasthenia is characterised by fatigue, diminished enjoyment and various 
bodily complaints, such as headache. 
Kleinman's diagnosis of Huang is 'depression' - there were other clinical features not 
described here - however he acknowledges that a Chinese physician would probably 
give a diagnosis of 'neurasthenia.' With regard to another similar case study 
(Kleinman, 1988) he states: 
"For the anthropologist, the problem seems more that of demoralisation as a 
serious life distress due to obvious social sources than depression as a 
psychiatric disease. From the anthropological vantage point, demoralisation 
might also be conceived as part of the illness experience associated with 
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disease, neurasthenia or depression. Here illness refers to the patient's 
perception, experience, expression, and pattern of coping with symptoms, while 
disease refers to the way practitioners recast illness in terms of their theoretical 
models of pathology ... Thus a psychiatric diagnosis is an interpretation of a 
person's experience." (p. 7). 
Kleinman's distinction between 'illness' and 'disease' was introduced in the previous 
chapter. On the one hand there is the actual illness experience and on the other there is 
the way that this experience is interpreted by the physician, namely in terms of disease 
categories. Kleinman also makes the point that the problem must be viewed in light of 
the personal and social context in which it has arisen and to which, according to the 
patient, it is inextricably tied. In the case of Huang Zhenyi, his feelings of shame and 
fear and his profound anger at the injustice that befell him are only fully understood 
with reference to the socio-political environment in which they arose. It was this 
environment which caused the events and it was this environment which mediated their 
particular consequences, in the form of psychopathology, for Huang. Huang's illness 
experience was shaped by cultural conceptions of suffering. 
Obviously political oppression of this nature is not limited to China. It is common 
world-wide and probably with equally deleterious psychological consequences. 
Huang's story resonates with other tales of oppression and may be easily understood 
even by someone who knows little of Chinese history. However while it may be 
interpreted as a tale of miscellaneous human suffering, Kleinman sees Huang as very 
much a cultural product with a history unique to a particular place and time. His illness 
stems from this and is best understood in this regard. This does not mean that he should 
not receive a diagnosis, but simply that any clinical account of his morbidity should 
acknowledge this. Moreover his symptomatology is culturally framed, expressing a 
specific 'folk' conceptualisation of disease. And this conceptualisation is corroborated 
by Chinese physicians. 
This example raises questions about the nature of mental disorder. Is Huang depressed 
or does he suffer from neurasthenia? Do his symptoms actually differ from those of a 
person who is diagnosed with depression? Or is it only his interpretation of them which 
is different? Should a mental disorder be understood in the context in which it occurs or 
is it something which is universal? Why is it that two physicians may give a person two 
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different diagnoses? Is the same-culture diagnosis necessarily more valid? These 
questions relate both to theoretical and clinical matters. An obvious and important goal 
is successful treatment for the patient and another is to establish some degree of 
conceptual understanding which is generalisable. In other words one can use cross-
cultural examples such as these to learn something about the nature of mental disorder. 
The diagnosis of neurasthenia still appears in the ICD 9 - where it is described as a 
neurotic disorder - although it is a diagnosis rarely used now in Western Europe 
(Starcevic, 1991). Shorter (1995) includes it in a list of psychosomatic complaints 
which he claims are subject to a substantial degree of 'cultural moulding.' He explains 
how these sorts of complaints which may also be referred to as 'conversion reaction: 
'nondisease' or 'persistent somatisation,' have appeared in various forms over the 
years. During the 1600s numerous cases of pseudoepilepsy were documented. Two 
centuries later hysterical paralysis became rather prevalent. This disorder, which 
typically affected young women, was iridicated by partial or complete paralysis of one 
or both lower limbs. 
During the 1930s a bacteriologist claimed that cases of neurasthenia were actually 
chronic brucellosis. Following reports of this 'new' disease by the media, many people 
presented themselves to physicians with the belief that this was the label that best fitted 
their symptoms. At around the same time the condition of 'hypoglycemia' was first 
described. Symptoms of this disorder were typically psychological in nature yet they 
were attributed to a deficiency of glucose in the blood stream. Looking back, it is now 
clear that there was no evidence for either of these conditions, even though they were 
'discovered' by medical experts. The latest conceptualisation of this type of 
psychosomatic illness entity is chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS). Initially, it was 
claimed that this disorder was caused by the Epstein-Barr virus, a virus which was 
found in those with chronic fatigue. However, later studies revealed that this virus 
evidenced with equal frequency in those without such symptoms. Hence, once again, 
hopes for an organic basis for amorphous psychosomatic symptoms were unfulfilled. 
Yager and Young (1974) point out that many people desire a diagnosis which has a 
clear organic etiology as it means that they can avoid the stigma of a psychological 
illness. Metabolic conditions are often believed to be more respectable. This may be 
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why Neurasthenia is a more common diagnosis in China and Japan. Munakata (1989) 
reports the case of a Japanese pilot who crash landed killing some and injuring many of 
his passengers in 1982. For several years prior to the crash, the pilot had been receiving 
treatment for a 'psychosomatic disorder' and 'malfunction of the autonomic nervous 
system.' He had time off work to recover and was subsequently considered fit to return 
to work. It was later discovered that the pilot had been prescribed a particular 
psychotropic medication which is typically given for schizophrenia. And according to 
the fmal air accident report, the cause of the crash was the pilot's sudden response to an 
auditory hallucination, wherein he changed the plane's trajectory, away from the 
normal landing path. 
The pilot's sister confirmed that he had been acting strangely, reporting frequent 
delusions and hallucinations. It appeared that the pilot had been given a disguised 
diagnosis so that he could avoid the social stigma associated with a mental disorder. 
Apparently the pilot's elder sister had'died in a mental hospital and his family had 
attempted to conceal her existence. This may seem extreme, however it is not if one 
considers the importance of family connections in Japan. A diagnosis of a mental 
disorder is something which would have ramifications for all members of a particular 
family. For young women it may mean diminished marital prospects. Japanese 
physicians are acutely aware of such consequences and often attempt to protect people 
by giving disguised diagnoses, such as neurasthenia. In the case of the pilot this false 
diagnosis had serious consequences. 
This example demonstrates the social dimension of diagnosis. In Japan as in some other 
countries, the label neurasthenia legitimises psychological symptoms by giving them an 
organic explanation. Today, in the West, similar symptom patterns would probably be 
diagnosed as CFS. Historically, such labels and conceptions change according to 
prevailing medical theories and media interest. According to Shorter (1995) the 
increase in somatic illness in the West correlates with less tolerance of depression 
which reflects societies' general responses to 'madness.' Ware and Kleinman (1992) 
provide an interesting analysis of the social embeddedness of neurasthenia and CFS. 
They state that: 
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· .. health and suffering, like other existential states, are patterned by culture 
realised as local worlds of experience. The process is one in which events in the 
local world - moral, political, economic - mediate the effects of large-scale 
social forces in ways that are reflected in cognitive, affective, and physiological 
changes. The result is the manifestation, exacerbation, andlor alleviation of 
symptoms. The experience of illness in tum structures and shapes the local 
world by serving as a vehicle for change in the character of social life for both 
the sufferer and others with whom he or she regularly interacts. (p. 547). 
Suggested here is a dynamic interplay between illness and society wherein each may 
influence the other. Not only is society seen to shape illness, but illness is also seen to 
shape society. In the case of Huang, one can argue that the way he experienced his 
disorder was shaped by his culture and that his culture is in tum shaped by the 
responses to illness of those like Huang. The relationship of culture to illness is also 
seen in the case of the Japanese pilot. In many societies mental illness is stigmatised 
(Fabrega, 1991), hence a particular diagnosis may have serious consequences for 
individuals and their families. Physicians therefore, may respond to social forces, as 
well as physiological and behavioural ones when forming a diagnosis. 
These examples reveal some of the ways in which culture may be seen to interact with 
the manifestation and diagnosis of mental disorder. This complex interaction is central 
to many of the issues and difficulties of cross-cultural psychology. 
ISSUES AND DIFFICULTIES OF 
CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Nilchaikovit, Hill & Holland (1993) report the case of a 24 year old Korean woman 
who has been diagnosed with leukaemia and referred for psychiatric assessment. The 
assessment was done jointly by one Asian and one American physician. Following the 
initial evaluation the physicians had developed quite different views of the patient and 
hence different treatment plans. The American physician reasoned that the patient was 
suffering from a lack of independence and control, due to her parents' 
overinvolvement, hence his recommended intervention involved assisting the woman to 
distance herself from the family and establish some space and autonomy. In contrast, 
the Asian physician believed that the patient wanted to maintain the involvement of her 
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family, and saw her symptoms of passivity and regression as an expression of a cultural 
norm, as opposed to a sign of pathology. 
The authors use this case to illustrate the importance of understanding the cultural 
background of patients. Although their paper centres on purely physical disorders they 
make some pertinent points. Conceptions of self and conceptions of the relationships 
between self and others may affect illness attributions. And responses to illness may 
vary according to ones particular existential views. Such views are often mediated by 
religion and cultural heritage. According to Nilchaikovit and colleagues: "In order to 
understand cultural influences on human behaviour, it is crucial to understand the 
varying ways in which the concept of self and self-other relationships are experienced, 
defined, and used among cultures of the world" (p. 49). This is one of the primary 
challenges of cross-cultural psychology and has implications for both clinical and 
research practices. This section provides a brief discussion of some of these 
implications. 
One of the major barriers to cross-cultural understanding in psychology and psychiatry 
is differences in language. Many societies today are multi-racial and multi-lingual so it 
is not uncommon for health professionals to interview clients who have a different first 
language. Sometimes such clients are emigrants who may speak the language of their 
new locality, but less proficiently than their native tongue. Westermeyer (1987) states: 
"The patient may have limited vocabulary, grammar, syntax, and use of idiom in the 
second language." (p. 161). And as Westermeyer notes, amidst the symptoms of mental 
disorder the ability to communicate in a second language is often impaired. When using 
a second language a patient's psychosis may be exaggerated and the physician may 
overestimate the severity of pathology. Others may express greater distress in their first 
language due to better fluency in this medium. 
Sometimes psychologists and psychiatrists must carry out interviews with the help of 
translators. These may be people especially trained for this sort of task or otherwise 
family members or friends of the patient. Marcos (1976) says that difficulties can arise 
if a family member or friend takes on the role of translator. They may attempt to avoid 
asking questions about topics such as sex, suicidal ideation and other typically personal 
matters. And there is a tendency for lay interpreters to translate selectively according to 
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their own perceptions of the situation. They might also disrupt the interview by 
expressing their own analyses and related suggestions. For these reasons, properly 
trained translators are often preferred. With some psychiatric knowledge and intimate 
understanding of the client's language and culture they are more likely to facilitate the 
interview process. However professional translators are not always available. In lesser 
developed countries where they are often most needed there is a palpable lack of 
resources and translators are unlikely to be considered a priority. Commenting on 
medical resources in America, Westermeyer states: "The recent focus on biological 
psychiatry has resulted in virtual abandonment of socio-cultural research funding." (p. 
164). 
Westermeyer's claim has been echoed elsewhere. Mental health treatment programmes 
in many developing countries are unable to meet even the most basic of demands so 
there is little time or money for socio-cultural investigation. In India the proportion of 
psychiatrists to the general . population is slightly over one per million and 
conservatively it has been estimated that at least 4000 per million would have a mental 
disorder (Laungani, 1992). Obviously Indians would seek other forms of treatment 
besides that offered by psychiatry but this may be due to the scarcity of psychiatrists 
and the cost of consulting one rather than an inherent preference for alternatives. As 
Wig (1989) explains, in developing countries psychiatry is typically a 'minor clinical 
speciality' which revolves around the institutional care of those with chronic mental 
illness. Psychiatric care is available to others only through the private sector which 
means that for many it is unaffordable. 
The limitations of psychiatric services in these contexts exacerbate the problems of 
cross-cultural understanding. Because psychiatric training in many of these countries is 
inadequate, professionals may be trained elsewhere, in contexts quite different from 
that in which they will ultimately work. Often developing countries must rely on 
Western trained clinicians and researchers who are unfamiliar with local language and 
culture. According to Kleinman (1987), vernacular difference is typically viewed by 
psychiatrists as an impediment to understanding, and translation, as an annoying 
technical difficulty. For the anthropologist however, " ... translation .. .is the very essence 
of ethnographic research" (p. 451). Anthropologists attempt to gain an understanding of 
language with reference to the broader cultural context. For them the translation of 
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findings into tenus which are suitable for cross-cultural comparison comes only after a 
period of cultural immersion during which the investigator attempts to understand the 
social environment from the inside out (as opposed to the reverse). But, as Kleinman 
explains, translation is often the first step in a psychiatrist's investigation, as at the 
outset diagnostic assessment tools are translated into local idioms. 
The use of Western-devised and Western-oriented diagnostic tools in non-Western 
settings has been the focus of much debate over the years. Kleinman claims that many 
such assessment instruments are not readily translatable. He states, for example, that 
some North American diagnostic tools measure dysphoria with the tenus 'feeling blue' 
or feeling down' which are meaningless when translated literally into other languages. 
The most commonly used Western diagnostic instrument for the measurement of 
depression is the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) which has also been used 
extensively in non-Western settings. The BDI has been translated into several 
languages and used in a number of ethnic groups with reasonable success. For instance 
studies carried out in Chinese, French-Canadian and Swedish populations using 
appropriately modified versions show good reliability (Naughton & Wiklund, 1993). 
Zheng and Lin (1991) compared the use of the Chinese version of the BDI (CBDI) with 
the Chinese Depression Inventory (CDI) and found the latter to have superior reliability 
and validity. The reason for this, they explain, is that items in the CDI were derived 
from an analysis of the ways in which depressed Chinese express emotional and 
somatic experiences; ways that are culturally distinct and not entirely captured by the 
CBDI. They ascribe the disparity between the two scales to differences in the verbal 
expression between North American and Chinese cultures and conclude that" ... there is 
an obvious limitation in the application of Western self-report scales to non-Western 
populations even if they are accurately translated in the semantic sense." (p. 531). (Or 
perhaps because they are). One of the primary reasons for devising standardised 
diagnostic instruments which may be used cross-culturally, is the ease with which 
results may be compared. It is obviously difficult to compare results from different 
psychometric tests. However such comparison is useless if results do not provide an 
accurate representation of people's mental states. 
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Even if one decides that Western-developed diagnostic schedules such as the BDI can 
be used reliably across cultures, there are other reasons why their use may still be 
problematic. In many developing countries there is wide-spread illiteracy so 
questionnaires requiring reading and writing may be impossible. Moreover many 
people may be unfamiliar with the notion of a psychological test and may have 
difficulty carrying out the necessary self-reflection and self-assessment (Lonner, 1990). 
What is being suggested, is not that these people have limited self-awareness, but rather 
that they have not previously measured their thoughts, feelings and behaviours in this 
way. Rating scales require a particular, quantitative and linear, form of self-evaluation 
which may be foreign to some people. Hence they may question the value of such tests 
and not take them seriously. 
The problem of patient cynicism manifests more widely. A Western clinician andlor 
researcher in a lesser developed country, such as India, bringing with him or her foreign 
ideas and techniques, may not be warmly received. The Western conception of mental 
disorder does not 'fit' with traditional Indian approaches to its understanding and 
therefore patients might feel that they are being imposed on. This raises ethical 
questions: What level of explanation is considered satisfactory before a particular 
treatment can proceed? Is it acceptable for a Western physician to treat a patient in this 
context? Note that in the West, people who are 'committed' are often diagnosed and 
treated without being told either their diagnosis or their treatment plan, even if they are 
considered able to understand it. 
Of course if mental disorders are seen as primarily the result of neurobiological 
dysfunction then questions of this nature might seem trivial. According to some 
theorists, pharmacological treatment for schizophrenia would be expected to be equally 
effective in all populations. But even if it is effective, physicians in these contexts have 
a responsibility to explain their conceptions and procedures to patients, and gain 
consent for interventions. Westermeyer (1987) notes that it is important for clinicians to 
realise that they too have belief systems which are intimately connected with their own 
culture. This awareness aids the appreciation of cultural difference. However even if a 
psychiatrist or psychologist understands the culture of their client, accurate assessment 
is difficult without culture-sensitive instruments. 
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Channabasavanna, Raguram, Mitchell, Parvathavardhini & Thriveni (1993) report a 
study involving the adaptation of the Explanatory Model Interview Catalogue (EMIC) 
for use in South India. The EMIC, a relatively new assessment tool, arose largely out of 
Kleinman's 'explanatory model theory.' It was Kleinman's aim to devise a method for 
cross-cultural understanding which could acknowledge the personal and cultural 
significance of mental illness yet still be intelligible and comparable to Western 
psychiatry. "The EMIC makes operational a cultural model of illness having four 
components: 1) patterns of distress, 2) perceived causes, 3) preferences for help-seeking 
and treatment, and 4) general illness beliefs." (Channabasavanna, et aI., p. 2). This 
approach allows the physician to create a comprehensive culture-relevant illness picture 
which can then be understood in trans-cultural terms. The main advantage of the EMIC 
is that it does not involve the imposition of Western conceptions of illness on diverse 
cultures. Although of course ultimately there is a need for cross-cultural comparison, 
with the EMIC this can be done more accurately, because it is sensitive to, and even 
embracing of, cultural variation. In response to their findings, Channabasavanna et al. 
conclude that the EMIC (which was for their study translated into Kannada) is a useful 
and reliable instrument in cultural research. 
This sort of innovation in research techniques paves the way to more accurate cross-
cultural investigation. There is an increasing awareness that there is a social dimension 
to mental disorder and that it is therefore necessary to develop clinical practices which 
are responsive to this fact. However radical relativists are likely to question the efficacy 
of such approaches, because they still inevitably use the Western approach as a 
touchstone of normality and abnormality. For instance there is an implicit assumption 
that the 'basic emotions' as defined in Western language and culture are universal. So 
emotional experiences as delineated by, say, a Chinese person, will be interpreted 
according to this conceptualisation of the so-called basic emotions. As mentioned 
earlier, linguists such as Whorf (1950), have long argued against this analysis, 
suggesting instead that the basic emotions are actually artefacts of the English 
language. 
Wierzbicka (1992) has written extensively on this proposition, with detailed analyses of 
emotion concepts in several languages. She demonstrates that in some languages, 
concepts such as happiness, sadness, and anger are not represented. For example the 
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Ifaluk language of Micronesia has no word that corresponds directly with anger. The 
closest word in meaning to the English anger is song which means something like 
'justified anger.' But it also refers to a milder, less aggressive, emotional state than that 
inferred by the word anger. The behaviours which characterise song, such as scolding, 
sulking and food refusal are directed at the individual who has apparently misbehaved 
or offended. An elder is typically song at a younger person, or a person of lower status. 
Parents are often song at their children in order to express their disapproval. As 
reported by Wierzbicka, Lutz (1987) observed that Ifaluk culture actively encourages 
non-violent behaviour and values it more highly than it appears to be valued in most 
Western societies. Wierzbicka writes: "The fact that the Ifaluk language has no word 
corresponding to the English word anger and that the closest Ifaluk counterpart of this 
concept is much "softer" and closer to admonition, seems to constitute a lexical 
confirmation of this difference between the two cultures" (p. 306). 
According to Wierzbicka the difference between anger and song represents deep 
culture-bound differences in the experience of emotion. With reference to this and 
numerous other examples Wierzbicka argues that the 'basic' emotions as delineated by 
the English language do not designate lexical universals. Rather they express a 
particular conception of emotion, dividing the experience of it according to that 
conception. In response to this claim, some theorists argue that although there are subtle 
differences between languages in the understanding and description of emotion, that 
there are underlying similarities which demonstrate the existence of core emotions. For 
instance anger and song may be seen as elaborations of a basic emotion which has 
something in common with both concepts. 
As Wierzbicka points out however, this view is problematic in that the core emotion 
remains elusive and indefinable. If the basic emotion may be expressed differently in 
different cultures, what is it that signifies the manifestation of this emotion? It will not 
signified by language, nor by behaviour unless some similarities are found within these. 
She states: 
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"The advocates of "basic emotions" ... should be particularly interested in 
finding some universal points of reference in terms of which their hypothetical 
basic emotions could be identified; for without such points of reference their 
claims can be seen as either ethnocentric or less than truly meaningful." (p. 
297). 
Wierzbicka does not doubt that trans-cultural points of reference can be found but she 
proposes that such universals are likely to be more basic than complex concepts such as 
sadness and anger. She suggests that they may be captured with terms such as want, 
think, good and bad. 
The relevance of this discussion is obvious. Psychology, like most SCIences, uses 
English as its principle linguistic medium. Hence much cross-cultural research revolves 
around English terminology. The tools of diagnosis and research typically use English 
concepts. This means that from the outset there is an ethnocentric element to be 
overcome. If anger is not something experienced by an Ifaluk person, would it be 
reasonable to ascribe the label of anger if that is the closest label available in ones own 
language? The question of the universality of emotion has deeper significance. If 
emotions differ across cultures then perhaps abnormal emotion also differs. If the ways 
that emotions are understood by, and manifested in, people are to some extent culture-
relative then the ways that the malfunction of emotions are understood and manifested 
may be equally culture-driven. 
The position of Wierzbicka and others is controversial but none-the-less coherent and 
compelling. The question of the relationship of language to the experience of emotion 
is interesting and particularly relevant to the discussion of mental disorders across 
cultures. Many theories of emotion stress its connection with cognition (Strongman, 
1986). If one assumes that language is a form of cognition then it is reasonable to 
suggest that language is linked with emotion. This is perhaps a vague assertion but it is 
nevertheless an important one. Language may not only shape the interpretation of 
emotional experience but also the experience itself (which, anyway, is probably linked 
to the interpretation of it). 
Following from this is the argument that abnormal or maladaptive emotion will be 
expressed or 'channelled' by way of the language and customs with which one is 
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familiar. In this case a person will be depressed only if he or she understands the 
concept of depression; because the concept 'depression' is part of the experience. In 
labelling ones own experience one is thereby changing the quality of that experience. 
The interpretation both personal and social, feedback into the individual's response. To 
some extent it is a matter of noticing what one is alerted to and what one is expecting. If 
cognition is understood to affect emotion then one must accept perhaps that cognition 
may have some control over emotion, but exactly how this control might manifest is 
unclear. In the case of pathological sadness, it could perhaps mean the difference 
between depression in the West and neurasthenia in China. 
While there is more to mental disorder than abnormal emotion, the relativist argument 
presented by linguists such as Wierzbicka has implications for cross-cultural 
psychology. Most importantly clinicians and researchers alike, must acknowledge the 
cultural milieu of their language, beliefs and diagnostic tools. Cultural psychology 
based on ethnocentrism undermines the epistemological and metaphysical approaches 
of other cultures which may have much to offer Western thought. Moreover success 
in clinical contexts will likely depend on the acknowledgement and understanding of 
other world views. This may be difficult for the psychiatrist or clinical psychologist 
who lacks specialised training on cross-cultural issues. 
SUMMARY 
As evidenced herein, the field of cross-cultural psychology incorporates a vast and 
diverse array of phenomena. It is characterised by a number of important issues and 
debates which remain unresolved. The primary goal of this chapter was to describe 
these and their various arguments and introduce some of the relevant literature. As 
discussed, the impact of culture on mental disorder is multifarious and complex, 
involving variables such as language, politics, and religion. Consequently the use of 
Western diagnostic systems in cross-cultural contexts is problematical. A Western 
clinician may not recognise the socio-political context of disorder in which the 
disorder is inextricably embedded. Or the diagnostic instruments which he or she is 
using may be inappropriate. As mentioned though, some culturally sensitive 
instruments have been developed and used with some success. 
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The following chapter examines the cross-cultural application of the DSM-IV with a 
focus on the recent cultural additions. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE CROSS-CULTURAL APPLICATION 
OF THE DSM-IV 
The latest edition of the DSM displays a significant move towards cross-cultural 
understanding. It is for this reason that the investigation herein of the cultural 
dimension of psychiatric nosology focuses solely on the use of this diagnostic manual. 
The ICD-IO while in many ways the equivalent of the DSM-N lacks the cultural 
sensitivity. With reference to the ICD-IO, Alarcon (1995) states: "The attempt to 
obliterate the cultural component is almost blatant." (p. 458). Like earlier versions, the 
ICD-IO utilises a rigid and universalistic approach to the understanding of 
psychopathology. The extent to which the DSM-N is superior in this regard - therefore 
the extent to which it is cross-culturally effectual- is the subject of this chapter. 
Following a brief description of the history of the DSM series, is a discussion of the 
development of the cultural components of the DSM-N. The efficacy of these 
modifications has been the subject of widespread debate. While some view them as 
giant leaps forward, others see them as small steps albeit in the right direction. One 
question which clearly deserves attention is whether a diagnostic manual of mental 
disorders should aim for universal usage. Perhaps such an aim detracts from the more 
important goal of understanding the tremendous variation in the manifestation and 
interpretation of mental disorders in different socio-cultural environments. The answer 
to this depends in part on the cross-cultural presentation of disorders such as depression 
and schizophrenia which are pivotal to Western conceptions of psychopathology, and 
on the prevalence of culture-specific disorders which can not be explained with the 
application of Western diagnostic categories. 
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Following an evaluation of the cross-cultural components of the DSM-IV is a look at 
some of the culture-bound syndromes which are listed in the manual. This is followed 
by a discussion of the cross-cultural manifestation of depression. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DSM-IV 
The inaugural edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders was 
published in 1952. It listed 106 diagnostic categories and was influenced greatly by the 
ideas of Adolf Meyer (Skodol Wilson & Skodol, 1994). Meyer was perhaps one of the 
first theorists in the field to propose a multi-dimensional model of mental disorder, 
acknowledging the influence of psychological, social and biological variables. The 
DSM I was also based on Freudian theory (Alarcon, 1995); its diagnostic criteria 
typically subjective and theory laden, suggesting links between unconscious reactions 
and nebulous stressors. These two rather divergent theoretical influences rendered a 
diagnostic manual of little practical use. It lacked operational definitions and hence 
relied heavily on therapist interpretation. 
The DSM-II, published in 1968, was undoubtedly an improvement; it eliminated much 
of the psychoanalytic theory of the earlier edition and adopted a more descriptive and 
objective methodology (Alarcon, 1995). However it was not particularly consequential 
in psychiatric circles. It was not until the appearance of the DSM-III that the APA 
became a significant force in psychiatric nosology. Published in 1980, the third DSM 
extended the use of descriptive diagnostic criteria with the aim of multi-theoretical 
compatibility. It was broadly based on a biopsychosocial model of psychopathology, 
reflecting developments in psychopharmacology and growth in cultural understanding 
(Alarcon, 1995). Yet its aim was to be atheoretical - to describe psychopathology 
without reference to any particular theory. However as many theorists have pointed out 
(e.g. Nikelly, 1992; Poland, Eckardt & Spalding, 1996) it was not atheoretical. The 
process of classification necessarily involves the application of theory. For instance the 
DSM-III introduced a multiaxial system dividing mental disorders into several general 
kinds. The development of this framework would (at the very least) have involved the 
ascription of theories of the similarities between particular disorders. 
96 
Although the DSM-III was purported to have displayed better reliability than its 
predecessors (Skodol Wilson & Skodol, 1994), it met with some criticism, especially 
with regard to the cross-cultural applicability of the manual (Alarcon, 1995). Many of 
the mental disorders included in the manual were not found outside the West. As noted 
by Alarcon, 80% of the total human population exist in non-Western cultures, hence it 
could not be considered a truly international classification system if it was based solely 
on Western conceptions of disease. In response to such criticisms, revisions to the 
DSM-III in 1987 included an acknowledgement of the limitations of the manual in 
diverse cultural settings and a recommendation that clinicians respond with sensitivity 
to differences in language, values and behaviour. However for those expecting a major 
move towards the embodiment of cultural factors this modification was seen as nothing 
more than a token gesture. Clearly the DSM-III-R expressed "".Western or more 
appropriately American cultural commitments." (Alarcon, 1995, p. 453). 
The Task Force involved in the development of the DSM-IV sought to address this 
issue with the aim of enhancing its efficacy, in the multi-ethnic environment of the 
U.S.A., and in diverse international settings (Skodol Wilson & Skodol 1994). As noted 
by Lewis-Fernandez and Kleinman (1995) the use of the DSM (in its many forms) has 
increased over the years to the point where it has surpassed the use of the lCD-lOin 
some countries. It is now widely used in Japan and in the U.K. It was the aim of those 
instrumental in the development of the fourth DSM, that cultural issues be rigorously 
addressed. Hence a committee was set up to establish the inadequacies of the DSM-III-
R in this area and propose ways of improving the cultural validity of the forthcoming 
edition. 
This investigation culminated in a number of changes. Basically the DSM-IV attends to 
cultural factors in three ways. Firstly, it includes in the text, a discussion of the cross-
cultural differences in the presentations of some disorders. Secondly, it provides in an 
Appendix a list of culture-bound syndromes. And thirdly, it outlines a cultural 
formulation for the assessment of cultural factors, which may be used in conjunction 
with each of the axes of the DSM-IV. The cultural formulation uses the following five 
category headings: 
97 
- Cultural identity of the individual. 
- Cultural explanations of the individual's illness. 
- Cultural factors related to psychosocial environment and levels of functioning. 
- Cultural elements of the relationship between the individual and the clinician. 
- Overall cultural assessment for diagnosis and care. 
(DSM-IV p. 844) 
The cultural formulation, then, is a substantial and complex addition to the diagnostic 
procedure. It allows, within diagnosis, the embodiment of the many rich and diverse 
aspects of culture and acknowledges their multi-dimensional impact on the individual 
and his or her psychopathology. Mezzich (1995) describes some of the potential 
benefits of the use of the cultural formulation in clinical assessment. He states, firstly, 
that one of the primary advantages is the greater capacity for understanding the patient 
and his or her situation. After recognising the culture with which the client identifies, 
the clinician should gain an understanding of the client's own-culture illness 
explanation and of the ways in which his or her culture might impact on the illness. 
As noted by Mezzich another important advantage of the cultural formulation is the 
potential for data collection. Traditional diagnostic approaches focus on prototypical 
symptom patterns to the exclusion of other potentially relevant variables. They provide 
no systematic way of recording or considering culture-specific factors. This means that 
a large body of information which may enhance understanding of cross-cultural issues 
is lost. The cultural formulation encourages the inclusion of cultural data, not only for 
the benefit of the client but also for the purpose of expanding and enriching the 
knowledge of the impact of culture on psychopathology. Perhaps one of the most 
important aspects of this practice is the inclusion of individual perceptions of meaning. 
Fundamental is how the patient construes his or her illness because such self-
examination and self-diagnosis is an important indicator of cultural conceptions of 
illness. 
The third and last benefit of the cultural formulation, suggested by Mezzich, is the 
general enhancement of the clinical process through a better client-clinician 
relationship. If the client feels that his or her beliefs, values, and practices are 
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understood and respected by the clinician, then there is increased likelihood that good 
rapport will be established and that the client will trust the clinician and his or her 
clinical procedures. A psychiatric assessment is, at the best of times, a daunting affair. 
This apprehension may be magnified by cultural differences between the client and 
clinician, especially in environments where there is tension between ethnic groups. The 
cultural formulation offers a way of fostering cross-cultural understanding so as to 
facilitate communication and establish a culture-sensitive approach to diagnosis and 
treatment. The application of a diagnostic label may be experienced as intimidating 
even when it is a label with which one is reasonably familiar. It is likely to be 
experienced as even more intimidating if it is seen as representative of an entirely 
foreign system of illness interpretation. 
Hence it is important for the psychologist or psychiatrist to not only show an 
appreciation of the client's cultural background, but to also acknowledge the cultural 
relativity of hislher own diagnostic and' treatment methods. An aspect of this involves 
offering the patient information regarding the respective clinical procedures. 
Explanation and subsequent demystification are likely to facilitate diagnosis and 
treatment. As Alarcon (1995) states, " ... the clinician-patient encounter realises culture" 
(p. 455). Both patient and clinician embody their socio-cultural contexts. Each takes 
with him/her a socio-cultural history which impacts on interpersonal communication 
and understanding. It is essential for the clinician to recognise this and develop 
sensitive and open-minded clinical practices. Such an approach requires a certain level 
of skill. As Mezzich points out, the successful application of the cultural formulation 
and other cultural components of the DSM -IV depends on relevant clinical training and 
such training has been widely encouraged " ... on the grounds that it leads to better 
treatment outcomes" (Alarcon, p. 655). So in order for changes to the DSM to be 
effective, clinicians may require guidance in their practical application. 
While the changes, in the direction of cultural understanding, incorporated into the 
DSM-N may seem substantial they represent only a portion of those recommended by 
the committee. Lewis-Fernandez & Kleinman (1995) state: 
"The cultural additions to the General Introduction and the 'Cultural features' of 
individual disorders, based on a large body of scholarship were cut down 
dramatically and their critical emphasis eliminated, typically resulting in 
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superficial commentaries that are often empty of specific content. .. This pattern 
of decisions denotes a general policy. It suggests that the editors of the DSM -N 
may not really be interested in the cultural validation of the manual and seem 
unwilling to accord the same serious consideration to cultural data as is given to 
other data sources (p. 439). 
As noted by Lewis-Fernandez and Kleinman, among the rej ected recommendations 
were the three suggested Western "culture-bound" syndromes: Namely, Anorexia 
Nervosa, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Dissociative Identity Disorder. The DSM-N 
has essentially retained the view that the disorders listed in main part of the manual (i.e. 
within the five axes) are universal. Disorders considered to be non-Western are 
included in the glossary of culture-bound syndromes. According to Lewis-Fernandez 
and Kleinman those involved in designing the DSM-N ultimately decided on a watered 
down cultural component which seeks to perpetuate the view that difference and 
heterogeneity are superficial and unimportant. While some commentators would view 
the DSM -IV as the product of a deeper understanding and more open-minded 
consideration of the relationship between culture and mental health, Lewis-Fernandez 
and Kleinman claim, in contrast, that "It is clear that recent theoretical and research 
changes in cultural psychiatry ... have not permeated the leadership of U.S. psychiatry" 
(p.445). 
Alarcon (1995) claims that there are inadequacies in the DSM-N's approach to the 
understanding and delineation of personality disorders. He points out that the modes of· 
expression of some aspects of behaviour are dependent on ones socio-cultural 
environment, particularly those aspects of behaviour which are mediated by 
personality. However with regard to the particular symptom patterns of the personality 
disorders, as outlined in the DSM-N, the socio-cultural nature of personality seems to 
have been overlooked. According to Alarcon the personality disorders outlined in the 
manual are relative to Western derived behavioural and social standards and such 
standards should not be treated as universal measures of normality. As noted by 
Alarcon borderline personality disorder and multiple personality disorder alongwith 
hypoglycemia and chronic fatigue syndrome are representative of the complex 
relationship between culture and the diagnostic process. However the complexity of 
this relationship is not captured by the DSM-N's approach to the delineation of these 
disorders. 
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Importantly Alarcon suggests that one of the pnmary benefits of the cultural 
components of the DSM-IV will be the increased awareness by clinicians of the cultural 
dimension of mental illness and a subsequent improvement in treatment efficacy. This 
may be more important than the fine detail of these additions which will no doubt 
require some modification after their utilisation in clinical situations. Alarcon states: "A 
cultural view of the diagnostic process makes it possible to see through the patient's 
identified 'symptoms' some of the cultural influences that can then help to weigh the 
clinical evidence more objectively" (p. 461). 
CULTURE AND DIAGNOSIS 
There is no doubt that the Task Force involved in the development of the DSM-IV was 
committed to the goal of producing a more culture-sensitive and cross-culturally 
effective diagnostic system. Whether or not this goal has been realised is a question 
dependent on both empirical and theoretical facts. An obvious mark of its success will 
be its utility in clinical settings. However at this point in time it is probably too early to 
draw any firm conclusions. And, quite independently of such empirical outcomes, there 
remain some important theoretical issues which impact on the general cross-cultural 
applicability of the DSM-IV. First and foremost is the question of whether disorders 
such as depression and schizophrenia are universal. Because the latest version of the 
DSM is fundamentally equivalent to the DSM-III and DSM-III-R. Syndromes 
delineated in the main axes are implicitly contrasted with the culture-bound syndromes 
listed in the appendix (although no such list was provided in the earlier manuals). The 
central question here is: Is the idea of a universal diagnostic manual of mental disorders 
conceptually sound? Given the diversity of mental disorder one must consider the 
possibility that a manual for universal use is undesirable on the grounds that the quest 
for universality will lead necessarily to inaccuracies. Kirmayer (1991) states, "If culture 
is basic to the origins and form of psychiatric distress, then the project of a culture-free 
'universal' psychiatric nosology is ill-conceived." (p. 26). And, "Clearly no single 
classificatory system will suffice for all purposes: different diagnostic approaches are 
needed to address different clinical concerns." (p. 27). 
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Kirmayer makes these remarks in the context of a discussion of the Japanese syndrome 
Taijin Kyofusho (TKS), a mental disorder characterised by a fear of interpersonal 
contact and social situations. He notes that while TKS is characterised by a number of 
culture-specific symptoms, most people who receive its diagnosis would also fulfil the 
criteria in the DSM-III for social phobia. This raises a number of questions: Is TKS 
social phobia? Which diagnosis is correct? And: Are both diagnoses valid? According 
to Kirmayer different contexts demand different diagnostic systems because mental 
disorders are culturally defined and culturally realised. For a Japanese person TKS is 
the best explanation because it explains the symptoms with reference to the social 
settings in which they have arisen and to which they are inextricably linked. As 
Kirmayer explains, the most culturally unique aspect of TKS is a preoccupation with 
the comfort of others which appears to develop out of the culturally accepted practice 
of regarding others with sensitivity. So the disorder is an expression of cultural norms, 
albeit in an extreme form. 5 
The question of whether a disorder such as TKS should be subsumed into a Western 
conception of psychopathology is complex. Even if empirical research reveals common 
underlying neurophysiological causes, such subsumption would inevitably result in a 
loss of data. It may also result in less effective treatment practices. However it could 
perhaps highlight similarities across cultures; similarities which might otherwise be 
overlooked. Kirmayer suggests that the quest for a universal classification system is 
illfounded and if this is the case then the DSM -IV may prove no more effective in 
cross-cultural situations than its earlier renditions. It is necessary to note that 
Kirmayer's remarks about the classification of psychopathology were made with regard 
to the DSM-III-R. In the DSM-IV, TKS is included in the list of culture-bound 
syndromes. While this represents a move towards cross-cultural understanding, as 
mentioned above the disorders outlined in the main body of the manual are thereby 
presented as universal. So, Kirmayer would probably criticise the DSM-IV on similar 
grounds. 
As discussed in the second chapter the difficulty of classifying psychopathologies lies 
in the complexity of the subject matter. Fabrega (1987) states: 
5 Taijin Kyofusho is discussed again later in the section on culture-bound syndromes. 
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If human illnesses were like plants or animals, that is, like concrete, fully 
formed, and static biological entities that existed in nature as discrete and 
discontinuous phenomena, hence easily identified through ones sensory 
apparatus, then diagnosis would conform nicely to biological 
classification ... However as aheady indicated, in a certain sense general medical 
and psychiatric illnesses, as construed in contemporary biomedical theory, are 
first and foremost conceptual and/or abstract objects that are manifest in 
behaving individuals. Behaviour is not an object, but a set of actions that 
involve intentions, motives, and purposes, all of which are conditioned by social 
and cultural conventions. (p. 385) 
While for some this remains a moot point, for many it is uncontentious. The willingness 
of the DSM-IV Task Force to investigate cultural factors and accordingly modify the 
manual shows an acceptance of a significant connection between culture and 
psychopathology. However there is an apparent reluctance to consider the possibility 
that disorders which are prevalent in the West are also culturally shaped. The 
universalist directive persists, albeit in a· toned down presentation. The concept of fixed 
illness objects is, for whatever reason, attractive but as Fabrega suggests it is misguided 
because of the nature of the phenomena in question. Stein (1993) discusses the 
difficulty of drawing a definitive distinction between disease and health (not 
conceptually but with regard to the ascription of conditions to one or other category). 
He notes that the question of what is to be labelled disease rests on the value placed on 
their absence and decisions about the need for clinical intervention. Such decisions may 
vary across cultures. But importantly, Stein also lays claim to a substantial amount of 
cross-cultural agreement on what is valued and disvalued and what is correspondingly 
considered to be pathological. 
One study which clearly supports this view was documented by Altshuler et al. (1988). 
It involved the comparison of diagnoses carried out by Western psychiatrists using the 
DSM-III and by Chinese psychiatrists using their own diagnostic manual. The study, 
carried out in an outpatient clinic in Shanghai, gave dual diagnoses to over one hundred 
patients and then compared the two diagnoses of each patient. An impressive 75% of 
diagnoses were reported to be in agreement. The most significant difference was in the 
diagnosis of depression. Nearly half of the patients who were given a DSM-III-based 
diagnosis of depression were differently diagnosed by the Chinese psychiatrists. Most 
who presented with predominantly somatic symptoms were diagnosed with 
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neurasthenia or anxiety disorder. And all of the patients given a diagnosis of major 
depression, with delusions or hallucinations (according to the DSM-III) were 
diagnosed, by the Chinese psychiatrists, as schizophrenic. The only other major 
difference was in the diagnosis of adjustment disorder which does not appear in the 
Chinese classification system. Hence the 10 patients who received this diagnosis from 
the Western psychiatrists received different diagnoses from the Chinese physicians. In 
all, five different categories were used to diagnose these individuals. 
In interpreting these findings it is important to note that the Chinese diagnostic manual 
is based in part on the DSM-Ill. The similarities between the two manuals are reflected 
in the results of this study. Without this extent of overlap the comparison would have 
been significantly more difficult. What this study revealed, most notably, is that the 
Chinese psychiatrists employed a similar diagnostic tool as their Western counterparts 
and that they used it in a similar way. However there were also important differences 
some of which reflect disparity between the diagnostic manuals and some of which are 
the result of more subtle cultural incongruence. Overall, results of this study appear to 
support Stein's claim that there is significant agreement across cultures on what are 
considered to be pathological mental phenomena. If this is so, then a universal 
diagnostic manual may be an appropriate objective. It is essential however to 
ac1mowledge the impact of Western ideas and medical practices on lesser developed 
nations such as China. As mentioned, the Chinese diagnostic manual was developed in 
accordance with the DSM-III and hence this study was not a comparison between 
Western and Chinese ideologies. But even so, if a manual such as this is being used 
effectively in China it would seem that there is significant correspondence between the 
Chinese approach to the understanding of mental disorder, and the Western approach. 
As noted though, the most significant difference was the Chinese clinicians' tendency 
to ac1mowledge somatic symptoms through diagnoses of neurasthenia and anxiety 
rather than depression. As will be discussed in the last section the presentation of 
somatic symptoms in depression, in Asian populations has been widely aclmowledged. 
Culture-bound syndromes are another interesting example of cultural differences in the 
manifestation of psychopatholo gy. 
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CULTURE-BOUND SYNDROMES 
Reference to culture-specific syndromes can be found as far back as two hundred years. 
In 1770 Captain James Cook documented the occurrence of amok among Malaysian 
people, a condition characterised by the sudden onset of violent and often homicidal 
behaviour (Levine & Gaw, 1995).6 About a century later, Blonk described koro, a 
syndrome found in several parts of Asia, which is characterised by an intense fear of 
genital retraction and subsequent death (Levine & Gaw, 1995). According to Levine 
and Gaw, culture-specific mental disorders have been known by a variety of terms. For 
example, 'exotic psychoses,' 'ethnic neuroses,' and 'psychogenic psychoses' are all 
terms that have been used to refer to them in the past. And more recently they have 
been referred to as (the wordy) 'syndromes not seen in Western culture' and 'folk 
diagnostic categories.' 
The term 'culture-bound syndrome' was first used by Yap (1951) (Aderibigbe & 
Pandurangi, 1995), and has since become the term of choice for culture-specific mental 
disorders. However, as noted by Levine and Gaw (1995), one problem with this 
expression is that it suggests that syndromes are limited to a particular culture, whereas 
many are found in a variety of socio-cultural groups. Nonetheless, this is the term found 
in the DSM -IV which lists in an appendix, a number of culture-bound syndromes. 
According to the DSM-N the term 'culture-bound syndrome' indicates: 
... recurrent, locality-specific patterns of aberrant behaviour and troubling 
experience that mayor may not be linked to a partiCUlar DSM-N diagnostic 
category. Many of these patterns are indigenously considered to be 'illnesses' 
or at least afflictions, and most have local names ... culture-bound syndromes 
are generally limited to specific societies or culture areas and are localised, 
folk, diagnostic categories that frame coherent meanings for certain repetitive, 
patterned, and troubling sets of experiences and observations (p. 844). 
The DSM-N provides descriptions of 25 culture-bound syndromes, some of which are 
discussed below.7 All of the descriptions are condensed versions of those provided in 
the DSM-N and much is copied directly. 
6 This is the origin of the expression 'running amok' which is sometimes used to describe wild and 
uncontrolled behaviour. 
7 The culture-bound syndromes which I discuss were chosen because they are some of the most 





A dissociative episode characterised by a period of brooding followed by an outburst of 
violent, aggressive, or homicidal behaviour directed at people and objects. The episode 
tends to be precipitated by a perceived slight or insult and seems to be prevalent only 
among males. The episode is often accompanied by persecutory ideas, automatism, 
amnesia, exhaustion, and a return to premorbid state following the episode. It was first 
reported in Malaysia but similar patterns of behaviour have since been reported in a 
number of other countries. 
Ataque de nervios 
An idiom of distress principally reported among Latinos from the Caribbean, but 
recognised among many Latin American and Latin Mediterranean groups. Commonly 
reported symptoms include uncontrollable shouting, attacks of crying, trembling, heat 
in the chest, and verbal or physical aggression. Dissociative experiences, seizure-like or 
fainting episodes, and suicidal gestures are prominent in some attacks. A general 
feature of the condition is a sense of being out of control. Ataques de nervios frequently 
occur as a direct result of a stressful event relating to the family (e.g. news of a death). 
Dhat 
A folk diagnostic term used in India to refer to severe anxiety and hypochondriacal 
concerns associated with the discharge of semen, whitish discoloration of the urine, and 
feelings of wealmess and exhaustion. Similar to syndromes reported in Sri Lanlm and 
China. 
Ghost sickness 
A preoccupation with death and the deceased (sometimes associated with witchcraft) 
frequently observed among members of many American Indian tribes. Various 
symptoms can be attributed to ghost sickness, including bad dreams, weakness, feelings 
of danger, loss of appetite, fainting, dizziness, fear, anxiety, hallucinations, loss of 
consciousness, confusion, feelings of futility, and a sense of suffocation. 
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Koro 
A term that refers to an episode of sudden and intense anxiety that the penis (or, in 
females, the vulva and nipples) will recede into the body and possibly cause death. The 
syndrome is reported in south and east Asia, where it is known by a variety of local 
terms, such as shuk yang (Chinese) and rok-joo (Thai). At times koro occurs in 
localised epidemic form in east Asian areas and it is occasionally found in the West. 
This diagnosis is included in the Chinese Classification of Mental Disorders. 
Latah 
Hypersensitivity to sudden fright, often with echopraxia, echolalia, command 
obedience, and dissociative or trance like behaviour. The term latah is of Malaysian 
origin, but the syndrome has been found in many parts of the world including Thailand, 
Japan and the Philippines. In Malaysia it is more frequent among middle-aged women. 
Taijin kyofusho 
A culturally distinctive phobia in Japan, in some ways resembling Social Phobia in 
DSM-IV. This syndrome refers to an individual's intense fear that his or her body, its 
parts or its functions, displease, embarrass, or are offensive to other people in 
appearance, odour, facial expressions, or movements. This syndrome is inciuded in the 
official Japanese diagnostic system for mental disorders. 
Implications of the culture-bound syndromes 
Clearly culture-bound syndromes embody a wide range of diverse phenomena in a 
variety of cultural settings. As mentioned, those described above are just a few of those 
listed in the DSM-IV and there are many more that are not included in the manual. 
Simons & Hughes (1993) provide a comprehensive list of culture-bound syndromes 
which documents 185 different conditions. Hence the need for the DSM-IV to limit its 
coverage to those which are considered to be well-researched, and most relevant to 
North American clinical practice (as stated in the manual). 
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Interestingly the DSM-N acknowledges, in its introduction to the glossary of culture-
bound syndromes, that some of the disorders outlined in the main text, have by some 
theorists been construed as culture-bound. It gives the examples of Anorexia Nervosa 
and Dissociative Identity Disorder both of which are apparently rare or absent in non-
industrialised cultures. However, despite this admission it is noteworthy that these 
disorders have remained in the main text, and that alongwith all the other disorders 
therein, they stand in contrast to the list of culture-bound syndromes found in the 
appendix. This is consistent with the underlying bio-medical conception of mental 
disorder which sees the syndromes in the main text as cross-culturally immutable, 
based on the proposition that the core of intra-organismic dysfunction is invariant 
across diverse socio-cultural groups. 
As noted by Levine and Gaw (1995), culture-bound syndromes provide a window to 
the facilitation of a deeper understanding of the interplay between psychopathology and 
socio-cultural factors. In particular they'provide an excellent means for examining the 
roles of psychosocial and biological variables. Basically there are two contrasting 
interpretations of culture-bound syndromes. One is that they are simply superficially 
different manifestations of ubiquitous underlying pathology, as delineated by Western 
nosologies such as the DSM-N. And the other, that they are discrete syndromes which 
can not be subsumed under Western diagnostic categories but rather, must stand along 
side them. Almost a century ago, Kraepelin proposed that amok in Indonesia was 
probably catatonia or epilepsy. And Windigo a condition observed in North American 
Indians has been described by various researchers as schizophrenia, anxiety, hysteria 
and depression (Littlewood & Lipsedge, 1985). 
Several of the syndrome descriptions in the DSM-N culture-bound syndrome glossary, 
include suggested associations with major diagnostic categories. For instance, it is 
proposed that some cases of amok may occur in the midst of a brief psychotic episode 
or that they may signify the onset or intensification of chronic psychosis. In such cases 
amok might be interpreted as a culturally shaped expression of a universal type of 
psychopathology. While amok may lead to dire outcomes, in Malaysia where it is 
widely reported, it is generally considered to be an acceptable form of aggressive 
behaviour (Aderibigbe & Pandurangi, 1995). However, as noted by these authors, it is 
only considered appropriate in response to a certain type of social circumstance. 
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Typically amok is seen as an appropriate response to political oppression. In this sense 
it would seem to be a strongly culturally mediated disorder. 
And noted in the DSM~N is the similarity of Ataque de nervios, to a panic attack, the 
primary symptom ofpanic disorder. However also noted are the important differences: 
Firstly, that the intense fear and apprehension which characterise a Panic Attack are 
absent in Ataques de nervios and secondly, that the latter are usually associated with a 
specific precipitating event. Also in some populations Ataques de nervios are 
remarkably common. One study of residents of Puerto Rico found that sixteen percent 
of those surveyed reported that they had had an ataque at some point during their 
lifetime (Rubel, 1993). This figure contrasts sharply with the prevalence rate of panic 
disorder, which has been estimated at about 0.7 percent for men and a little over 1 
percent for women (Myers, Weissman, Tischler, Holzer, Leaf, Orvaschel et aI., (1984).8 
Ataque de nervios, it seems, is a socio~culturally mediated response to a particular type 
of stress. The familial events with which it is typically associated include injury to, or 
death of family member, substance abuse and disagreements between family members 
(Rubel, 1993). 
Taijin kyofusho is likened in the DSM-N to social phobia as it is essentially a fear of 
social interaction and social situations. The term itself is often translated as 
anthropophobia (Kirmayer, 1991), suggesting an anxiety centred on contact with other 
human beings. However as noted by Kirmayer (1991) (and mentioned earlier in the 
chapter), taijin kyofusho has a number of culturally distinct features. In particular this 
syndrome is rather physically centred with a fear of blushing and a fear of emitting an 
offensive odour among the most commonly seen symptoms. As discussed earlier 
Kirmayer argues that due to these rather distinct culture~relative features, taijin 
kyofusho is best understood in relation to the context that it occurs. His discussion of 
Japanese culture demonstrates the intimate connection between cultural variables and 
taijin kyofusho. For example, in Japan eye contact is considered to be inappropriate in 
many social situations. And more generally, the outward portrayal of the self is seen as 
immensely important in social interaction (Kirmayer, 1991). 
8 Obviously I am comparing incidence with prevalence here, however the comparison is nonetheless 
useful, showing a significant difference. 
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Levine and Gaw (1995) suggest that: "The pathophysiology ofthis disorder may be the 
same as that of social phobia, with a higher prevalence among the Japanese because of 
values inherent to the culture that emphasise the importance of proper behaviour in all 
situations" (p. 530). This is an example of the now familiar idea that culture-bound 
syndromes are simply superficially different variants of universal forms of pathology. 
Whether this is true of taijin kyofusho remains to be seen. Too little is known of the 
underlying physiological correlates to determine the relationship between it and social 
phobia at this time. Interestingly though, following the same argument, social phobia as 
it is delineated in the DSM-IV may be a Western-bound form of social-focused 
psychopathology. 
While some theorists such as Levine and Gaw, argue that culture-bound syndromes are 
socially coloured manifestations of ubiquitous patterns of underlying pathophysiology, 
others such as Kirmayer see the socio-cultural aspects of mental disorder as 
inextricably connected to the underlying pathophysiology and therefore as defining 
features of the condition. He states: " ... for many culture-bound syndromes, cultural 
beliefs or rules and patterns of interaction are constitutive of the disorder" (1991, p. 26). 
According to this view, cultural factors are not merely an overlay of variance upon 
uniform patterns of psychopathology, but are rather an integral part of a complex 
system of psychopathology. To assume the same pathophysiology in both social phobia 
and taijin kyofusho is to ignore the connection between physiological, psychological 
and socio-cultural variables all of which arguably interact in the manifestation of 
mental disorder. 
While many culture-bound syndromes resemble many of the pnmary syndromes 
detailed in the DSM-IV, even those with the greatest similarity exhibit striking 
differences. This does not mean that comparisons are therefore futile, but simply that 
one should not make hasty assumptions about their relationships to those primary 
syndromes. A major problem with such comparison is that researchers often assume 
that disorders in the DSM-IV are universal and therefore culture-bound syndromes are 
subsumed into 'universal' categories. This underestimates the cultural aspects of 
Western delineated syndromes thereby promoting the idea that while many other ethnic 




Affective disorders are the 'common cold' of major psychopathologies (Gupta, 1993). 
Their prevalence and subsequent impact on society (at least in the W est) is unmatched 
by any other mental disorder (Lehtinen & Joukamaa 1995). The DSM-N lists two 
major mood disorders, major or unipolar depression and bipolar disorder. The DSM-N 
diagnostic criteria for major depression are sad, low mood and/or loss of interest and 
pleasure in usual activities, coupled with disturbances of weight, appetite, sleep and 
activity level. The symptoms must be present almost every day for at least two weeks. 
Bipolar disorder is characterised by similar episodes of depression alongwith periods of 
manic symptomatology which includes, elated or irritable mood, talkativeness and 
hyperactivity. Both unipolar and bipolar disorder are discussed in this section although 
the latter receives considerably less attention due to its paucity in the literature. 
Early studies 
During the early 1900s Kraepelin carried out the first systematic studies of depression 
in a non-Western context (Jilek, 1995). He reported that among hospitalised Javanese, 
chronic and serious depressive states were rare, and suicide attempts almost unheard of. 
More frequent, were periods of confused excitement which were typically of short 
duration. Kraepelin concluded that manic-depression was unusual but not absent in this 
population while major depression was extremely rare. Kraepelin noted that self-
accusations of sinfulness which were common indicators of depression in European 
societies were never voiced by Javanese patients. This finding while unremarkable, is 
nonetheless interesting in that it represents one of the earliest references to the 
relationship of culture-bound belief systems to psychopathology. The self-deprecation 
evident in the depressive symptomatology of Kraepelin's European patients was 
believed to be closely linked to Judaeo-Christian theology. 
According to Jilek (1995) more recent research confirms Kraepelin's findings - that 
feelings of guilt linked to sinfulness and worthlessness are not seen in depressives 
trans culturally. He suggests, however, that guilt is not absent in non-Western 
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depressive states, but rather that it takes a different form. For example in societies 
instilled with Confucian ethics, guilt may arise from the neglect of family and the 
failure to live up to familial expectation. And in Hinduist and Islamic cultures guilt may 
centre around the failure to conduct religious rituals and obey religious creeds. This is a 
clear example of the way in which the 'content' of depressive symptoms may vary 
across cultures. Those who favour a universalist interpretation of cross-cultural 
differences in mental disorders, typically claim that although there may be superficial 
differences in the expression of some symptoms (such as the basis and form of ones 
guilt), the same basic symptoms will be found. 
While Kraepelin's pioneering studies of depression in Indonesia yielded some 
interesting results they have been criticised - for the same reason that other similar 
studies have been criticised - for focusing solely on a hospitalised population. This 
subject group is not representative; it consisted of those who lived in or near urban 
areas. Following a study of depression in Indonesia, Pfeiffer (1967, in Jilek 1995) 
concluded that depression was not uncommon, however patients were rarely 
hospitalised. This highlights the inadequacy of cross-cultural studies which focus solely 
on hospitalised cases. As many cultures have quite different approaches to the treatment 
of psychopathologies it is important to take account of these approaches when 
designing cross-cultural investigations. This means that studies should, where possible, 
survey a cross-section of the population. In many developing countries, only the 
wealthy and educated have access to hospital-centred mental health care. 
Biological factors 
Familial studies and the success of neurochemical treatments for both unipolar and 
bipolar affective disorder suggest a significant biogenetic element in depression. 
Bipolar depression in particular has a strong genetic component (Nesse & Williams, 
1994). In a review of data on the manifestation of bipolar depression in twins, Allen 
(1976) reported an average concordance rate of72 percent in monozygotic twins and 14 
percent in dizygotic twins. In contrast, the figures for unipolar depression were 40 
percent and 11 percent respectively. Andreasen, Rice, Endicott, Coryell, Grove and 
Reich (1987) confirm that genetic factors are considerably less influential in unipolar 
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depression. Even so, a 40 percent concordance rate suggests that even unipolar 
depression has a consequential genetic component. 
The increasingly successful use of drug treatments for affective disorders lends support 
to causal theories which revolve around changes in neurotransmitter systems. The two 
neurotransmitters most commonly implicated are norepinephrine and seratonin. It is 
believed that low levels of norepinephrine may lead to depression and high levels to 
mania. In contrast, low levels of seratonin (which is understood to playa regulatory 
role) are claimed to produce both depressive and manic symptomatology (McNeal & 
Cimbolic, 1986). Although pharmacological treatments of affective disorders have been 
and continue to be effective, the operative neural substrates are not entirely understood. 
While seratonin and norepinephrine are probably important, they interact with other 
neurochemicals forming a complex picture of neural activity; a picture which at this 
time is far from clear. 
The interaction of biological factors with socio-cultural ones, in the manifestation of 
depression is complex. The assumption that a disorder with a genetic component will 
necessarily appear in all human populations is quite wrong. There are several physical 
diseases which occur only in specific locations. For example Oliver Sacks (1996) in his 
typically eloquent fashion describes congenital colour-blindness in the native 
inhabitants of some islands of Micronesia. Two more familiar examples are sickle-cell 
anaemia and Tay-Sachs disease. Although it is not possible to discuss these diseases in 
detail, they show, simply by their mere existence, that different human populations can 
have diseases unique to the genotype which is shared by individuals in the group. So a 
genetic element in a mental disorder does not necessitate universality. Moreover the 
genetic elements in depression are predispositions which interact with environmental 
factors. They are not solitary markers of causation. 
Comparing psychiatry's utilisation of biological explanations, with that of evolutionary 
biologists, Kleinman (1988) says, "Ironically, it is the reverse of the argument 
evolutionary biologists advance to explain the great diversity of species world-wide. 
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There biology is viewed as the major source of variation" (p. 19).9 It is within-species 
variation that underlies the process of natural selection. It is heterogeneity, not 
homogeneity among species which leads to phylogenetic change. Physically Homo 
sapiens demonstrate a certain amount of environmentally induced variation which as 
suggested earlier could be realised neurologically. 
Drug treatments and related neurochemical theories are also often hailed as evidence of 
a primarily biological basis and hence universal incidence of depression. However, 
while neurochemical intervention can relieve depressive symptomatology it may not be 
the cause of it. Pathological sadness is likely to be associated with a particular type of 
neural 'state' but this state is not necessarily the cause of the problem. The thesis of 
universality based on biological etiology depends on a clear causal pathway from 
neural change to depressive symptoms. But arguably this has not been demonstrated. 
There are many other factors involved. As will be explained later, depression varies 
across populations; beliefs, values' and customs influence its cross-cultural 
manifestation. And moreover, as mentioned in the previous chapter, evidence suggests 
that there are racial differences in responses to antidepressants (Lin et aI., 1986, 
Sakauye, 1992) indicating that there may be differences even at the biological leveL 
Depression and culture 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, translation is often central to cross-cultural 
research but typically it is not a straightforward procedure. The word 'depressed' has 
no equivalent in the languages of some cultures, for example American Indian and 
some South East Asian groups (Manson, 1995). And Yoruba, a Nigerian language, has 
only one word to denote depression, anxiety and anger (Abusah, 1993). This does not 
mean therefore, that these people do not experience depressive states similar to those 
experienced by Westerners, but it may mean that such states will be more difficult to 
understand from the perspective of a Western researcher. If the subjective experience of 
'feeling depressed' is considered fundamental to a diagnosis of depression then the 
absence of such an experience may preclude the ascription of this diagnostic label. 
9 This is stated in the context of a discussion on the biological basis of schizophrenia. Psychiatrists 
often assert that if a mental disorder such as schizophrenia has a strong biological basis then it will 
necessarily manifest similarly across cultures. 
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Conversely one may wish to accept a broader conception of major depression which 
allows for a more diverse array of symptoms; symptoms which differ from those 
typically seen in the West, but which retain some essential characteristics. 
In a summary of findings of cross-cultural studies of mental disorder Draguns (1995) 
states: "Major depression is more susceptible to cultural shaping than the schizophrenic 
disorders" and "Both major depression and schizophrenia are characterised by a few 
culturally immutable symptoms" (p. 87-88). According to Draguns then, there are some 
depressive symptoms which occur universally and there are some that vary 
trans culturally. He cites the WHO study published in 1983 - carried out in Canada, Iran, 
Japan and Switzerland - which identifies several core symptoms of major depression, 
including sad affect and loss of enjoyment. So these two symptoms, which are perhaps 
fundamental to Western conceptions of depression, were found (alongwith several 
others) to be equally important indicators of depression in all of these population 
groups. However the WHO study also found significant variation in the incidence of 
some symptoms - including hypochondriasis, previous depressive episode and sleep 
disturbance. 
Westermeyer (1989) lists depressions under the heading of 'pathoplastic and culture-
bound disorders' (which he defines as 'non-psychotic/non-druglnon-organic psychiatric 
disorders'). He says that these disorders are often referred to as 'culture-bound' because 
of the substantial variation in their prevalence across cultures. Westermeyer's claim is 
not that depression is a uniquely Western phenomenon but rather that in many cultures 
it may manifest very differently. That is, it is significantly influenced by cultural 
factors. While depression is not typically referred to as a culture-bound syndrome, the 
view that some depressive symptoms vary cross-culturally is widely accepted 
(Sartorius, Jablensky, Gulbinat & Ernberg, 1980). As mentioned in the previous chapter 
cross-cultural differences in the emphasis on somatic symptoms are well established. 
And it is this sort of variation which Westermeyer is referring to. However the extent to 
which differences of this nature impinge on the cross-cultural applicability of a 
diagnostic category such as depression is unclear. Although a depression experienced 
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primarily as the sensation of 'worms crawling in the head' or 'noises in the ears'lO may 
have other features in common with a Western conception of the disorder, the question 
arises of whether it would be better delineated as a different nosological entity. 
Somatisation 
Undoubtedly the most striking and consistent finding of the relationship between 
culture and depression is the variation in somatisation. Essentially somatisation is the 
presentation of physical symptoms as an explanation for psychological distress 
(Mukherji, 1995). In other words an individual experiences bodily symptoms which are 
perceived as being related to, or even the cause of, the psychological problem. This 
type of symptomatology is uncommon in Westerners, but very common in many non-
Western populations, particularly in some Asian communities. For example, Weiss et 
al. (1995) studied the manifestation of depression in South India and found a 'striking' 
tendency to spontaneously rep()rt somatic symptoms but to also identify depressive 
symptoms when probed. So, patients were more immediately aware of their physical 
symptoms but could recognise psychological symptoms when these were explored. 
Weiss et al. claim: 
"Our findings provide empirical evidence that even in DSM-III-R, privileging 
depressive over somatoform patterns of distress in the professional nosology 
may be a cultural and historical artefact that is problematic for clinical practice 
in South Asia and probably among other groups as well"(p. 357). 
They note that depression in developing countries is often referred to as 'masked' and 
. suggest that equally plausible is the concept of 'masked somatoform disorders' in the 
West. Mukherji (1995) suggests that somatic symptomatology may be the most 
ubiquitous expression of psychological distress and he points out physical discomfort of 
one sort or another almost always accompanies psychological distress. Considering 
these facts, the suggestion that somatic symptoms simply mask depression and are not a 
genuine part is questionable. 
10 According to Levine and Gaw (1995) symptoms of this sort have been reported by Africans as part 
of a folk-syndrome labelled 'brain fag.' They note that this syndrome and others like it have a 
pathophysiology similar to depression. 
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While the somatisation of depression has been most frequently investigated in Asia, this 
sort of symptom pattern has also been reported elsewhere. For example Ulusahin, 
Basoglu & Paykel (1994) compared depression in Britain and Turkey and found that 
Turkish patients typically presented somatic symptoms while British patients generally 
reported symptoms of, what they refer to as, 'core depression' - such as loss of interest 
and pleasure, and occupational impairment. hnportantly the 'core depression' 
symptoms were found equally in both patient groups, however the Turkish patients 
tended to report their somatic symptoms more readily. So, although the researchers 
found some significant differences in symptom presentation they confirm the findings 
of other studies - that a core set of depressive symptoms may be universal. 
The emphasis on psychological as opposed to somatic symptoms in contemporary 
Western conceptualisations of depression, reflects a long intellectual tradition of mind-
body dualism (Manson, 1995). While Descartes' tenet of this critical distinction has 
been universally discredited (at least within scientific circles), the mind-body 
dichotomy has nonetheless remained influentiaL This is evidenced by the inclination of 
Westerners to separate mental and physical phenomenology. For example, depressed 
mood may be experienced only in cognitive and emotional terms with little or no 
attention paid to somatic symptoms. In contrast an individual with a more holistic 
understanding of mind and body, such as an Indian, would be more likely to attend to 
somatic symptoms and view them as part of a totality of experience (Varma, 1986). 
Hence differences across cultures in somatisation probably represent differences in folk 
psychologies. This illustrates the way in which belief systems may influence the 
manifestation of mental disorders. 
Another possible reason for the emphasis of some cultures on somatic symptomatology 
is the negative response of many of these cultures to the expression of emotion (Chen, 
1995). For instance, as mentioned in the previous chapter, in Japan a psychiatric 
diagnosis is often greatly stigmatised. This stigmatisation is not only attached to the 
individual concerned but also to the individual's immediate and extended family. 
Therefore, to avoid the profound consequences of a psychiatric diagnosis, both patients 
and physicians may emphasise somatic symptoms. Moreover in Japan and many other 
Asian countries the open expression of emotion, in any form, is considered socially 
unacceptable. "Thus a legitimate entry into the sick role in these cultures may be by the 
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communication of somatic or physical illness" (Mukhetji, 1995, p.209). Patients may 
underemphasise psychological problems and overemphasise physical ones in order to 
facilitate a more acceptable expression of their pathology. This does not mean therefore 
that the physical symptoms are illusory. Rather, it suggests that people in these cultures 
who learn from an early age to control and conceal their emotions, will be more likely 
to freely express their somatic symptoms than their psychological ones. 
The connection between somatisation and the devaluing of emotional expression has 
also been noted elsewhere. For instance in Algeria and many other Arab nations the 
public display of emotion is considered shameful. And, as in Japan, patients will freely 
discuss somatic symptoms but only reluctantly reveal their low mood (AI-Issa, 1990). 
In fact, AI-Issa states that, "In contrast to somatic symptoms, mood disturbance is either 
minor or not verbalised at all by the patients." On what basis then were patients 
diagnosed as depressed? Intuitively one would assume that mood disturbance would 
have to be more than 'minor' in order' for patients to receive diagnoses of affective 
disorder. Presumably such patients displayed the typical physiological changes 
commonly associated with endogenous depression, but such changes mimic those of 
chronic fatigue syndrome. Like many other researchers, AI-Issa refers to depression in 
this context as 'masked', downplaying the significance of somatic symptomatology. 
However his remark concerning the diagnosis of depression without major mood 
disturbance suggests in contrast, a practice of acknowledging the primacy of somatic 
symptoms in depression, in this population. 
In an extensive analysis of the world-wide occurrence of somatisation, Mumford (1993) 
questions the depth of the differences between Western and non-Western cultures. He 
claims that such differences are often exaggerated and misinterpreted. He notes the 
distinction between the experience and presentation of somatic symptoms and suggests 
that this is often blurred or even overlooked. His central point is that clinicians often 
mistakenly assume that the expression of somatic symptoms accurately represents 
underlying experience. According to Mumford, although evidence shows undoubtedly 
that many non-Westerners readily communicate somatic complaints, there is little 
evidence to support the related, yet distinct claim, that they have a predominantly 
somatic experience of their illness. Mumford cites a number of studies comparing the 
experience of somatic symptoms in Britain and Pakistan, which he states reveal only 
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'modest cultural differences.' Importantly, however, the Pakistani subjects were all 
English speaking and from a higher socio-economic group. Hence many may have been 
familiar with Western conceptualisations of depression. And all studies found 
differences which would be considered statistically significant. Basically, Mumford's 
claim that somatisation is superficial, in that it may misrepresent actual experience, has 
little empirical support. 
Summary 
Research to date reveals that although some core symptoms of depression have been 
found in a wide variety of countries and cultures, the experience and presentation of its 
symptomatology vary significantly, particularly between Western and non-Western 
cultures. Although some core features of depression have been found across cultures, 
the DSM-IV criteria for depression, especially major depression, are undoubtedly 
biased towards a Western illness presentation. These Griteria do not adequately capture 
the symptom configuration of those whose primary focus is somatic. The view that 
somatic symptoms are superficial and psychological ones fundamental to depression is 
more likely an artefact of Western ideology than an objective observation of actual 
phenomenology. 
SUMMARY 
While the historical development of the various DSMs reveals a move, in the most 
recent edition, towards a more culture-sensitive approach, the DSM-N has none-the-
less retained a Western oriented bio-medical perspective which underestimates the 
significant influence of socio-cultural variables. As illustrated, there are a number of 
difficulties associated with the use of such a system in cross-cultural contexts. In 
particular it assumes that Western forms of psychopathology are universal thereby 
undermining indigenous understandings and approaches. The existence of culture-
bound syndromes demonstrates the important interaction between mental disorder and 
socio-cultural factors. And cultural differences have also been found in the 
manifestation of depression, one of the DSM's primary syndromes. The following 
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SCHIZOPHRENIA ACROSS CULTURES 
This chapter looks in detail at the cross-cultural research on schizophrenia, with the 
primary aim of establishing whether or not schizophrenia, as delineated by western 
diagnostic systems, actually occurs in non-western settings. This discussion provides a 
framework within which, the methodological problems which arise in this field can be 
explicated, and general issues such as the relationship between biological and 
sociological factors can be addressed. Compared to other mental disorders, the cross-
cultural research on schizophrenia is substantial. One reason for this is the widespread 
belief that the principal cause of schizophrenia is biological dysfunction. Hence many 
researchers believe that compared to disorders with a lesser biological component, 
schizophrenia is more likely to evidence universally. Another reason is the impact that 
the disease has on society. Because schizophrenia is characterised by early onset and 
long term disability it is associated with high personal, social and economic costs. It has 
been estimated that the costs of the disease in the United States; including the expense 
of treatment and long term care, and the indirect cost of lost productivity, amount to 
about 2% of the gross national product (Andrews, Hall, Goldstein, Lapsley, Bartels & 
Silove, 1985). To date, one of the most consequential findings of cross-cultural studies 
of schizophrenia, is that people in developing countries who have the disease have a 
better prognosis than those in developed countries. If this is indeed true, this would be 
an important area of study in terms of understanding the disease process and developing 
optimal treatment. 
Late last century, Kraepelin, who was the first to formally identify schizophrenia, put it 
under the heading of 'metabolic diseases.' Although he referred to it as 'dementia 
praecox,' his characterisation of the disorder is similar to contemporary descriptions 
and is still well regarded (Jablensky and Sartorius, 1988). Interestingly, although 
Kraepelin believed that dementia praecox was primarily due to biological dysfunction, 
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he was also mindful of the influence of culture on mental disorders and travelled to 
Singapore and Indonesia in order to develop his understanding of this field. His most 
important finding was probably the insightful realisation of the difficulties associated 
with cross-cultural research. He recognised the importance of developing clear clinical 
concepts and ensuring observer reliability - tasks which are fundamental to all good 
research but which are particularly important in the application of cross-cultural 
studies. 
Despite Kraepelin's awareness of the limitations of his cross-cultural exploration, he 
concluded, after identifying several cases of dementia praecox in institutions in both 
Singapore and Indonesia, that it is a universal disease (Torrey, 1973). As noted by 
Torrey, Kraepelin's observations were limited to institutionalised persons who would 
not have been representative of the general population. Inpatients of mental hospitals 
were necessarily those who had had substantial contact with western culture and 
western technology - they generally lived in the colonially driven urban areas and were 
often employed by the colonists. As will be demonstrated below, this sort of 
investigative error was commonly seen in early cross-cultural studies in psychology. In 
light of the shortcomings of Kraepelin's work his conclusion of the universality of 
dementia praecox was obviously premature. This is confirmed by the fact that almost a 
century later, the question of the universality of the disorder is still being avidly 
debated. 
WHAT IS SCHIZOPHRENIA? 
In 1896, Kraepelin wrote: 
"We designate as dementia praecox the development of a simple, more or less 
pervasive, state of mental weakness, which manifests itself as an acute or 
subacute mental disorder. The course of this disease process can exhibit very 
different patterns ... This behaviour indicates, I believe, that in all likelihood we 
are dealing with organic change in the brain" (Jablensky & Sartorius, 1988). 
Although, over the years, many clinicians and theorists have commended Kraepelin on 
this definition, it is undoubtedly obscure. Its appeal lies primarily in its flexibility, 
serving as testimony to the fact that schizophrenia is a complex and perhaps elusive 
122 
concept. More specifically, he believed the following symptoms to be typical of 
dementia praecox: hallucinations, delusions, decrease in attention to outside stimuli, 
lack of curiosity, disordered thought, diminished insight and judgement, affective 
blunting and negativism. He noted that its initial onset was usually during early 
adulthood and believed this to be an important defining feature. The definition of 
schizophrenia offered in the DSM-IV is remarkably similar. Here it is classified under 
the heading of psychotic disorders and its symptoms are as follows: delusions, 
hallucinations, disorganised speech, grossly disorganised or catatonic behaviour, social 
withdrawal, and negative symptoms (which are, restricted affect, restriction of fluency 
of thought and speech, and diminished avolition). In order to fulfil the diagnosis, at 
least two of these symptoms must be present for one month and some signs of the 
disorder must be present for at least six months (APA, 1994). 
Although Kraepe1in's original definition of schizophrenia and the definition found in 
the latest DSM are very similar, there have throughout the century, been several other 
quite different approaches to the definition of the disorder. The most consequential of 
these were the definitions of Bleuler (1950) and Schneider (1959). Bleuler recognised 
the heterogeneity of the condition and broadened the definition to include various 
subtypes; the unifying feature of which was a loss of integration of mental functions. 
He described the primary symptoms as altered associations, altered affect, ambivalence 
and autism. Schneider, on the other hand, was interested in the 'core' indicators of the 
disease which he referred to as first rank symptoms. In an attempt to clarify the concept 
of schizophrenia, Schneider's goal was to find symptoms which could be described as 
definitive markers of the disorder. His central claim was that delusions and 
hallucinations are the core features of schizophrenia. This view finds little support 
today, as it is now commonly believed that schizophrenia may occur without this sort of 
symptomatology. 
Discussions about the 'essence' of schizophl'enia continue today. Due to the complex 
nature of the disorder and its diverse symptomatology its validity as a diagnostic label 
has frequently been questioned (e.g. Bentall et aL 1988; Heinrichs, 1993; He1mchen, 
1988). However, as stated by Andreasen (1987): 
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Almost anyone who works carefully with patients suffering from this illness 
will concur that it is a 'real disease', but will be hard pressed to define it in a 
way likely to lead to universal consensus (p. 10). 
And Kendell (1972) wrote: 
... the only defining characteristic available to us is the syndrome itself. In our 
present state of knowledge, our criteria for a diagnosis can only be the typical 
clinical features of schizophrenia (p. 385). 
As is the case with many psychological disorders, a precise and rigid definition of 
schizophrenia is perhaps impossible. However, whatever definition one decides to 
utilise, it is essential to be aware of the issues which surround this discussion. If 
schizophrenia is not one disorder, but rather many related yet distinct and more 
narrowly defined conditions, then this would undoubtedly influence the design and 
outcome of research on schizophrenia. How can the search for schizophrenia in other 
cultures be undertaken if there is uncertainty about the nature and boundaries of 
schizophrenic symptoms? Another important consequence of conceptual uncertainty, is 
the impact on treatment. The efficacy of pharmacological treatments, particularly, relies 
on diagnostic accuracy. And one must also consider the wider significance of the 
diagnostic label and the possible ramifications of misdiagnosis. 
Schizophrenia is a serious mental disorder inasmuch as it is usually associated with 
serious social and/or occupational dysfunction. With a lifetime risk, in western 
societies, of slightly greater than one percent, schizophrenia accounts for approximately 
one fifth of all serious and long-term disability (Jablensky, 1989).11 As such, it has 
throughout this century, received considerable attention from psychologists, 
psychiatrists and anthropologists. The cross-cultural manifestations of the disease have 
been a primary focus of the research, as well as etiological factors, and the reliability 
and validity of the diagnostic labeL However despite the rigorous and resolute approach 
of researchers, there is much that remains in question, and schizophrenia retains its 
primordial mystique. As stated by Jablensky and Sartorius (1988), "Few disorders have 
11 It should be noted that while the western/non-western dichotomy is often a useful and accurate way 
of classifying cultural groups, there may be substantial differences within these domains. For instance, 
compared to other parts of Europe, some Scandinavian communities are reported to have very high 
rates of schizophrenia (Kleinman, 1988). And a number of researchers have suggested that the rates of 
schizophrenia differ according to peoples' socio-economic status within a given community (Elnagar et 
al,1971; Minas et al. 1985; Odegard, 1959; Rose, 1964). 
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been investigated with such persistence and with so few tangible results as 
schizophrenia" (p. 65). 
BIOLOGICAL FACTORS 
Doran, Breier, and Roy (1986) suggest: "Such characteristics as phannacologic 
responsivity and genetic transmission and the development of biological markers may 
be the prospective cornerstones for validating the diagnosis of schizophrenia" (p. 29). 
This has been, and remains, the hope of many who seek clarification of schizophrenia 
as both a nosological concept and a disease. However, studies investigating the 
neurobiological abnonnalities which may playa part in the onset of schizophrenia, have 
been fraught with methodological difficulties (Minas, Jackson, Doherty, & McGorry, 
1985). While the "dopamine hypothesis" (i.e., that essentially schizophrenia is due to 
dopaminergic overactivity) has received considerable attention, there have been no 
major advancements since its inception many years ago. The dopamine hypothesis 
arose primarily from the success of antipsychotics in the treatment of schizophrenia. 
These drugs, in addition to relieving some of the symptoms of schizophrenia, may also 
cause Parkinsonism, which is commonly believed to be caused by a dopamine 
deficiency in the basal ganglia (Murray, 1979). Hence it was reasoned that 
schizophrenia is associated with excess dopamine in this region. Other evidence in 
support of the theory comes from schizophrenic-like symptoms in an amphetamine 
induced psychosis; amphetamines are believed to produce an increase in synaptic 
dopamine (Murray, 1979). 
The search for the biological substrates of schizophrenia has been driven in part by the 
results of genetic studies which show unequivocally that genetic factors playa role in 
the etiology of the disorder. While twin and other familial studies reveal a genetic 
component the physiological instantiation of this component has not been identified 
(Lyons, Kremen, Tsuang, & Faraone, 1989). Twin studies reveal average concordance 
figures of 50% for monozygotic pairs and 17% for dizygotic (Minas et aI, 1985). 
According to Shields (1978) there is no substantial difference in concordance between 
monozygotic twins reared together and those reared apart. 
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This is not to say however that environmental factors do not also play an important role 
in the etiology of schizophrenia. McGue and Gottesman (1989) suggest that the 
concordance rate for monozygotic twins is considerably less than 100 percent (they 
suggest that it is about 44%) meaning that environmental variables also have 
considerable etiological significance. 
The interaction of biological factors with socio-cultural ones, in the manifestation of 
schizophrenia is complex. As detailed in the previous chapter, in the discussion of 
depression, the assumption that a disorder with a genetic component will· necessarily 
appear identically in all human populations is unfounded. As explained, there are 
several physical conditions which are found only in specific populations. These 
conditions demonstrate by their mere existence, that different human populations can 
have diseases unique to their genotype. A genetic element in a mental disorder does not 
necessitate universality. Moreover, like the genetic component of depression, the 
genetic element in schizophrenia is arguably a predisposition which interacts with 
environmental factors, rather than a solitary marker of causation. 
In an early study, Brown and Birley (1968) demonstrated the importance of stressful 
life events in the onset of schizophrenia, a finding which has received considerable 
recognition. And other studies have revealed a complex interaction between the 
manifestation of schizophrenia and particular environmental variables such as socio-
economic status (e.g. Dohrenwend, Levav, Schwartz, Naveh, Lin1e et aI., 1992). 
Research in these areas suggests that even if human beings in all regions of the world 
are genetically equivalent, there may yet be differences in the manifestation of 
schizophrenia due to environmental variation. Some researchers argue that if 
schizophrenia is essentially the result of neurological malfunction then there will be 
few if any transcultural differences in symptomatology. However to date the 
neurochemical pathways of schizophrenia are not fully understood. Increases in 
synaptic dopamine may simply be correlates, not causes, of the disorder. Hence any 
argument asserting universality of schizophrenia based on biological etiology is 
unquestionably premature. 
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EARLY CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES 
Early cross-cultural research on Schizophrenia deserves only brief acknowledgement. 
Although some interesting work has been carried out over the past century, it was not 
until the 1970s that studies with good methodological design emerged. Much of the 
early research utilised a very broad interpretation of the concept of schizophrenia -
including cases which would not fall within the modem diagnostic category. And often 
cultures were described as 'primitive' when in fact they had been significantly 
influenced by Western civilisation. 
Throughout the first half of the century the question of the universality of schizophrenia 
received considerable attention. A common outcome of the various investigations was 
that the incidence of schizophrenia was found to correlate with the amount of Western 
influence that people had been exposed to. Three studies carried out between 1929 and 
1937, in New Guinea, Brazil and the Congo reported that no cases of schizophrenia 
were found in natives who had little or no contact with Europeans (Torrey, 1973). 
Other researchers (; Dhunjibhoy, 1930; Shelley & Watson, 1936; Rao, 1966) 
complimented these fmdings, concluding, after studying cases in Africa and illdia, that 
European or Western influences increased the rates of schizophrenia. 
A reVIew by Benedict and lacks (1954) seemed to change the tide of opinion, 
convincing many that schizophrenia was beyond doubt, universal. The review, entitled, 
'Mental illness in primitive societies,' included studies on five cultures: New Zealand 
Maori, native Hawaiian, South African Bantu, Africans in Kenya and Australian 
Aborigines. All five studies presented data which was alleged to prove unequivocally, 
the universality of schizophrenia. However as argued convincingly by Torrey (1973), 
all five studies had such serious methodological problems that the review of Benedict 
and lacks, which relies on their data, must not be given the recognition which it 
received 40 years ago. While the populations in the five countries were described as 
primitive, none would have met today's criteria for such a label. ill fact, most cases 
were hospitalised patients in urban areas who had to a large extent been 'Westernised'. 
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Another problem with the studies referred to in the review, and one which was typical 
of other cross-cultural studies from this era, was that the concept of 'schizophrenia' was 
used so loosely, so as to refer, in some instances, to all types of mental disorder. The 
investigation of Carothers (1951) into the extent of manifestation of schizophrenia 
among Africans in Kenya was actually a report on the total incidence of all forms of 
mental illness among the native people of the region. This approach was undoubtedly 
related to his views on the overall mental inferiority of black people. Carothers 
theorised that the mental deficiencies of Africans were due to underdevelopment of 
their forebrains, describing their behaviour as similar to that of "leucotomized 
Europeans". Considering comments such as this, it is surprising that Carothers' work 
was ever taken seriously. 
Despite the shortcomings of the Benedict and Jacks review, it has frequently been cited, 
without question, as testimony to the universality of schizophrenia, with many later 
studies basing their hypotheses on its premise. According to Torrey (1973) this view of 
schizophrenia has greatly influenced more recent studies which often sought to confirm 
the already known fact of its universality. Lin's (1953) study of schizophrenia in three 
communities in Taiwan reported a prevalence of 2 per 1000 which approximates 
prevalence figures in the west. Measuring the prevalence of schizophrenia in 
indigenous inhabitants of Taiwan, Rin and Lin (1962) reported a rate of .9 per 1000. 
They noted however that most of the cases had an acute onset, short duration and often 
a complete remission which is a very different symptom profile from that found 
characteristically in the West. 
Burton-Bradley (1969) studied schizophrenia in New Guinea where he had practised 
psychiatry for 15 years and reported that although it seemed relatively common among 
the native inhabitants it almost always occurred in people who lived in urban areas. He 
claimed that it was rarely seen in the "so-called bush individual". He did say, however, 
that sometimes people who had recently left their villages to settle in the city, exhibited 
the symptoms of acute schizophrenia, which often abated if the individuals returned to 
their rural environment. 
Unfortunately few conclusions can be drawn from these early studies. Many of the 
claims which have been made by the various researchers are based on unsound 
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methodology, which is characterised by poor definitions and shoddy fieldwork. While 
schizophrenia has been reported in many diverse environments, little work has been 
undertaken in cultures that are largely unaffected by the West. One could argue that the 
degree of Western influence is not necessarily consequential. After all, many non-
Western communities which have been colonised or influenced in other ways, by 
Western practices, retain a strong cultural identity and may seem largely unaffected by 
invading customs. Or what may be of more interest to some researchers is whether or 
not schizophrenia occurs across races, regardless of social environment. It would seem 
that the answer to this question is positive; it has been exhibited in many different 
people from different parts of the world. It may however be more common in people 
who live in, or are at least exposed to, the industrialised West. 
THE WHO CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
The International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia (IPSS) conducted by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) represented a significant improvement in the quality of cross-
cultural psychological research. Carried out during the early 1970s, in nine countries, it 
set out to show that there are core features of schizophrenia that occur similarly in 
primitive and modem, Western and non-Western societies (WHO 1973, 1979). To 
ensure the standardisation of diagnostic systems across countries, the participating 
psychiatrists in the various centres were all trained in the use of the same diagnostic 
instrument (the Present State Examination or PSE), which had been translated into the 
various local languages. The IPSS demonstrated that in all nine centres, groups of 
psychotic patients could be found, who exhibited the symptoms characteristic of 
schizophrenia. 
However, while this result may seem impressive and conclusive, as noted by Kleinman 
(1988), the IPSS used strict inclusion and exclusion criteria resulting in an artificially 
homogenous sample. Kleinman claims that the " ... similarity was an artefact of the 
methodology." (p. 19). Patients who would have been more likely to show different 
symptom patterns were excluded from the study from the outset. So, although subjects 
who met the rigid criteria for diagnosis, were found across cultures, it must be noted 
that those who would have shown the greatest diversity, and would perhaps have 
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challenged the diagnostic approach, were not included in the fmal sample. This 
highlights a difficulty with this sort of research. A cross-cultural study of a mental 
disorder will necessarily require defmition of the particular disorder and corresponding 
guidelines for sample delineation which is relative to a particular diagnostic system. 
However, ideally the possibility of cross-cultural differences should also be 
incorporated into the methodology, so that if there are differences, they will be 
revealed. The WHO study was a search for similarity, which it found, but it was a 
limited search within a predetermined sample. 
Admittedly the IPSS was designed to find people with prototypical schizophrenic 
symptomatology and hence there was little sense in including patients who would not 
have met these criteria. On the other hand, however, results from this sort of 
investigation which reveals cross-cultural similarities, should not overshadow the 
potential impact of cross-cultural diversity. One must remember that the similarity 
discovered here was the primary object of study and that the methodology was not 
designed to pick up differences in symptom patterns. An obvious response to this 
criticism would be that certain criteria for the disorder must be stated and that it makes 
sense to keep them as simple as possible. Using the so-called core symptomatology 
would perhaps be the most culturally neutral approach. However, whatever the 
rationale for the methodology, the pick-and-choose structure of it should be 
acknowledged by those who want to draw firm conclusions from the results. 
An important finding of the first WHO study was that the outcome for schizophrenic 
patients in developing countries was significantly better than the outcome for those in 
developed countries. Building on this finding the WHO then carried out another cross-
cultural study called: The determinants of outcome of severe mental disorder project 
(Sartorius, Jablensky, Korten, Ernberg, Anker, Cooper & Day, 1986). This 
investigation was even larger than the first, drawing on 12 research centres in 10 
countries, and including more than 1300 cases. Results supported the findings of the 
pilot study, showing similar symptom profiles in all centres. At least, this is the primary 
conclusion of the initial report, a conclusion which Kleinman (1988) is critical of, 
considering that some important differences also emerged form the data. For instance, 
the authors state: 
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The frequency of the use of individual ICD-9 subtype rubrics varied from 0 to 
65% of the cases in the different centres. Overall, paranoid schizophrenia was 
the most commonly diagnosed subtype followed by that of 'other' 
(undifferentiated) and acute schizophrenic episodes. However in the 
developing countries the acute subtype diagnosis was used almost twice as 
often (in 40% of the cases) as the diagnosis of the paranoid subtype (in 23% 
of the cases). Catatonic schizophrenia was diagnosed in 10% of the cases in 
the developing countries but in only a handful of cases in the developed 
countries. In contrast the hebephrenic subtype was diagnosed in 13 % of the 
patients in the developed countries and in only 4% of the patients in 
developing countries. (Sartorius et aI, 1986: p 16). (Also quoted by Kleinman, 
1988). 
Whatever the implications of these differences, they deserve as much credence as the 
data indicating broad similarities. As Kleinman astutely notes, however, in the review 
by Sartorius et al. they fall in the shadow of universalist conclusions, receiving only a 
brief mention. Another interesting finding of this WHO investigation was the figures on 
the annual incidence of schizophrenia across various centres. Two calculations were 
made according to the results of two different sample groups: one was based on the 
'broad' definition of schizophrenia which included almost all the cases in the study and 
one on the 'restricted' definition based on a computer program classification of a 
particular subtype of schizophrenia called S+. In order to receive a diagnosis of 
CA TEGO S+ schizophrenia, a patient must exhibit at least one Schneiderian first rank 
symptom or other unambiguous symptoms typical of schizophrenia, such as auditory 
hallucination or delusions of persecution. 12 Calculations according to the broad 
definition yielded incidence rates varying from 1.5 in Aarhus, Denmark to 4.2 in 
Chandighar, India. Using the S+ subtype, there was a significantly smaller range of 0.7 
in Aarhus to 1.4 in Nottingham (Kleinman, 1988). 
Kleinman is critical of the authors' decision to base their conclusions on the narrower 
diagnostic category which yields quite similar incidence rates across the various 
populations. The CATEGO program is a narrow diagnostic instrument which is 
unlikely to be sensitive to subtle cross-cultural incongruence. In fact according to the 
diagnostic criteria found in the latest DSM, schizophrenia can be diagnosed without the 
delusional and hallucinatory symptomatology which are considered primary by the 
CATEGO programme. And moreover, the Schneiderian 'first rank' symptoms of 
12 CATEGO is a computerised classification program which assigns cases to particular categories 
according to a set of hierarchical rules. 
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schizophrenia may also occur in other psychotic states such as affective psychoses 
(Doran, Breier & Roy, 1986). Kleinman claims, "The restricted sample is artifactual, 
since it places a clinical template on the original population that excludes precisely 
those cases that demonstrate the most cultural heterogeneity" (p. 20). 
According to Kleinman the broad definitional sample is the appropriate one to work 
with as it is more true to life; that is, it reflects more accurately the diversity in 
incidence which occurred in the various centres. The researchers argue that the 
CATEGO based sample is more appropriate because although it results in a decreased 
sample size, there is no loss of statistical significance. Interestingly, Chandighar, India, 
which was the only rural centre in the study, reported the highest rate of incidence, 
based on the broad definition of schizophrenia. This would appear to be an important 
finding, a finding which is lost when the restricted definition is used. 
Like the IPSS, the 'Determinants of outcome study' confirmed that the course of the 
syndrome in patients from less industrialised societies was significantly better than in 
patients from the industrialised West. The figures supporting this conclusion are rather 
stunning. 58% of the Nigerian patients and 51% of Indian patients, had a distinct 
psychotic episode followed by complete recovery, compared to 6% in Denmark and 
27% in China. Correspondingly, the rates of chronic psychotic illness ranged from 50% 
of the patients in Denmark, to 47% in the USA, and 30% in Czechoslovakia and the 
UK. In contrast the Nigerian sample had only 7% of such cases and the Indian sample 
20% (Jablensky & Sartorius, 1988). 
It is necessary at this point to discuss the distinction between the disorder and the 
outcome of the disorder, a distinction which is rather misleading. Whereas the WHO 
studies seem to differentiate between the manifestation of the 'core' symptoms of 
schizophrenia and the outcome - which is described at times as if it is a separate entity -
the course must be seen as an integral part of the disorder. In the DSM -IV, a clear 
distinction is made between schizophrenia and brief psychotic episode (which may 
occur in response to stressful life events). Although these two disorders have very 
similar 'core' symptoms, the time period associated with each is very different. 
Essentially, what really distinguishes one from the other is 'course'. So, the finding that 
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the course of schizophrenia varies across cultures must be seen as a discovery of 
profound significance, in that 'course' is a defining feature of the disorder. 
In conjunction with the 'Determinants of Outcome Study' the WHO also conducted 
several sub-studies designed to test specific hypotheses. One of these was titled: 
Stressful life events preceding the acute onset of schizophrenia. (Day, Nielson, Korten, 
Emberg, Dube, Gebhart et al.,1987). This study collected data from nine research 
centres; five in developed countries and four in developing countries, with the goals of: 
1. Exploring the feasibility of collecting valid comparative data on the 
frequency and the kinds of stress provoking events taking place in the lives of 
psychiatric patients from a wide range of socio-economic and cultural settings; 
and 
2. Cross-culturally testing pnor findings in the literature concemmg an 
association between the occurrence of stressful life events and the acute onset 
of attacks of schizophrenia. 
(Day et aI, p. 123). 
Results showed that methodologies designed to measure the nature and extent of 
stressful life events in developed countries can be adapted relatively easily to the task 
of cross-cultural investigation in developing countries. Similar sorts of events were 
found to be stressful in the various cultural settings and even where stressful events 
were peculiar to a particular culture it was usually clear to the interviewers, how and 
why, the particular events would have been experienced as stressful according to the 
specific context of the events. 
With regard to the second aim of the study, it was found that in all research centres a 
relationship was found between stressful life events and the onset of schizophrenia. 
However the researchers note that these sorts of stressors are only one of several types 
of relevant environmental factors which may influence the onset of the disease. They 
state that " ... stressful life events are part of a pool of causal factors found to be 
associated with the disease" (p. 192). An interesting and unexpected finding of this 
project was that the onset of schizophrenia in developing countries was more likely to 
be associated with stressful life events than the onset of the disorder in developed 
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countries. Relating this finding to the finding of differential outcome would suggest that 
schizophrenia may be more likely to manifest in developing countries in the form of 
'brief psychotic episode'. This disorder, which often occurs after exposure to stressful 
events, is usually associated with a more rapid and complete recovery. The suggestion 
here is that the difference in outcomes is due to a difference in mode of onset. Perhaps 
schizophrenia in the form of brief psychotic episode is more common in developing 
countries whereas classical schizophrenia is more common in the West. 
Commenting on the results of the WHO cross-cultural research programme Jablensky 
and Sartorius state: 
The WHO studies have so far only suggested the possibility that in 
technologically less complex cultures the chronic deteriorating forms of 
schizophrenia may be less frequent than in societies imposing on their 
members complex and potentially conflicting cognitive tasks. We know little 
about the occurrence and manifestations of schizophrenia in societies radically 
different from those encompassed by cross-cultural psychiatry up to date, e.g. 
pre-literate cultures or hunter-gatherer groups. The judicious application of 
modem research technologies to such settings may give us new insights into 
the nature of schizophrenia (1988, p. 69). 
OTHER STUDIES 
A number of studies have investigated differences in the presentation of schizophrenia 
across ethnic groups in the United States. Several of these have focused on the Hispanic 
population which comprises the fastest growing ethnic minority (Ruiz, 1995). Looking 
at psychosis in general, Cuellar (1982) reported that Mexican-American patients exhibit 
behaviours similar to other patient groups. Looking specifically at schizophrenia, 
Escobar, Randolph, and Hill (1986) found no major differences in the primary 
symptoms of the disorder between Hispanic and Anglo veterans. However, Hispanic 
patients were reported to have a later age at onset, a finding which has also been 
documented elsewhere (e.g., Ramirez, Johnson, & Opler, 1992). Another interesting 
difference reported by Ramirez and colleagues was in the presentation of negative 
symptoms, with Puerto Ricans showing significantly fewer than their Anglo 
counterparts. In contrast, another study (Dassori, Miller, Velligan, Saldana, & Mahurin, 
1993) found that Mexican-Americans exhibited more negative symptomatology. 
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As noted by Dassori, Miller, and Saldana (1995) these studies, and others in this area, 
vary with regard to diagnostic criteria and sampling techniques. The criteria for ethnic 
identification also appear to differ across studies. Some use the term 'Hispanic' loosely 
and may include participants who are perhaps acculturated. For instance, the majority 
of the Hispanic individuals in the study by Escobar et al. (1986) were at least second-
generation Americans, and moreover, they were from a specific population, namely war 
veterans. Other studies, for example, Dassori et al. (1993), sampled hospital 
admissions. It may be variables such as these that underlie the disparities in the results 
of the above studies. However, notwithstanding the discrepancies, Dassori et al. (1995) 
in their review of the literature on schizophrenia among Hispanics, concluded that 
culture influences a number of illness dimensions and that family factors in particular 
may play an important role in the course of the illness. 
Using data from the WHO Determinants of Outcome Study, Susser and Wanderling 
(1994) investigated the epidemiology across cultures of nonaffective acute remitting 
psychosis (NARP). They found the incidence of NARP in developing countries to be 
10 times that of industrialised countries and propose that such striking epidemiological 
differences support the view that NARP should be nosologically differentiated from 
schizophrenia. This epidemiological difference also supports the proposition stated 
above, that acute psychosis coupled with favourable outcome is more common in 
developing than developed countries. Another study (Roland & Malanda, 1988) 
investigating the differences in mental disorders between Africans and Europeans 
yielded a similar finding, that is, a significantly higher incidence of acute onset, brief 
psychotic episodes with complete remission, in African patients than in European 
patients. 
An investigation into the presentation of acute psychosis in Egyptians (Okasha, Seif, 
Dawla, Kahil, & Saad, 1993) found that psychotic symptoms were preceded by a 
stressor in 74 percent of cases and that the presence of a stressor correlated with 
positive outcome. The researchers noted that this finding concurs with the general 
belief that acute psychotic episodes are often precipitated by stressful life events. And 
they suggest that this etiological variable explains their favourable outcome, meaning 
that (as commonly believed) psychosis which occurs in response to a stressor will 
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necessarily have a more benign course. The results of this study have important 
implications for conclusions drawn from the WHO's research project. As proposed 
above, the supposed identification of "core" schizophrenic symptoms across cultures 
may be a misinterpretation of data which is confounded by the presence of patients who 
are diagnosed as schizophrenic when in fact a diagnosis of brief reactive psychosis 
would be more accurate (Lin & Kleinman, 1988). 
A study looking at the cross-cultural use of the CATEGO S+ diagnostic tool was 
carried out by Kulhara, Mattoo, Awasthi, and Chandiramani (1987) in India. Like the 
WHO studies, the Present State Examination was used to interview patients and 
determine if they met the diagnostic criteria for CATEGO S+ schizophrenia. 
Comparing their results with previous studies on the cross-cultural manifestation of 
schizophrenia, including the IPSS, the researchers reported several important 
differences. In contrast to the pooled data of the IPSS, summarised by Wing, Cooper, 
and Sartorius (1974), this investigation reported significantly more cases with 
symptoms of catatonia and more patients experiencing persecutory delusions. 
Differences were also found when comparing the Indian data with results of a similar 
study in South Africa (Teggin, Elk, Ben-Arie, & Gills, 1985). The African patients 
were found to have significantly more symptoms of tension, depression and olfactory 
hallucinations, while the Indian subjects reported more auditory hallucinations. In 
contrast to both studies Kulhara et al. found significantly less depressive 
symptomatology and significantly fewer reports of anxiety and tension. Leff (1973) 
suggested that these findings may be due to differences in the ability of people to 
distinguish between various unpleasant emotional experiences. He claims that those 
from developed countries tend to be better at making theses discriminations. Kulhara et 
al. conclude that " ... even in a so precisely defined group of schizophrenics such as 
CATEGO class S schizophrenia, there are striking cross-cultural differences in 
psychiatric manifestations," (p. 312). 
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES 
Murphy and Raman (1971) carried out a twelve year longitudinal study of 
schizophrenia in Mauritius and reported comparatively favourable outcomes for 
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patients in contrast to figures on the recovery of patients in Britain. Similarly Waxler 
(1979) reported significantly better outcomes for schizophrenics in Sri Lanka. In fact 
Waxler (1977) proposed one of the more well supported explanations for this 
difference, suggesting that it is primarily due to the expectations of recovery within 
families and communities. His claim is that in communities where schizophrenia is 
viewed as an acute disorder there is generally a high expectation that there will be a 
full, or nearly full recovery. In these sorts of environments, significant others tend to 
encourage patients' reintegration with normal life and discourage perceiving of 
individuals as disabled. Chronicity of schizophrenia, is according to Waxler, largely the 
result of social responses to the patient which exaggerate the long term effects of the 
condition and undermine the patient's sense of self-control. Kleinman (1988) notes that 
in the West the course of schizophrenia in many patients is much more positive than the 
general professional prognosis. 
In a study investigating the . influence of familial variables on the course of 
schizophrenia Brown, Birley and Wing (1972) report that schizophrenic patients are 
particularly affected by excessive emotionality of family members and they suggest that 
this can act as a stressor, perpetuating the illness and perhaps even precipitating it. 
Other more general stressors have also been implicated in the disease; such as 
bereavement, unsupportive relationships and difficult children (Sheldon, 1994). 
Focusing on the influence of family life on schizophrenia Jenkins, Kamo, De La Selva 
and Santana (1986) measured and compared amounts of expressed emotion (BE) in 
Mexican-American and Anglo-American families of schizophrenic patients. EE refers 
to the family's amount of criticality and overinvolvement with the relative with 
schizophreniaY Jenkins et al. found that in contrast to their Anglo counterparts 
Mexican-Americans were significantly less likely to be classified as high EE. And 
concurrently they showed that Mexican-American patients were less likely to relapse 
during follow-up. Other researchers have reported similar fmdings in comparing 
Western and non-Western families of schizophrenics (e.g. Kamo, Jenkins, De La Selva, 
Santana, Telles, Lopez & Mintz, 1987; Leff, Wig, Ghosh, Bedi, Menon & Kuipers et 
al., 1987). 
13 A detailed account of the EE concept and its use in the study of schizophrenia and family functioning 
is provided by Jenkins (1991). 
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It has been suggested that EE may reflect aspects of social support (Lin & Kleinman, 
1988). Many non-Western peoples live in the context of an extended family which may 
perhaps provide a more supportive environment to the recovering schizophrenic. Care 
of the schizophrenic family member is less likely to become the responsibility of one 
particular relative - such responsibility may be shared, meaning that the illness does not 
impact so intensely on anyone person. Also, in an extended family, simple logistics 
would imply that the patient will be more likely to find support and understanding 
within their own home. EE is just one of many socio-cultural variables which may 
impact on the manifestation of schizophrenia. There are many others, although typically 
they are difficult to measure. EE has received a considerable amount of attention in the 
literature because of its conduciveness to cross-cultural investigation and perhaps 
because it attempts to shed light on the issue of differential course and outcome of 
schizophrenia. 
Dassori et al. (1995) write: "The differences in course of schizophrenia among 
countries are particularly intriguing. They suggest a powerful influence of 
environmental factors ... " (p. 304). However they also draw attention to the more 
original point that environmental factors are not always purely social. They refer to a 
study by Mendoza, Smith, Polan, Lin and Strickland (1991) which reports differences 
in neuroleptic dosage requirements between some ethnic groupS.14 The authors of this 
study suggested that differences were due to factors such as diet, alcohol consumption 
and exposure to toxins which they propose could affect physiological responses to 
neuroleptics. Considering environmental variability world-wide this proposition is 
profoundly relevant to cross-cultural research on mental disorders. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, the conceptual and methodological limitations of studies investigating 
schizophrenia cross-culturally preclude the drawing of firm conclusions. While the 
WHO research programme has made a significant contribution to the understanding of 
schizophrenia across cultures, its results must be interpreted cautiously because of the 
Western-focused nature of its methodology. It sought to affirm the universality of 
14 The differences related to immigrant status not to ethnicity per se. 
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schizophrenia across people and followed an investigative method which was arguably 
weighted in this direction. Even so, these research projects represent an impressive 
achievement and have resulted in the detection of some important phenomena. The 
difference in course across cultures raises the question of whether the psychosis 
identified in various populations was in fact schizophrenia, some variant of the 
spectrum, or another psychotic disorder altogether. 
It is highly likely that psychosis of one sort or another is ubiquitous in humanity, 
however psychosis as delineated by the concept of schizophrenia may not be. Evidence 
suggests that it is a condition which may be importantly influenced by socio-
environmental factors. Clearly, more research is needed in order to illuminate the 
intricacies of the relationship between social and psychological variables and the 
various ways in which schizophrenia may be influenced by culture. 
139 
PART THREE 







THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
This chapter introduces constructivism through an examination of its historical 
beginnings and its subsequent development over the last two hundred years. Drawing 
heavily on Mahoney's (1988) historical analysis of constructivism, theorists who 
contributed to its evolvement during this period are introduced chronologically. It is 
important to note that most of these philosophers are described broadly as 
constructivist, retrospectively. In their' respective times they would not have been 
adhering to or supporting a philosophy with this name. Rather, what they all have in 
common is a particular theoretical position which is today construed as consistent with 
constructivism and which can therefore be understood as contributing to it. 
The chapter is comprised of two sections. The first is a historical exegesis which covers 
a variety of key figures discussing the pertinent ideas of each, while the second section 
examines in detail the work of two significant contemporary constructivists. 
FROM VIeO TO KELLY 
Mahoney (1988a) traces the beginnings of 'constructivist thinking' to Giambattista 
Vico, an 18th Century philosopher. Although best known for his contribution to the 
philosophy of history, Vico was also interested in human mental processes. In response 
and in contrast to Cartesian dualism, Vico recognised the connection between 'thought 
and extension'. Descartes' view which was reminiscent of early Greek philosophy, was 
dominated by the claim that 'thought' is independent of 'matter'. This echoes the 
Platonic idea that 'intellect' is separate from, and superior to the physical world. The 
well known empiricists Locke, Berkeley and Hume who were contemporaries of Vico, 
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rejected this view and claimed instead, that all knowledge arises out of direct 'sensory' 
experience with the physical realm; that knowledge is inextricably linked to the subject 
matter which it describes. It was in this conceptual atmosphere, namely the emergence 
of empiricism, that Vico discussed human mentality. 
Although there are some empiricist influences in Vico's work, his ideas were 
characterised by an emphasis on the process of knowledge acquisition as opposed to the 
simple data of sense experience. On the one hand he acknowledged that human thought 
arises out of environmental demands; that it responds to and interacts with the world 
around us. On the other hand he saw the mind not as a passive participant which 
directly apprehends the world, but rather as a complex and active processor of life 
events (Verene, 1981). He realised the significance of symbolism and language in 
human evolution and emphasised their role in scientific understanding. In contrast to 
the empiricist view, Vico asserted that truth is largely dependant on experiential and 
social variables and challenged the popular view (of the time) that it could come about 
only through direct apprehension ofthe world. 
The next major contributor to the beginnings of constructivism was Immanuel Kant, 
another 18th Century writer. Like Vico, Kant's approach to epistemology was centred 
around the notion of active cognition. However: "While agreeing that all knowledge 
begins with experience, he challenged the idea that all knowledge is based in 
experience," (Mahoney, 1988a, p. 21). He developed the concept of 'a priori 
knowledge' for which he is most well known. This is knowledge which is generated by 
logic and which requires no empirical justification. But what is most pertinent to this 
discussion is his emphasis on the role of the mind in epistemological matters. The mind 
is understood by Kant, to be the touchstone and primary progenitor of truth. (The mind 
in this case is essentially a synonym for thought, or more precisely rational thought). 
This is in stark contrast to empiricist thinking which has the external world as its 
epistemological focus. 
Kant's appeal to rationality as the source of all truth, conjures up images of Platonic 
forms, however there is one major difference. Kant made no corresponding theological 
claims. Whereas Plato equated the intellect with a 'higher good', Kant imposes no 
outside order on the human mind. Kant does however state that the 'idea' of God may 
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provide some sort of self-imposed order or constraint on ideas, but this is only for 
convenience; primarily as an aid for morality, and should not be interpreted as a 
reflection of his ontological views (Durant & Durant, 1967). 
According to Mahoney (1988), Kant's philosophy was influential in the work of Hans 
Vaihinger (1852-1933) who was the first to elaborate on, and formalise some of the 
early constructivist ideas. Vaihinger states: 
Consciousness is not to be compared to a mere passive mirror, which 
reflects rays according to purely physical laws, but "consciousness 
receives no external stimulus without moulding it according to its own 
nature. II The psyche then is an organic formative force, which 
independently changes what has been appropriated, and can adapt foreign 
elements to its own requirements as easily as it adapts itself to what is 
new. The mind is not merely appropriative, it is also assimilative and 
constructive. (Cited in Mahoney 1988a, p. 24). 
Clearly expressed in this passage is the interpretative role of thought. Vaihinger asserts 
that the mind processes information and that in doing so, changes it. Hence it can never 
provide a perfect representation of an objective reality. Vaihinger sees this not as an 
inadequacy, but rather as an inevitability, the utility of which is measured in terms of its 
contribution to an organism's survival. For Vaihinger the mind's function is primarily 
adaptive. The ability to consciously reflect on and evaluate external stimuli allows a 
greater variety of responses. This is in contrast to the reflexive style behaviours of less 
complex organisms. So, the mind allows more effective negotiation of the world and 
does this by processing and assimilating information and creating an abstraction. While 
the abstraction, is by definition imperfect, it may none-the-Iess be usefuL It is important 
to note that although most constructivists agree that the physical realm is not directly 
accessible (at least not without some amount of reconstruction), it is not therefore only 
a mental figment. Vaihinger would say that there is an external world, however 
discussions about that world may not actually be based on information which is attained 
directly from it. Rather such discussion may arise from ideas, about impressions, about 
interpretations, etc. about the world. 
Critics of constructivism no doubt abhor this scepticism. Knowledge inevitably 
becomes a 'fiction', in the sense that it is a concocted narrative. And this interestingly, 
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was Vaihinger's primary interest. In stark contrast to Kant's focus on the notion of a 
priori truth, Vaihinger discusses at length, the role of fiction in science and philosophy. 
He uses this term (fiction) to explain how ideas change over time and why there is often 
resistance to such change. Narratives become familiar and there is comfort in 
familiarity. When the world is interpreted according to particular beliefs, it may be 
difficult to change those beliefs when so much is dependant (or seemingly dependant) 
on them. In reply to the sceptics, Vaihinger would emphasise the value of constructive 
knowing. A person can bring his or her own experience to bear on a situation and 
interpret it according to what has been previously learnt. If human mental processing 
was passive and unintrusive, this sort of intelligent response would not be possible. 
While objective reality may appear to anti-constructivists to be the sacrificial lamb, it 
may none-the-Iess contribute to the greater good, if good is measured in terms of 
adaptive success. 
Within psychology, the leading construCtivist this century has been Jean Piaget. Like 
Vaihinger, Piaget rejects the view of empiricists, that the mind is passive and simply 
reflects external stimuli (piaget, 1970). Rather he talks about assimilation and 
accommodation and how cognition involves these 'active' processes in learning and 
knowledge acquisition. Assimilation refers to the ongoing cognitive ingestion of 
experiential data whereby data are integrated into existing cognitive structures. 
Accommodation, on the other hand, refers to structural change which occurs in 
response to novel stimuli, meaning that mind mutates in accordance with the demands 
of new experience. Lyddon and Mclaughlin (1992) state: 
... the role of experience within the Piagetian perspective is not to dictate the 
form of knowledge, but rather to create disequilibrium - a disequilibrium 
that challenges the knower to actively construct novel forms of 
understanding (p. 98). 
This view suggests a dynamic interplay between the individual and the environment 
which affords a versatile and adaptive cognitive life. And most importantly it asserts 
the role of 'construction' in human understanding. Piaget's primary focus is learning 
and development. However his work is clearly reminiscent of early constructivist 
philosophers whose concerns were confined to broader theoretical topics. In terms of 
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epistemology, Pia get obviously assumes a relativistic VIew wherein knowledge is 
constrained by but not confined to, the external world. 
Another relevant and influential thinker early in this century was John Dewey (1859-
1952). Dewey commented on a wide range of topics and advanced a proliferation of 
original ideas. In one of his early essays he wrote: 
From the psychological standpoint the relation of SUbject and Object is 
one which exists within consciousness. And its nature or meaning must be 
determined by an examination of consciousness itself. The duty· of the 
psychologist is to show how it arises for consciousness. Put from the 
positive side, he must point out how consciousness differentiates itself so 
as to give rise to the existence within, that is for, itself of subject and 
object. This operation fixes the nature of the two (for they have no nature 
aside from their relation in consciousness), and at the same time explicates 
or develops the nature of consciousness itself. In this case it reveals that 
consciousness is precisely the unity of subject and object (from 
. McDermott, E&, 1973, p. 106). 
For Dewey, there can be no knowledge without a knower. Like Piaget knowledge is 
viewed as dependant on the process through which it arises and this necessarily 
involves some sort of transformation. The following excerpt expresses more precisely 
the interdependence of the internal and the external: 
The nervous organism, the objects, the series of events as known, are 
relative to our consciousness, but since this itself is dependant, is a product, 
there is a reality behind the processes, behind our consciousness, which has 
produced them both (from McDermott, Ed., 1973, p. 107). 
This is consistent with Piaget's notion of active cognition and the circular relationship 
between the thinker and the object (or perhaps the perceived object) of thought. The 
way that the organism interprets events is mediated by both inner structure and external 
reality. What is known is relative to consciousness and consciousness itself is 
influenced by its own previous manifestations and external information. But here 
Dewey departs from Piaget, claiming that although the evaluation of experience is 
mutative, in that it involves a step back from reality and a step towards construction, 
there is however such a thing as 'brute' experience. For instance the sensation of pain, 
or the perception of a colour. He says that these sorts of experiences are not "a matter 
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oflmowledge" but of "existence". That is to say, a sensation just is whether or not one 
chooses to interpret it or describe it. 
However Dewey can still be described as a constructivist. He states: "To know a 
quality as sensation is to have perfonned an act of complicated objective reference; it 
is not to register an inherently given property" (from Pepper, 1942, p. 29). Dewey's 
point is that regardless of one's intellectual acts there will be certain objects of 
analysis. To use Dewey's example: Whether or not what one sees is actually a red 
tomato, one cannot doubt that there is in one's visual field an object that looks red and 
is the shape of an ordinary tomato. However despite the indubitability of the red 
object, as soon as it is called a tomato and subsequently eaten, a constructive 
operation has occurred. For Dewey, the fact that there are hard data does not in any 
way diminish the constructive role of cognition. Although there are objects, 
knowledge of them does not arise through direct apprehension, but rather through a 
combination of perception and cognition. 
Around the time that Dewey's career was drawing to a close, Stephen Pepper published 
a book entitled 'World Hypotheses' (1942). In it he presented an interesting and rather 
innovative approach to the understanding of various world views. He tenned these 
world views 'root metaphors' and claimed that these lie at the heart of many more 
complex metaphysical theories. Basically, he outlined four different modes of 
understanding: fonnism, mechanism, organicism and contextualism. In short, the 
difference between these approaches is the underlying or perhaps overriding metaphor. 
For fonnism this metaphor is similarity. Data are assigned to vanous categories 
according to their similarity to ideal fonns. This involves a process of typification 
wherein phenomena are categorised in relation to their material and stable essences. 
Mechanism, on the other hand, is based on the root metaphor of the machine and 
construes the world in tenns of discrete yet interactive parts. This view assumes that 
there are linear cause and effect relationships between stable entities. In contrast, 
organicism, with its focus on living systems, presents a more dynamic picture. 
According to this view, phenomena are in an ongoing process of development and 
transformation. This development is goal directed; that is, it is the result of inherent 
'growth oriented' natures. Finally, contextualism uses the root metaphor of the 
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'historical event' and explains with reference to context. By 'historical', Pepper means 
not an event that occurred in the past, but rather a present event within a context of 
various other interwoven events. Unlike organicism, this view assumes an open-
endedness claiming that basically, anything can happen. This is illustrated by the 
following excerpt: 
Contextualism is accordingly sometimes said to have a horizontal 
cosmology in contrast to other views, which have a vertical cosmology. 
There is no top nor bottom to the contextualistic world. In formism or 
mechanism or organicism one has only to analyse in certain specified ways 
and one is bound, so it is believed, ultimately to get to the bottom of things 
or the top of things. Contextualism justifies no such faith. There is no 
cosmological mode of analysis that guarantees the whole truth or an arrival 
at the ultimate nature of things. On the other hand, one does not need to 
hunt for a distant cosmological truth, since every present event gives it as 
fully as it can be given. 
(Pepper, 1942, p. 251) 
This view exhibits a conspicuous lack of determinism, realising that as phenomena 
emerge, they give rise to new phenomena, and that events are inextricably linked. 
Hence, in a sense there is no touchstone of truth other than the complex pattern of 
active ongoing acts which are embedded in context. According to this system of 
understanding, one can not accurately describe a thing or process without reference to 
its interdependent variables as these become part of the thing itself. 
Relatedly, Mead (1934) offered the term 'emergence' to refer to features which arise 
through the interaction of organism and environment (Prawat & Floden, 1994). This is 
rather like the Gestalt idea that a whole is greater than its constituent parts. According 
to the Gestalt view a whole has qualities which are not present within individual 
components; rather something quite new can emerge from the relationship 
(Wertheimer, 1922). Hence, the study of the parts ofa phenomenon will not necessarily 
lead to greater understanding of that phenomenon. What is important is the interaction 
of the parts and the properties which arise as a result of it. And this is also what Mead's 
term 'emergence' expresses. 
Pepper's contextualism embodies these ideas. Phenomena must be viewed in context. If 
for example one intends to analyse human behaviour, the analysis must include the 
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environment, particularly the social environment. The essential point, and one which is 
also central to a constructivist epistemology, is that knowledge can not be gained from 
the intensive study of isolated phenomena. Rather, phenomena must be studied in 
relation to their various interconnections with one another and to their context. ill the 
field of psychology such an approach is particularly valuable, as human behaviour is 
comprised of a complex mixture of variables and a thorough understanding will depend 
on the acknowledgement of all of these. More generally, Pepper's description of several 
alternative world views is also relevant. This is compatible with the broad constructivist 
assumption that different constructions may each offer their own unique and valuable 
perspective. This is in contrast to rationalist theories which seek to explain with 
reference to only one system and which strive for a single 'truth'. 
Finally to end this look at the history of constructivism, is a brief introduction to the 
most important figure in constructivist psychology. Described by Mahoney as the 
'pioneer constructivist' (in the fields of personality theory and psychotherapy), George 
Kelly was the first person to apply constructivism specifically to psychological topics. 
Although several theorists such as Piaget and Dewey had previously discussed the 
'mind' in light of constructivist ideas, such discussions were largely philosophical in 
nature. Kelly brought constructivism fairly and squarely into the domain of psychology. 
This is not surprising considering that he worked as a clinician for 25 years before 
publishing his first major work, "The psychology of personal constructs," (Stewart & 
Barry, 1991). 
ill this Kelly claims that although there is a single, external world, there may be many 
different ways to conceive of it. This position has been called alternativism as it views 
knowledge as a matter of alternatives. The alternativism is based on the assumption that 
the world is not directly perceived, but rather, is represented to (and processed by) 
individuals in various ways depending on their own unique construct systems (Kelly, 
1955). Like Vaihinger, Kelly asserts that perception involves a process of abstraction, 
whereby people construct their representations of the world, but going one step further, 
Kelly focuses on the concept of alternatives and asks the question of why one 
abstraction is chosen over another. This point is illustrated in the excerpts below: 
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A full-fledged psychological inquiry into the behaviour of a baby, for 
example, is not confined to calculating what he will pop into his mouth next, 
nor to training him to do what we want by frustrating all his ingenious 
efforts to escape the strictures we have imposed, but invites us to look at him 
and wonder what vast and unforeseen alternatives might lie ahead (Maher, 
Ed., 1969, p. 8). 
Kelly assumes that infonnation about alternatives comes from context. An 
understanding of the context and an understanding of the alternatives, go hand-in-hand. 
This is very close to Pepper's contextualism. Kelly states: 
Construct theory, or better,personal construct theory - a tenn which implies 
that a construct is as much a personal undertaking as it is a disembodied 
scheme for putting nature in its place - suggests that human behaviour is to 
be understood in a context of relevance (Maher, Ed., 1969, p. 11-12). 
So, objects, phenomena and human behaviour, or any other item of scientific inquiry 
cannot be explained without reference to context, and the alternatives which arise from 
it. According to Kelly there are many different ways of construing the world, however 
we are constrained by our personal experience and our social environment, both of 
which shape our construct systems. For instance language is perhaps our most 
significant construct system. We view and interpret the world in tenns of this system. 
And this interpretation is not a passive response; rather it involves an active process of 
selecting infonnation which is considered relevant and comprehending it according to 
the concepts which we are familiar with. A major influence on Kelly's constructivism 
was Jacob Korzybsky (1933, 1943), who claimed that human beings' interaction with 
the world is mediated by linguistic referents (Stewart and Barry, 1991). Like other 
constructivists, Korzybsky was interested in the process of abstraction, which was used 
to denote the activity of apprehending selected environmental stimuli. He suggested 
that psychological problems arise largely from a break-down of the process of 
abstraction, which causes the disruption of a person's ability to evaluate and understand 
his or her environment. Kelly agreed with this view, stating that mental health is 
dependant on the cognitive and linguistic constructs which people employ in their 
interaction with the world. 
As mentioned, Kelly's Personal Construct Theory was presented after many years of 
practice as a clinician, and hence while it seems to involve some rather abstract claims, 
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it has a strong pragmatic focus. The theory was fostered in conjunction with 
developments in his therapeutic techniques. The central tenet of Kelly's thinking during 
this time was the merit and utility of altemativism. This necessarily suggests choice and 
the opportunity for change, which Kelly considered vital to the treatment of 
psychological disorders. The fact that construct systems can be changed provides a 
therapeutic window. A person who is using a conceptual map which is ineffective or 
debilitative can change it and bring about improvement in their quality of life. This 
claim may seem unclear and far-fetched. How can a change in mere terminology attend 
to the difficulties of mental disorder? For Kelly, a construct system is not just 
terminology; rather it is a deeply embedded aspect of personality which affects every 
dimension of a person's existence. It influences how we see ourselves in relation to the 
world and this is fundamental. 
Kelly saw drama as an effective means for eliciting change. Building on the work of 
Jacob Moreno who was one of the first major psychodramatists, Kelly experimented 
with the use of role-playing as a way of enabling people to develop newer and better 
construct systems. Moreno (1937) claimed to have observed substantial improvement in 
patients who participated in his psychodramatic programme. Kelly particUlarly liked 
Moreno's use of spontaneous improvisation which encouraged people to lose their 
inhibitions and challenge their self and world-perceptions. One important goal of this 
dramatic method is to allow the expression of hidden aspects of personality. It was 
Kelly's view that many of his patients had hidden potential and role-playing was seen as 
one way of encouraging this potential to emerge. Kelly believed that in this way people 
would be better placed to understand their problems and find solutions. 
Kelly's constructivism is refreshingly optimistic in contrast to the cynicism of some 
early constructivists, who saw human knowledge as trapped within the lonely bounds of 
relativism. Kelly seized the creativity of constructivism and used it as the basis of his 
therapeutic method. For him, the relativity is an expression of the mutability of 
knowledge and the fact that epistemology is directed toward human ends. These ends 
are dependant on the interaction of human beings and their environments which is 
mediated by personal and social construct systems. This view, namely the significance 
of personal and social constructions and their role in the understanding of 
psychopathology will playa key role in forthcoming discussions. 
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CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIVISTS 
Within psychology and particularly its application in psychotherapy, the two most 
influential constructivists are Robert Neimeyer and Michael Mahoney. Both are 
psychotherapists who use a constructivist approach in their clinical work and like Kelly, 
stress the advantages offered by this particular construal of human thought and 
behaviour. And both display a clear understanding of constructivism's philosophical 
claims. The term 'philosophical' is used here to indicate the theoretical or perhaps 
abstract aspects of constructivism which form the foundation of its use within 
psychology. This must be distinguished from the use of the term constructivism within 
philosophy, where its meaning may be quite different. It has been used as a synonym 
for 'rationalist interventionism' which describes a particular approach to the regulation 
and control of complex open systems. And within mathematics it denotes an 
epistemological position which claims, that in order for mathematical statements to be 
true, they must be supported by formal proof (Mahoney, 1988a). The defmition of 
constructivism which is being used herein, has in part been outlined by the overview of 
the various pertinent thinkers of the last few centuries. The brief introduction to the 
work of Neimeyer and Mahoney, that follows, is provided for two reasons. Firstly, to 
bring the historical analysis up to date, and secondly to elaborate on the earlier ideas 
and hence complete the definition of constructivism. 
Robert Neimeyer 
Neimeyer contrasts the constructivist 'movement' with traditional cognitive therapies 
which have their roots in logical empiricist and rationalist ideologies (Neimeyer, 
1993a). These ideologies promote the view that logic (or rationality) is the basis for 
knowledge, and that it provides one all encompassing framework within which all 
knowledge arises. It is the method and test of truth, and has a transcendental aspect to it 
which enables the knower to overcome problems of relativism. Tied to this, is the idea 
that there is a real world which can be directly apprehended and that truth corresponds 
to this real world. So according to this view, knowledge is both logical and empirical; it 
involves both reason and observation. With regard to psychopathology this view 
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assumes that effective treatment must involve the substitution of rational for irrational 
cognitions. 
As noted by Neimeyer, constructivism presents a very different view, representing an 
extensive shift in metatheoretical thinking. He sees this as part of the 'post-modem' era 
which places more significance on the constructive or perhaps 'constructed' aspects of 
knowledge and awareness. He states: 
Perhaps the core of post-modem consciousness is the increasingly 
widespread awareness that the belief systems and apparent 'realities' one 
indwells are socially constituted rather than 'given,' and hence can be 
constituted very differently in various cultures (or subcultures), times, and 
circumstances, although they might appear to carry the force of necessity 
to those who inhabit them (1993a, p. 221). 
As . succinctly stated by Neimeyer, the post-modem view challenges logical 
empiricism's core proposition: that knowledge objectively represents an all-
encompassing external reality and that it also expresses certain indubitable laws; like 
Einstein's theory of relativity. According to the constructivist, the theory of relativity is 
one way, not the way of understanding a phenomenon. Placing this view in the context 
of the present discussion yields a progressive vision of mental disorder across cultures. 
Progressive, because it reflects the growing acceptance and appreciation of cultural 
diversity throughout the Western world. What is being alluded to, is a view which is 
very different to the typical universalist approach which dominates Western 
psychology. Whether or not mental disorders are largely, or at least to some extent, 
culture-bound, this view asserts that a classification system such as the DSM-IV is one 
way of understanding them. There may be other equally effective systems, because as 
Neimeyer states these systems are not 'given', but rather, 'socially constituted.' 
Of course Neimeyer is speaking generally about knowledge, not about mental disorder, 
however he does make some comments about the latter. He discusses the differences 
between traditional cognitive therapies and constructivist therapies, which rest on quite 
incompatible construals of psychological disturbance. Cognitive therapies such as those 
espoused by Beck and Ellis, aim to promote rationality, and encourage individuals to 
perceive things as they 'really' are. According to this therapeutic approach, mental 
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disorders are primarily due to faulty or illogical thinking which does not correspond to 
the world. Neimeyer argues, along with Anderson (1990), that 'in a world with many 
realities' this construal of mental disturbance is very difficult to uphold. There are 
numerous languages, religions, customs or whatever, hence they ask the question: How 
can maladjustment to one, be the one and only hallmark of ill health? This is an 
important question which clearly challenges objectivists. If there is only one true 
understanding, one must choose which is correct and this will necessarily render the 
others wrong. This sort of absolutism is an unfortunate consequence of the rationalist's 
quest for objectivity. Strangely, many religions rely on this sort of reasoning. In order 
for them to be right, all other religions must be wrong and if they are right, then all 
others are sure to be wrong. Yet, of course they all believe that they are right, because 
they all lay claim to a 'true' perception of the world. 
Neimeyer states that rather than the outright rejection of inaccurate cognitions, 
constructivists maintain that: 
... the viability of any given construction is a function of its consequences for 
the individual or group that provisionally adopts it, as well as its overall 
coherence with the larger system of personally or socially held beliefs into 
which it is incorporated (1993a, p. 222). 
This is reminiscent of Vaihinger who saw the value of personal constructions and 
acknowledged their adaptive qualities. What is important is whether or not an idea 
'works' not whether or not it 'fits.' Obviously many ideas which are good (in terms of 
their contribution to an organism's survival) will do both (therefore fit and work) 
however Neimeyer suggests that sometimes a belief may have positive consequences 
without being a true representation of the world. Note the mention of and hence 
distinction between, personal and social systems of knowledge. There will inevitably be 
differences between these however both are important for constructivism. Neimeyer 
states: 
At the core of constructivist theory is a view of human beings as active 
agents who individually and collectively, co-constitute the meaning of 
their experiential world ... From this perspective, human knowledge is 
ultimately (inter)personal and evolutionary, with no simple prospect of 
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validation against an objective reality beyond peoples constructions 
(1993a, p.222). 
So, meaning occurs at both the level of the individual and the community. In a sense, 
the individual is a sub-culture, and the immediate family is a wider sub-culture and the 
community an even wider sub-culture and so on. While meaning is construed in terms 
of social norms and expectations, it is also tested against ones own unique set of 
experiences. And what matters to the constructivist is not the external validation of 
meaning, but rather how that meaning enables people to live their lives. 
According to Neimeyer, the constructivist approach to psychotherapy is based on this 
philosophy. Rather than attempting to change a person's 'faulty' cognitions, 
constructivist therapy attempts to facilitate change within the patient's own unique 
construct system. As Neimeyer states, the goal is 'creative' rather that 'corrective', in 
that beliefs are viewed as fundamentally positive and as part of an intricate pattern of 
ideas which, ideal or not, has been of some use to the person. Therapy is flexible in that 
it is tailored to individual needs; it acknowledges differences in customs and culture 
and responds to the particular needs of the client. As a therapeutic approach this may 
seem rather vague, however it should be noted that Neimeyer is speaking generally 
about a broad field which is comprised of many quite different therapeutic techniques. 
As a theoretical movement within psychology, constructivism lends itself to a variety of 
conceptualisations of psychopathology and a number of treatment methods, all of 
which express a similar philosophy of mind. 
As noted by Neimeyer, Kelly was the first to systematically use constructivist ideas in 
clinical practice. He experimented with role-playing techniques wherein clients were 
encouraged to tryout different construct systems. Most importantly, he realised the 
consequence of language and other social tools which shape and in a sense limit 
peoples cognitions. This awareness contributed to a dynamic and colourful clinical 
method which promoted the self-examination of beliefs, desires and meanings, hence 
creating the opportunity for modification. 
Relatedly, another type of therapy listed by Neimeyer, which relies on constructivist 
principles is narrative reconstruction. As its name suggests, this psychotherapeutic 
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method assumes that people live, and make sense of, their lives through stories. A 
literary explication is used as a metaphor for the client's life and a therapeutic tool. An 
understanding of the story gives insight into its direction and deficiencies, and stories 
can then be retold. What is most important is 'meaning', as opposed to actual events, 
because events occur within a context and are interpreted and experienced according to 
peoples' inner narratives. 
Because of the strong focus on context and social variables, of constructivist 
approaches to the treatment of psychopathology, they are particularly useful in the field 
of family therapy. And this has become a primary area of their use. Therapists of this 
method pay special attention to relationships between family members and the family'S 
unique style and system of interaction. An important goal of the therapist in this 
situation, is to promote the idea that there may be different yet compatible perceptions 
and opinions within a family, and to encourage family members to try out various 
scenarios, particularly those of, say, 'their siblings. This is aimed at promoting 
acceptance and a heightened understanding of each other. 
An important closing remark which Neimeyer makes in his article on constructivist 
therapies, is that the therapist does not claim to have greater authority or knowledge, 
than the client. The relationship is one of equality and co-operation and the client and 
therapist work together as 'co-investigators', studying construct systems and where 
necessary, challenging them. This is in stark contrast perhaps, to traditional clinical 
psychology which seeks to understand by imposing its own system of analysis on 
clients who have very little understanding of it. The intention herein is to apply 
constructivist ideas to this more strict and implacable field, by way of a critique of its 
properties and theoretical foundations. Although as mentioned by Neimeyer, 
constructivism and its applications are becoming increasingly popular within 
psychology, this approval is limited largely to the area of psychotherapy. 
Arguably, Neimeyer's account of constructivism can be criticised for being too strongly 
relativistic. He seems to stress. the social context of knowledge to the exclusion of 
material phenomena. While his ontological views are not entirely clear, he explicitly 
states that the external validation of meaning is irrelevant. What is considered relevant, 
is the extent to which individuals' understandings of experiences enable them to live 
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their lives. But supposedly there is some overlap here. It is undoubtedly advantageous 
to understand that serious injury may result if one steps into the path of an oncoming 
vehicle. Clearly, in many instances, there is what may be termed a correct interpretation 
of events which has little to do with socio-cultural factors. And in such cases hard data 
may provide confirmation of ideas and theories and hence a contribution to knowledge. 
In explicating the role of meaning in human experience, Neimeyer, like Vaihinger, 
relies on the notion of utility, claiming that the meaning that one ascribes to events 
should prove useful - in other words it should assist the individual in some way. 
However Neimeyer fails to acknowledge that the external world places certain 
constraints on the process of ascribing meaning, thereby delimiting what mayor may 
not be a useful interpetation. 
Relatedly, in discussing psychotherapy, Neimeyer suggests that the therapist should 
attempt to effect change within the client's own unique construct system. In contrast to 
the approach oftraditional cognitive therapy, Neimeyer proposes that it is inappropriate 
to set out to 'correct' the 'faulty' cognitions of the client because the therapist's role is 
not one of a 'judge' but of an 'equal.' According to this view the therapist has no right 
to impose on the client, his or her perception of what is suitable thinking, because it is 
no more likely to be right than the client's. This view is clearly problematic because it 
puts the therapist in a position of complete inaction. At every tum the clinician must 
decide how to best help the client and to do this he or she must rely on a combination of 
personal experience and professional skills. If the clinician fails to impose these on the 
client in any way then it is likely that there has been no therapeutic process. Moreover, 
in many situations, progress in therapy is dependant upon the client being challenged in 
some way. This encourages experimentation with alternative ways of thinking, feeling 
and being, which may not be discovered otherwise. One must not forget that a primary 
purpose of therapy is personal change and personal growth. 
Michael Mahoney 
Michael Mahoney is one of the most prolific writers on the subject of constructivism 
and psychology. Like Neimeyer his key area of interest is psychotherapy, however he 
has also provided a detailed analysis of 'constructive metatheory', which is, " ... a 
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family of models and theories that share the foundational assumption of constructivism" 
(Mahoney 1988a, p. 1). Mahoney views constructivism as a powerful and broad 
philosophical movement which has emerged slowly and in various forms over an 
extended period of time. He insightfully acknowledges that constructivism can trace its 
conceptual lineage to both idealism and realism which are of course mutually 
incompatible theories. For example Kant was clearly an idealist; he claimed that the 
objects of our experience do not exist independently of our thoughts. Whereas theorists 
such as Vaihinger and Dewey admitted to the actual manifestation of matter, 
independent of mind. These two dichotomous views have been called radical 
constructivism and critical constructivism (respectively). 
Radical constructivism is indistinguishable from idealism in that it claims that 
knowledge is simply an expression of human beings' capacity to organise and process 
experiences; experiences which have no correlation to a 'real' external world (von 
Glaserfeld, 1984; Varela, 1979). hi contrast, critical constructivism takes a 
compatibilist approach, proposing that although knowledge is constructed, its 
constructions are constrained by external determinants (Weimer, 1979). As Mahoney 
points out, like him, most contemporary constructivists are critical constructivists. They 
acknowledge the existence of the material dimension, however they claim that access to 
it can only be partial and indirect. 
In his summary of the primary elements of 'constructive metatheories,' Mahoney states 
that they: 
1. acknowledge the power of ideas and mental/symbolic processes that 
mediate, constrain, and order the particulars and patterns of experience. 
acknowledge the existence of a 'real' external world "the furniture of 
the universe" - that can be known to us only individually and 
imperfectly. 
3. acknowledge the potential power of reason and rationality in human 
knowing, that power being most apparent when it is applied in the 
service of critical (disconfirmatory) examination rather than positive 
confirmatory justification; and 
4. assert that the function of data (sense and scientific) in knowledge 
development is essentially one of selecting or winnowing enacted 
hypotheses; in this sense, data do not justify or form the foundations of 
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valid knowledge, but instead selectively eliminate less viable 
approximations. 
(~ahoney, 1988a,p.4-5) 
This delineation is a confluence of many of the ideas which have already been 
expressed in this chapter: That the world can only be known indirectly, because the 
mind actively and 'constructively' processes information; that knowledge should be 
'viable' as opposed to 'valid' because it arises within a complex system of ideas which 
enables negotiation of the world. In this sense knowledge is relative to individuals and 
communities. These milieus provide their own validation; hence there is no need for an 
objective evaluation. Another important factor is criticality which refers to the process 
of actively examining information and evaluating it according to reason and to 
individual beliefs and needs. The suggestion here is that in the process of applying 
reason to a situation, people will draw on their past experiences and particular construct 
systems; for instance their languages. They may also consider their goals in the analysis 
of information. 
To describe another facet of constructivism, ~ahoney introduces the term 
'morphogenic nuclear structure', which he claims captures the fundamental nature of 
human mentality. This fundamental nature involves a central core around which more 
peripheral structures and processes are organised. Mahoney states that peripheral 
activity is also constrained by the central system. To exemplify this idea, he draws on 
the field of linguistics. Chomsky used a distinction between deep structure and surface 
structure in his understanding of language. The deep structure consists of abstract 
organising rules which shape and delineate expressions at higher (as in nearer to the 
surface) levels. The central point is that the abstract rules determine the nature of the 
peripheral linguistic expressions and that this process is often covert. In other words the 
power of abstract and underlying linguistic mechanisms and tools is often 
underestimated or even overlooked. 
According to Mahoney, another position with a component which is similar to the 
concept of 'morphogenic nuclear structure' is that of Hayek, who uses the term 
'unconscious' where Chomsky would use deep structure. As noted by ~ahoney, the 
meaning which Hayek ascribes to the notion 'unconscious' is very different from 
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Freud's use of the term. For Hayek an unconscious process is simply a process of 
which a person is not conscious (Hayek, 1978). It is not therefore 'sub-conscious' but 
rather, more likely, 'superconscious' because it has an enormous influence on a 
person's experience of the world. Hayek's unconscious is like Chomsky's deep 
structure in that it orders and constrains conscious processes. Although the unconscious 
consists of, or is a product of, abstractions and generalisations, it impacts on and 
delineates the 'particulars' of experience. It is form-giving; it guides perception and 
interpretation although it is not impervious to influences from above (or perhaps 
below). The abstracts are of course affected and modified by the particulars. 
Another feature of constructivism described by Mahoney concerns the private or 
personal focus of the term. Experiences and the meanings which are ascribed to them 
are essentially private. For instance unconscious or abstract processes will differ 
significantly across individuals even though the individuals may share the same 
language and similar environment. Because psychological phenomena revolve around 
the self, which is of course unique. The individual is the centre of his or her universe 
and life experiences are understood relative to this vantage point. There is an on-going 
quest for survival and prosperity which is inevitably self-centred. And this self-
centredness dramatically affects ones existence. It is all-pervading and hence 
influences, though often implicitly, one's experience of the world. According to this 
view the self and its goals provide a touchstone for knowledge development. Theories 
which promote survival and success are more likely to become a permanent part of the 
person's belief system. 
This idea can be illuminated through a comparison with evolutionary theory. Like 
animal adaptation, theories are exposed to pressures which may cause them to mutate 
or die (or carry on unchanged). The pressures in this case are criticism and refutation, 
but though the purpose of these pressures is to reveal the 'truth', what they actually do 
is eliminate the least viable theories. Success of a species is measured in terms of its 
success in a particular environment. If it is taken out of that environment it may become 
extinct. And a species which thrives in its own unique habitat may yet become extinct; 
it is not therefore immune to danger. Likewise a theory may be useful at one time and 
useless at another or it may have to be modified according to changes in the larger 
metatheoretical picture. 
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What survives is not necessarily right, but it has not been shown to be wrong. Karl 
Popper is well known for his falsificationist construal of knowledge development, 
which claims that general scientific theories can be falsified but not verified (Popper, 
1972). In fact he claimed that falsification is the hallmark of science. His famous 
illustration of this point uses the statement, "All crows are black". Popper claims that 
no amount of observation will verify the proposition however the observation of a 
single white crow will falsify it. 
So, what has this to do with constructivism? According to Mahoney this type of 
epistemological approach is consistent with constructivism. A theory is often 
considered to be the best explanation because it has not been refuted, not because it is 
indubitable. He argues that ideas transmute over time, not necessarily toward a perfect 
end point but toward an ever-changing one. Goals are seen as personally and socially 
defmed, hence as the needs of these domains change, so too do their goals. As shown, 
Mahoney's constructivism makes claims about personal meaning systems and 
collective meaning systems, so the goals mentioned above are those of individuals and 
science in general. 
Like Neimeyer, the central focus of Mahoney's work is the treatment of psychological 
problems. As noted by Mahoney (l988b) constructivism takes a particular approach to 
the construal of such problems. A problem is often viewed as a coping mechanism as 
opposed to a malfunction. While the symptomatology may create difficulties for the 
individual, it is not therefore seen as inherently pathological. The approach is therefore 
an essentially positive one, in that the 'problem' is seen as a response to a challenging 
situation, a response which may have been the best (or only) option at a particular time. 
The context in which the problem arose is considered and included in the clinical 
picture. Problems are not analysed in isolation from other individual variables or 
environmental factors. The individual is understood as a whole, with many interwoven 
facets which are rooted in a unifying and form giving, deep underlying structure. 
So problems which may appear quite superficial and isolated, may signify more 
profound and pervading disruption. Mahoney states: 
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This shift of focus is conceptualised as moving from the problem level 
(current episodes of dysfunction or distress) through the pattern level 
(recurrent regularities in problems) and finally to the process level 
(generative and ongoing anticipatory constructions that contribute to the 
perpetuation of the patterns (Mahoney, 1988b, p. 304). 
One of the primary benefits of therapy '~hich is directed at the 'process level', is that 
clients gain insight into some of the assumptions and constructs which filter their 
experiences and behaviours. And this creates a capacity for change which would be 
more limited under traditional problem-focused approaches. According to this method 
the problem is not ignored and nor is its significance underestimated. Rather, the 
mechanisms and patterns of operation which have allowed it to develop are analysed so 
that (if necessary) more fundamental change can be effected. It appears that the 
differentiation of Mahoney's three levels of intervention, is not clear cut. There would 
be much overlap and interconnectedness. What the explication provides is essentially a 
paradigm for guiding the understanding and treatment of psychological disorders. 
Although there may be many similarities in symptomatology across individuals, people 
respond differently to them. And the response becomes part of the dilemma. What is 
particularly important for the constructivist is 'meaning'. One must ask the questions: 
what does this problem mean to this person? In what way is it connected with, or 
disconnected from, their construct system? And what underlying mental processes are 
supporting it? Obviously these questions are quite abstract and difficult to answer. They 
create challenges for both the therapist and the client. Mahoney uses a variety of 
therapies, including Gestalt and Humanist techniques to meet these challenges. 
Mahoney is one of few constructivist theorists to discuss the role of emotion in 
psychological dysfunction. He notes that many analyses of mental disorder assume that 
such problems are essentially emotional. For example, emotions such as anger and 
depression are often viewed as central to psychopathology. The DSM~N, for instance, 
lists several disorders which are characterised by low mood or excessive despondency. 
Mahoney states that intense emotions are sometimes described as having " ... a 
disorganising influence on the individual" (Mahoney, 1988b). According to Mahoney 
the constructivist view of emotionality is quite different. Emotion, even when it is 
excessive is not construed as inherently disorganising and therefore as something which 
161 
must be eradicated. Rather it is seen as a potent and primal type of experience which 
yields a particular type of knowledge. What this means is that the experience of an 
emotion may yield insight into ones state of being which may not be available through 
any other encounter. It is therefore considered valuable in that it plays an important role 
in the regulation and organisation of experience. An uncomfortable emotion may in this 
sense be understood as a necessary phase or process which occurs when change and/or 
growth are taking place. 
This view does not deny that often people are adversely affected by extended periods of 
feeling depressed or anxious. Such periods do not appear comfortable or productive. A 
constructivist however looks at emotion in a context not at emotion per se. Specifically 
its role is examined in relation to its place within the individual's other psychological 
systems. So the emotion itself is generally not the target of therapeutic intervention, but 
rather a person's total experience which is showing dysfunction in the form of intense 
emotion. In this sense excessive or disordered emotion may be seen not as the root or 
cause of the problem but as a symptom or component of it. 
Like Neimeyer, Mahoney may be criticised on the grounds that his theory of 
knowledge is ultimately relativistic as he states that the world can only be known 
'individually and imperfectly.' A major problem with this view is the inevitable 
relativity of all ideas. Mahoney argues that ideas change over time in response to 
personal and social need through a process of acceptance and refutation. However this 
ignores the possibility of objective verification which seems plausible according to 
Mahoney's views on ontology. If the existence of a real world is acknowledged then it 
is also necessary to acknowledge the influence of that world on the development of 
ideas. Mahoney argues that this can only be known imperfectly due to the complex 
processes of interpretation which necessarily affect the objects and phenomena under 
investigation. However this position is problematic in that there is therefore no common 
ground for scientific study. In many areas of science this relativist stance appears 
inappropriate. For instance, one can observe and report that water boils at 100 degrees 
Celsius without having to apply ones distinct mental processes. In this case such 
processes have no bearing on the description of the phenomenon in question. Like 
Neimeyer, Mahoney fails to acknowledge to a sufficient extent, the external constraints 
on the interpretation of events. 
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However, whereas Neimeyer's relativist position is primarily social, Mahoney'S is 
individual-centred. For Mahoney, each individual has his or her own unique 
understanding of the world which is a function of a unique psychological make-up. In 
contrast to this position, Neimeyer stresses the commonalities between people, 
proposing that while there may be individual differences, there are more powerful 
socio-culturally defined similarities. According to Mahoney, each individual is the 
centre of his or her universe and hence each understanding of the universe is different. 
Neimeyer, on the other hand, argues that people subsume the views which are 
predominant in their society and that therefore their knowledge of the world will be a 
product of those views. The difficulties with these two approaches lie not in the ideas 
per se, but in the extent to which they taken. The account of constructivism which I will 
advocate will draw on both of these views. I will argue that both individual and social 
factors play an important role in the development of knowledge but also that the 
influence of these factors is mediated by the data and phenomena under investigation. 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM & SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
There is an important distinction, requiring clarification, between constructivism and 
the related theoretical position of social constructionism. Social constructionists (and 
social constructivists), such as Gergen (1985) claim that knowledge is not objective and 
is therefore not an accurate representation of the objects and phenomena which it seeks 
to explain, but rather is relative to its socio-cultural context and is therefore inextricably 
tied to that context. In other words knowledge is an artefact of the social environment 
out of which it emerges. That environment consists of the language, beliefs and values 
of its inhabitants. Language plays a key role in social constructionism. Language is 
seen as the medium through which individuals ascribe meaning and glean 
understanding. It is the structure in which all ideas are embedded and it therefore 
delineates and constrains knowledge. Individuals use language, not only to 
communicate with one another, but also to SUbjectively interpret the world around 
them. Hence subjective interpretations within a social group are not viewed as radically 
different from one person to the next. Rather they are seen as similar due to their 
common linguistic origin. 
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This position can be traced to Vygotsky (1934) who asserted that mental activity arises 
largely out of what may be termed the 'privatisation' of social and interpersonal activity 
(Harre, 1989). Experiences are mediated by the concepts and conceptual structure of 
language. For instance, the referents of a language which are used for particular 
emotion states, shape the way in which emotions are experienced and interpreted. But 
well before Vygotsky, Vico noted the power oflanguageand symbolism in human, and 
in particular, scientific understanding. Vico was especially interested in the process of 
lmowledge development which he saw as being inextricably connected to the linguistic 
devices which it employed. Wittgenstein (1953) also wrote of the primacy oflanguage 
in the acquisition of meaning and the development of knowledge. Language for 
Wittgenstein is the centre of human psychology, as linguistic practices are seen to 
determine the nature of thought and the nature of science. 
Social constructionism may be viewed as one type of constructivism, one which 
emphasises the significance of language in human knowledge systems and one which 
relatedly adheres to the thesis of radical relativism. In contrast to the relativism seen in 
the ideas of Mahoney and Neimeyer, social constructionists argue that knowledge is 
entirely a product of socio-cultural factors. While Mahoney and Neimeyer both stress 
the primacy of such factors in human understanding, they both also acknowledge the 
existence and influence of the 'objects' of inquiry, which although can not be lmown 
directly, still playa part in the formulation of ideas. 
Central to social constructionism is the view that knowledge is relative to cultures and 
their particular beliefs and values. It is essentially a social product. In this sense 
constructivism, and certainly the version of it which I utilise, must be distinguished 
from social constructionism. Constructivism places less importance on the social realm. 
Its epistemology places equal emphasis on both society and the external physical world. 
While language is viewed as an important mediator of the interpretation and 
explanation of phenomena, language in tum is viewed as mediated to some extent by 
the phenomena which it seeks to explain. 
To illuminate this view one can tum to the analogous proposition in evolutionary theory 
known as 'structural coupling'. As described by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) 
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this refers to the interaction and correlation between organism and environment. 
According to the traditional Darwinian view, organismic structure is seen to respond to, 
and adapt to, changes in the environment, in what is essentially a one-way relationship. 
In contrast, the thesis of structural coupling proposes that habitats and their inhabitants 
co-evolve in response to an elaborate reciprocal relationship, wherein each necessarily 
influences the other. Accordingly the social and physical worlds may be seen to 
interact, although in a rather different sort of way. The objects which comprise the 
external environment - which may be tenned hard data necessarily influence the way 
in which the data may be described and explained. And, in tum, the way that the data 
are described may affect the way that the data are perceived. So the description does 
not loop back onto, and therefore impact on the hard data themselves, but on the 
perception and interpretation of the data. This concept fonned an important part of 
Piaget's philosophy; he often referred to the dynamic interplay between individual and 
environment. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the ideas of a variety of constructivist theorists, 
chronologically, thereby explicating the concept of constructivism and showing its 
development over time. This began with a look at its general philosophical roots and 
ended with a detailed discussion of its manifestation in contemporary thought. Also 
explained was the important distinction between constructivism and its 'sister' theory 
social constructionism. The latter is more strongly relativistic, stressing in particular the 
role of language in human understanding. 
Within this historical discussion can be seen the intersection of constructivism and 
psychology which will be drawn out in the remaining chapters. The following chapter 
draws on the material in this chapter to create a definition of constructivism and 
subsequently, a definition of mental disorder. 
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CHAPTER 8 
A CONSTRUCTIVIST DEFINITION OF 
MENTAL DISORDER 
This chapter offers an alternative approach to the understanding of mental disorder; an 
approach which has a number of advantages over the traditional bio-medical-oriented 
construal which has been shown to be problematic in a number of areas. In particular, 
the biomedical model is unable to explain or even acknowledge the significance of 
culture in the manifestation of psychopathology. Clearly mental disorders are strongly 
shaped by social forces, both in their respective manifestations and in their various 
interpretations, and more precisely, classifications} around the world. The DSM falls 
down at the point at which it seeks universal applicability. It acknowledges cultural 
variables yet in line with its underlying theoretical basis it asserts the ubiquity of its 
primary syndromes. Underlying this inconsistency is the DSM's definition of mental 
disorder which relies on the concept of dysfunction to delineate abnonnality. In light of 
the relevant empirical literature this definition is arguably inadequate. 
What is required is an alternative theoretical basis; one which allows for greater socio-
cultural shaping of mental disorder, both at the levels of definition and classification. I 
will argue that constructivism provides an excellent theoretical foundation and 
framework for the development of an alternative and more compelling definition of 
mental disorder. Compelling, primarily in that it is more consistent with the empirical 
literature and hence that it provides a more accurate account ofthe relevant phenomena. 
These phenomena are the many and varied components and detenninants of mental 
disorder, such as symptoms, biological correlates, diagnoses and social context. 
Through its characteristic multi-dimensionality, the application of constructivist ideas 
leads to a deeper and more complex understanding of mental disorder which can more 
readily incorporate its diversity world-wide. The bio-medical view relies too heavily on 
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the notion of intra-organismic dysfunction thereby understating the role of socio-
cultural factors in psychopathology. 
While constructivism has been frequently applied, in the field of psychology, to 
specialised areas such as psychotherapy and learning (e.g. Kelly, 1955; Prawat, 1992; 
respectively) it has not been applied to theoretical issues in clinical psychology. Hence 
it should be noted that some of the ideas that follow, are novel and should be viewed as 
experimentaL In empirical psychology one tests novel hypotheses against observable 
data and often novel propositions are presented along with their empirical support. In 
contrast the evaluation of a purely theoretical work (while also related to empirical 
phenomena) is to a large extent, the discourse which follows the proposition. It is hoped 
that at the very least these ideas will contribute usefully to discussions of these issues. 
They are not intended as fmal answers to the numerous complex questions which have 
been raised. One of constructivism's defining features is its self-reflexive 
aclmowledgement ofthe permutation of theories in accordance with the vicissitudes of 
the social milieu. Hence those who proffer constructivist theories must be aware of the 
fallibility of those theories. 
Beginning this chapter is a detailed explication of the definition of constructivism 
which I will be employing, which draws on many of the ideas expressed in the previous 
chapter. Following this I present a constructivist definition of mental disorder, which I 
contrast with the traditional contemporary view. 
A DEFINITION OF CONSTRUCTIVISM 
The previous chapter laid the foundation for a definition of constructivism by outlining 
the views of a number of key figures who have contributed to the delineation of the 
concept over the last two hundred years. The definition of constructivism which I 
utilise draws on these views. The key ingredient of constructivism is undoubtedly, and 
not surprisingly the notion of construction. Essentially this relates to the process of 
understanding and ascribing meaning. It is claimed that individuals actively construct 
their experience according to the various meanings and interpretations which they 
impose on the world and their connection with it. While the existence of a real world is 
acknowledged, what is seen as of primary importance are the numerous ways in which 
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this world can be interpreted and explained. The concept of construction describes the 
process by which these interpretations and explanations are created. 
Another important aspect of constructivism - one which has not been emphasised by all 
of its advocates - is the view that the human mind is rational. It seeks order; it attempts 
to make sense of complex stimuli; it acquires understanding through reason. By reason, 
I mean thinking critically and systematically about ones beliefs, intentions and actions 
in order to optimise ones situation.1 Without this ability our constructions would be 
useless as they would not enable effective living. Without reason these constructions 
would bear no relation to the external world. They would simply be misunderstandings 
which would result in horrors such as stepping into the path of an oncoming vehicle and 
eating the berries of a Belladonna plant. While constructions will differ from one 
person to another there is a significant amount of overlap due to the constancy of the 
external environment and the similar application of reason. Reason, perhaps, is a 
common language; one which places vital constraints on constructions and affords 
people the ability to interpret complex arrays of stimuli, in ways which lead to effective 
negotiation of the environment. Kant was a notable purveyor of this aspect of 
constructivism and more recently Mahoney has reiterated it. 
Combining these two components of constructivism - 'construction' and 'reason' - one 
gets at the essence of the concept; that human beings use their rational minds to 
understand, and ascribe meaning to, the world. This process, of understanding, and 
deciding what things 'mean,' involves selection and interpretation. It is not possible for 
individuals to attend at all times to all stimuli that present themselves to all the senses. 
What are considered to be important stimuli, are given more attention. So, 
constructivism also involves 'selection,' wherein people actively seek out, or ignore 
particular data. Due to physiological and psychological limits, capacities and abilities 
are finite, and hence there is a need to manage mental and physical resources in ways 
that maximise their utility. In this sense individuals' experiences of the world may 
differ according to their psychophysiology, their lmowledge, and their goals. This point 
was highlighted by Vaihinger, who claimed that the psyche, in interpreting, actively 
1 Hooker (1994) provides an excellent definition of reason. He states: "Reason is that capacity in virtue 
of which, within our finite resources, we transcend our imperfections. Reason is a capacity, operating at 
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Imposes itself on stimuli, thereby altering them according to its own requirements. 
Dewey described this with the term 'transformation', meaning that the process of 
gaining understanding and acquiring knowledge involves a transformation of data 
according to and depending on the selective attention of the knower. 
Similarly Piaget posited the notion of 'assimilation', referring to the way in which 
experiential data are incorporated into existing cognitive structures. He also proposed 
the term 'accommodation' referring to the structural change in the individual which 
occurs in response to exposure to novel stimuli. This is another important element of 
constructivism; one which Soldz (1988) referred to in his summary of the essential 
features of constructivist theories. Construction refers not only to the transformation of 
incoming data, but also to changes at a personal level. As information is integrated into 
cognitive systems, changes take place within the system, especially in the case of the 
interpretation of novel stimuli. There is a complex interaction between organism and 
environment wherein the environment' stimulates change in the organism and the 
change in the organism in tum influences the interpretation and assimilation of 
environmental variables. 
This interaction between the organism and its environment highlights the significance 
of 'context' in the understanding of behaviour? Kelly, in particular, noted that human 
beings interact meaningfully with their environments and that therefore human 
behaviour must be viewed and explained within the context that it occurs. Pepper's 
(1942) concept of contextualism aptly captures this idea. As explained in the previous 
chapter, this concept is one of Pepper's four alternative world views. Contextualism 
refers to the proposition that understanding and explanation are rooted in a complex 
array of inextricably connected events. He uses the notion of horizontal cosmology to 
describe the idea that truth will not be found by peeling away layers and getting to the 
both individual and collective levels, to replace ignorance with information, reactivity with systematic 
judgement, prejudice and partiality with critical appraisal, and so forth" (Hooker, 1994, p. 223). 
2 While I use the terms 'context' and 'environment' here, interchangeably, there is a subtle difference 
which requires acknowledgement. In my view, 'context' is a broader concept which encompasses 
'environment,' in other words the environment of an object or phenomenon is one aspect of the context 
of that object or phenomenon. 
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bottom of things, but rather by looking at the totality, the whole, and the relationships 
between the parts which comprise the whole. 3 
A vital aspect ofthe context of human existence is the social dimension which forms an 
important part of constructivism. Vico emphasised the significance of social variables, 
in particular, symbolism and language, in the formation of knowledge. And more 
recently Neimeyer (1993), in his exposition of constructivism stressed the prominence 
of social forces in the development and crystallisation of belief systems. While he 
acknowledges the role of the individual in ascribing meaning to phenomena, he notes 
also that meaning is dependent on the beliefs and values of groups, or cultures. He 
states that human knowledge is '{inter)personal', suggesting that constructions are 
shaped to some extent by societal factors. While some constructivists centre meaning 
firmly in the individual, the definition of constructivism used herein takes the approach 
of Vico and Neimeyer and realises the profound influence of the social dimension in 
human existence. Held (1995) concludes after careful observation , " ... that 
constructivism as it has been conceptualised recently does not preclude a social 
component" (p. 310). This appears to be the case, but its emphasis varies greatly from 
one author to another. 
The interaction between socio-cultural variables and data interpretation is of 
fundamental importance to constructivism. But unlike social constructivism it does not 
preclude the existence and influence of a real external world. Linguistic referents are 
not entirely dependent on culture, but are rather significantly shaped by the objects and 
phenomena which they seek to delineate. In this sense, constructivism is only anti-
realist insofar as it denies that the external world can be known perfectly and directly.4 
It does not deny the existence of the external world. This is the ontological position 
which I will be adopting. It is not one taken by all constructivists, and it is certainly not 
the view of most social constructionists. But it is the position which Mahoney sees as 
characteristic of constructivism. 
3 This view is similar to the thesis of 'holism' which claims that the whole is more than the sum of the 
parts, and hence to gain an understanding of the whole, it is necessary to look at the properties of the 
whole rather that the properties of the individual parts which comprise it. This can be contrasted with 
reductionism. 
4 There are of course different types of realism, however I use the term here as it is most commonly 
used, to denote the view that physical objects exist in the world irrespective of whether or not they are 
perceived. 
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Another important feature of constructivism is the role of the individual. Unlike social 
constructionism which sees all meaning and understanding as being rooted in social 
networks, constructivism claims that there is some degree of uniqueness (Viney, 1992). 
In other words, constructivists argue that there are individual differences in meaning. 
People perceive, intelpret and explain the world from their own unique vantage point 
which is a combination of their genetic inheritance and their particular set of life 
experiences. Although individuals are greatly influenced by their socio-cultural 
environments, it is argued that they also evoke their own private conceptions in the 
process of negotiating the world. 
Lastly, constructivism sees knowledge not as a static body, but rather as an ever 
changing, and ideally, ever improving entity. Whether or not, this knowledge is 
'objective' and 'true' is not important. What matters is its utility; its applicability to a 
particular time and place. Vaihinger saw the utility of ideas as being central to the 
process of their construction and to their continuation. So, a belief may rest on false 
premises yet still serve a worthwhile pUlpose. What is most important, according to this 
epistemology is the extent to which an idea can contribute to an individual's survival 
and to the survival of society as a whole. Generally, there should be a fit between what 
one believes to be the case and what is the case. The greater the correlation, the greater 
ones chances of surviving in a complex environment. But sometimes alternative beliefs 
and understandings may lead to the same outcome. For instance whether or not one 
believes in an afterlife makes no difference to the fact that we will all physically die. 
Vaihinger might argue that religious belief of some sort is useful whether or not it is the 
'truth.' The point I want to emphasise here is simply that knowledge changes; what is 
considered to be scientific fact today may not be centuries, or even just decades, from 
now. 
To summarise then, constructivism sees knowledge as grounded in both a real external 
world and within individuals (and their socio-cultural context); although the former is 
seldom available directly. Human beings use their rational abilities and their linguistic 
devices to make sense of the world and in doing so actively construct their experiences 
and explanations. This construction is strongly, although not entirely, mediated by 
social context; there are individual differences and hence there may be some 
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uniqueness of meaning. The value of knowledge is not measured against a yardstick of 
objective truth, but rather against a yardstick of utility. Ideas should be useful; they 
should enhance survival; they should enable efficacious living.5 Hence as human goals 
change, the knowledge base changes. This is not to say though that knowledge, and 
say, science, does not map the world to an accurate degree; it may. But science is 
progressive; theories change in response to fresh data and fresh ideas. Constructivism 
acknowledges this permutation and sees value and utility in the process rather than 
aspiring to an ideal end point. This process serves humankind and hence knowledge 
must be seen as, to some extent, a product of humanity. 
CONSTRUCTIVISM AND CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
In Part Two I provided an overview of the cross-cultural literature as it pertains to the 
definition and classification of mental disorder. I discussed the history of cross-cultural 
understanding in the West, generally, and in psychology, thereby describing the climate 
in which contemporary ideas have developed. Clearly, in the past, ethnocentric 
attitudes have influenced science and perhaps especially the social sciences, however 
there is now a greater tolerance and understanding of cross-cultural differences. But 
arguably, this tolerance and understanding has not permeated the traditional Western 
approach to the definition and classification of mental disorder which still asserts the 
universality of its primary syndromes. 
Cross-cultural studies of these syndromes suggest that there are substantial differences 
in their manifestations across cultures. The two disorders which I looked at in detail, 
namely schizophrenia and depression, show significant differences across ethnic 
groups. This calls into question the underlying bio-medical conception of mental 
disorder which underpins the traditional approach. An alternative conception is 
required, which can acknowledge the important influence of socio-cultural factors and 
can hence explain these differences. The central weakness of the bio-medical view is 
the inability to incorporate variables such as context and meaning in the experience and 
manifestation of mental disorder. As with many aspects of human existence, the 
5 This position is consistent with 'pragmatism,' a term used by James and Dewey, among others, to 
refer to the view that knowledge is the body of ideas that have proved useful (A dictionary of 
philosophy), 
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phenomena of mental disorder influence, and are influenced by, both the socio-cultural 
context in which they occur and the individual response, which consists in part of the 
process of ascribing meaning. 
According to a constructivist approach, this process is fundamental to the 
understanding of mental disorder. Seen as central, is the way that individuals interpret 
experience as this, in tum, influences the experience and the disorder. Whereas the 
traditional bio-medical view sees a mental disorder as a dysfunction within the 
individual, a constructivist view sees it as a complex process involving a diversity of 
interacting factors, with intra-organismic dysfunction as just one of these factors. If 
there is dysfunction, what is important is the way that it interacts with individual and 
socio-cultural variables. The following example illustrates this interaction. 
An example 
Harrington (1993) describes the unusual sexual practices of the Sambia, a people who 
live in a remote rain forest in New Guinea. Central to these rather unique practices is 
the belief that boys must ingest semen in order to become masculine. Between the ages 
of about seven and ten years, boys are forcibly introduced to the practice of fellatio by 
older males in their community. And for the next ten to fifteen years the boys engage in 
homosexual activities; firstly prior to adolescence as fellator and then as fellatee. 
During the first few years of marriage most men are bisexual, but when they become 
fathers they typically become strictly heterosexual. According to Sambia tradition this 
early compulsory introduction to homosexual oral sex enables the development of 
strength and virility, and a smooth transition from boyhood to manhood. 
As noted by Herdt (1981) Sambian men do not appear to be adversely, or otherwise, 
affected by their adolescent homosexuality later in life. Most become exclusively 
heterosexual following marriage and fatherhood. What is most interesting is the link 
between these sexual practices and the Sambia beliefs about male development. It is 
thought that ifboys do not ingest semen they will not reach their full physical potential. 
This belief is a vital part of the ritualised homosexuality, encouraging boys to see the 
experiences as beneficial. In Western societies sexual practices of this sort are 
prohibited, for many reasons, but primarily because they have detrimental effects on 
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children. In the West it is considered morally reprehensible to subjugate children in this 
manner. What is considered beneficial in one culture is considered detrimental in 
another. It is likely that because of the beliefs which surround homosexual practices in 
Sambia there are no ill effects. Boys believe that it is normal and necessary and 
therefore even if they find the acts unpleasant they may gladly endure them if they 
believe that such activities guarantee their normal development. 
This snippet of Sambian life illustrates the intersection between constructivism and 
cross-cultural psychology. What is important here is meaning. Fellatio in Sambia has 
special significance; it is part of complex, ritualised social behaviour. As Harrington 
points out a psychoanalyst may ascribe much importance to a fifteen year history of 
homosexual fellatio ,which began with the boy's father introducing him to a male friend 
or relative. Undoubtedly many personal difficulties may be linked to what could easily 
be termed 'abuse'. But such a label would be misplaced if within that boy's culture 
such behaviour was considered 'normal'. The context of life events and the way that 
events are experienced are inextricably connected to the events themselves. It is not the 
sexual act itself which has significance here, but the socio-cultural beliefs and practices 
in which it is embedded. With regard to sexuality, concepts of normality and 
abnormality must be applied with respect to socio-cultural context. 
Similarly psychopathology occurs in a context. Behaviour is mediated by beliefs and 
values which are always culture centred. And likewise the breakdown of behaviour has 
similar constraints. These constraints work in two ways. Firstly, behaviour is influenced 
by implicit rules governing that which is considered normal. In other words even when 
people are mentally unwell they will still attempt to conform to the expectations of 
those around them. And secondly, behaviour is influenced by folk conceptions and folk 
categories of mental disorder. In other words people who are mentally ill will be 
affected by their own ideas of mental illness and by what they believe is typical of 
people who are 'mad' or who have 'lost their minds'. Of course there is more to mental 
disorder than disordered behaviour. Also important are individuals' subjective 
experiences of their conditions which are an important dimension of psychopathology. 
Subjective expenence, also, is powerfully influenced by social factors. The words 
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which are used to interpret the experience of emotion, shape the way that emotion is 
experienced. 6 
The social context and social mediation of mental disorder have been demonstrated in 
previous chapters and accordingly the traditional biomedical approach has been 
criticised. As an alternative to this approach constructivism provides a conceptual 
foundation which is arguably advantageous because it can more readily account for 
socio-cultural diversity, and more generally, because it has greater explanatory 
coherence. The following section outlines a definition of mental disorder built on this 
constructivist foundation. 
A CONSTRUCTIVIST DEFINITION OF MENTAL DISORDER 
As shown in chapter one, there are a number of problems with contemporary 
definitions of mental disorder. And moreover as shown in part two, both the definition 
provided in the DSM-IV and Wakefield's definition are too rigid in their approach, 
asserting an homogeneity of mental disorder which is not consistent with the literature 
on the nature of various disorders. For example both definitions claim that mental 
disorder must involve dysfunction yet historical analysis reveals that there have been 
disorders in the past which were entirely social in nature. Moreover, as powerfully 
argued by Lilienfeld and Marino, dysfunction suggests a 'natural' element to disorder 
which may not always be present. While both definitions acknowledge the important 
role of social variables in psychopathology these variables are implicitly downplayed 
by the need for them to be always and necessarily tied to the notion of dysfunction. 
According to the DSM-IV, dysfunction may be behavioural, psychological or 
biological, but common to all these manifestations is the idea that something is going 
wrong within the organism. In this sense the concept of dysfunction embodies the bio-
medical understanding of mental disorder which sees various disorders as distinct 
disease entities (Thakker & Ward, in press). 
Wakefield is more explicit in his analysis of dysfunction, tying it firmly to evolution and 
its manifestation as adaptive function. Apart from the problems with this analysis which 
were discussed earlier, like the DSM definition, Wakefield's approach mistakenly 
6 This point was discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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asserts that functional breakdown of one sort or another underlies all disorders. Like 
medical conditions, psychopathologies are seen as discrete disease entities. However, 
arguably, due to their strong social component this definition places undue emphasis on 
internal processes to the exclusion of socio-cultural influences. The two aspects of his 
defmition, represented by the concepts of 'harm' and 'dysfunction' are both necessary 
and sufficient for mental disorder. The central problem here lies not with these aspects 
of disorder per se, but with the rigidity with which they are explicated. Accordingly, I 
will argue that a definition of mental disorder based on constructivist principles provides 
a more legitimate account of the concept; legitimate in the sense that it is consistent with 
the current views and theories on psychopathology in the empirical literature. And more 
specifically, it is able to acknowledge and embody the diverse manifestation of 
psychopathologies across cultures. 
A constructivist definition 
In earlier chapters I have argued that mental disorder is influenced powerfully by social 
variables. Entirely bio-medical and naturalistic explanations are unable to incorporate 
human diversity and impose too restrictive an approach on the understanding of 
psychopathology across cultures. A definition of mental disorder should acknowledge 
the tremendous variation across peoples and admit also that little is known, at this time, 
of the psychophysiological mechanisms which underlie most disorders. Though this is 
not to say that such correlates or perhaps origins are not to be found - they may be. I 
will propose, like Wakefield, that a definition of mental disorder should consist of both 
social and biological components, however I will also include an active self which 
interacts with these variables. 
It is the 'self' that is central to a constructivist analysis of mental disorder because it is 
here that construction takes place. In the words of Piaget, people assimilate and 
accommodate; they use language to interpret and to evoke meaning and in doing so 
they construct their realities. In this way individuals place their own unique stamp on 
their shared biological and social worlds. So to some extent every incidence of a mental 
disorder is unique, because the process by which it comes about has individual input. 
And of course mental disorder is primarily something that happens to people, in the 
176 
form of subjective experience. This expenence, while constrained by social and 
biological forces is not entirely dependent on them. These forces are moulded 
according to the details of life events and personal interpretation which are always 
unique. This means that two people in the same socio-cultural environment may 
experience a similar symptom array rather differently. 
So firstly, a mental disorder is something that happens to or occurs within a person. 
This may seem trite, but it nonetheless requires affirmation. In the definition which I 
espouse, I refer to all factors relating to the personal aspect of disorder as the 'self. 
This includes the experience of psychopathology, the meaning which one ascribes to 
this experience, and personallhistorical factors such as personality, life experiences, and 
goals. Essentially the 'self may be seen as the centre of personhood - as all those 
aspects of an individual's existence which are unique to him or her. According to a 
constructivist perspective this unique 'self would invariably influence the 
manifestation of psychopathology becailse even if there are significant physiological 
and socio-cultural components to mental disorder these components must connect 
within the individual. And due to the active, dynamic nature of the 'self within the 
individual, there is imposed on the manifestation of disorder, a unique experience and 
idiosyncratic interpretation of phenomena. 
As well as the personal dimension, my constructivist defmition of mental disorder has 
three other components: biological, psychological and socio-cultural. The biological 
component consists of physiological dysfunction - that is, the breakdown or disruption 
of physical processes - and more distal biological correlates such as genetic 
predisposition. While the term 'biological' may seem vague, it has been chosen not for 
its precision but for its breadth. It must include natural history, natural (or physical) 
environment and physiological factors all of which impact on mental disorder. Like 
other animals, Homo sapiens are a product of a complex evolutionary past which 
continues to exert a powerful influence on our behaviour. While at times I emphasise 
the role of social factors in psychopathology I do not want to imply that biological 
variables are unimportant. My main criticism of theories in this area which refer to 
biology, is that they often fail to acknowledge the equally important role of society and 
culture in their explanations. 
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Psychological variables are mental mechanisms and mental processes such as attention, 
face recognition, information processing and memory. These mechanisms and 
processes are of course central to mental disorder as the term itself denotes the 
disruption of psychological functioning. Different syndromes are characterised by 
different types of psychological disorder. For instance, dementia involves global 
cognitive impairment, in particular the breakdown of memory systems, while 
depression is indicated by disordered emotion. It is important to note that most mental 
disorders are at this time distinguished by psychological variables, rather than 
biological or socio-cultural factors. Symptom lists typically refer to 'abnormalities' in 
psychological functioning, such as low mood, delusions and obsessive thinking. 
Socio-cultural variables make up the third and last component of my definition of 
mental disorder. This refers to the social context of disorder which includes the 
language, beliefs, values and customs of a society. A mental disorder typically involves 
a violation of social value; that is a person will behave in a socially unacceptable 
manner or in a manner that is beyond the understanding of other people. And moreover 
the disordered individual will be influenced by his or her socio-cultural environment 
even in their disordered state. It is important to note that even in a state of 
psychological distress or disability a person will still speak their own language, wear a 
particular type of dress and obey some social norms. I want to argue that even in cases 
where people depart from these traditions they may still be affected by them. 
So the social aspect of mental disorder can be seen at two levels: The level of 
manifestation in the individual and the level of explanation. The former refers to what 
happens to the person and the latter refers to how we interpret what happens to the 
person. It is important when discussing the nature of mental disorder to distinguish 
between these levels and acknowledge that the explanation of mental disorder is not the 
disorder itself. As explained above, socio-cultural variables are evident at both levels. 
They are part of the presentation of disorder and they influence how the disorder is 
understood. The constructivist definition which I am proposing refers to both of these 
levels of socio-cultural influence. 
The four aspects which I have presented are seen as interacting in the manifestation of 
psychopathology. While the 'self must be seen as central, insofar as it is the point at 
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which the other variables intersect, the other three components - biological, 
psychological and socio-cultural - are seen as equally important. Together these 
components form a dynamic system wherein each aspect influences, and is influenced 
by, all of the others. This system is depicted in figure 3. Illustrated here is a complex 
system of interacting variables with the self placed in the middle surrounded by the 
three other dimensions. The self may be seen as the central processor through which the 
various aspects of psychopathology interact. However, as indicated by the external 
arrows, there are also direct interactions between the other aspects. So, for instance, 
biological factors are seen to directly influence psychological factors. It is not 
necessary therefore for all interactions to occur via the 'self.' Using the above example, 
it may be the case that in a particular disorder, neurochemical changes lead directly to 
changes in psychological functioning. 
Figure 3. Diagram of a constructivist model of mental disorder 
Importantly though, what is central to this constructivist understanding of mental 
disorder is the notion of a complex system with the 'self at the centre; a system within 
which each of the components affects each of the others. According to this view a 
mental disorder is a systemic breakdown involving the disruption of one or more 
aspects or levels of functioning which in tum impinges on the· system as a whole. 
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However, significantly, different disorders may be more powerfully influenced by 
different parts of the system. For instance dementia clearly has a strong biological 
component. Evidence from autopsies of those suffering from Alzheimer's disease -
which is a leading cause of dementia in the elderly - reveals significant neuronal loss in 
the cerebral cortex (Kowall & Beal, 1988). Other causes of dementia include 
Creutzfeld-Jacob disease - a rare viral disease - and meningitis - a (usually) bacterial 
infection of the membranes surrounding the brain. Dementia, then, typically has a 
distinct physiological component which causes or contributes powerfully to its 
manifestation. Hence, while according to the definition of mental disorder which I have 
proposed, there are important interactions between the physiological and other aspects 
of the system, an understanding of this condition may centre around the biological 
etiological factors. 
In contrast anorexia nervosa which has been described, by some researchers, as a 
Western 'culture-bound syndrome' (e.g. 'Banks, 1992; Simons & Hughes, 1985; Kaplin, 
Sadock & Grebb, 1994), may be a more socio-culturally embedded mental disorder, 
revolving around the Western idealisation of female slimness. What I have attempted to 
illustrate here is that mental disorders are a heterogeneous class of phenomena, and 
hence there is a need for a definition which can allow for different etiologies and 
varying emphases on the diverse aspects of their manifestations. Accordingly, this 
construal of mental disorder proposes that there are a number of important variables 
which are involved, but that different disorders may differ with respect to the extent to 
which the various aspects are implicated. 
In summary then, a mental disorder is conceptualised herein as a systemic failure or 
disruption, wherein the system consists of four primary dimensions - psychological, 
socio-cultural and biological and the 'self,' all of which interact with one another. The 
self though, is seen as central as it is through the 'self that the other dimensions come 
together. The 'self is the point of experience and the point of manifest~tion. It may be 
seen perhaps as an emergent property of the other variables. Yet it is not therefore 
passive but rather an active point of awareness which is continually seeking to interpret 
and understand. The 'self can also be understood as consisting of the other 
components to the extent that it relies on them for its existence. For example, self-
awareness often utilises an internal dialogue which relies on the use of language. And 
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obviously in order to carry out an internal dialogue one must make use of psychological 
mechanisms and more fundamentally, the brain. The self, then should not be viewed as 
separate from the other components of the system but as dependent on them. 
One might ask in what way this definition as depicted in figure 2. represents a 
constructivist philosophy. Firstly it acknowledges both natural and social elements, as 
constructivism assumes the existence of a real external world as well as an individually 
and socially constructed one. Secondly, and most importantly, the unique 'self' is seen 
as central to the manifestation of disorder. And the 'self' is submerged in psychology, 
biology and culture depicting the notion of a complex symbiotic relationship. While the 
'self' is surrounded by these variables, it is assumed that it realises them uniquely. 
What is referred to here is the idea that while there will be considerable similarity 
across human beings in the nature of their biological structures, there may also be 
differences due to the complex interactions between the various aspects of the system. 
And likewise for psychological mechariisms and socio-cultural factors. Inevitably the 
idiosyncrasies of the 'self' affect all other aspects of the system. 
This holistic approach is an important aspect of constructivism. A complete 
understanding is dependant not on an investigation of isolated elements but on an 
investigation of the connections and interactions between different aspects of the 
system. To explain a mental disorder one must attend to all of these variables. 
Particularly important according to a constructivist philosophy is the context of 
phenomena. According to the definition which I have proposed, the socio-cultural 
context is an integral aspect of mental disorder. Language, beliefs and values all impact 
on the experience and interpretation of psychopathology. For example, as discussed in 
earlier chapters, the somatic experience of depression among some Asian groups has 
been linked to language - in particular, the sort of words which are used to describe 
negative feelings - and to the social devaluing of the outward expression of emotion. 
These sorts of interactions raise a number of important questions, such as: How does 
language influence the experience of psychopathology - for example, do words like 
happy and sad mediate the experience of positive and negative emotions? And how do 
behavioural norms impact on 'abnormal' behaviour - for instance, are there still limits 
to what a person will or will not do? 
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Questions such as these would lead to a deeper understanding of the processes 
underlying psychopathology and of the dimensions of the process which are especially 
important in particular disorders. For example if schizophrenia appears to depend to 
some extent on various social variables, such as say, familial interpersonal 
relationships, then these variables should be investigated. Questions which could be 
explored might include: "What aspects of familial relationships are most pertinent to 
the onset and course of schizophrenia?" And, "What is therefore the best treatment 
approach? As explained in the chapter on schizophrenia one variable that has been 
implicated in the course of schizophrenia is expressed emotion. It is important to 
acknowledge that even though drug treatments are effective in controlling some of the 
symptoms of schizophrenia, there are important consequences in ignoring the social 
context of the disorder. If certain types of familial functioning contribute to the onset 
and course of schizophrenia then these factors must be addressed by treatment regimes. 
And similarly researchers must look at all the variables which are purported to 
influence the manifestation of schizophrenia so that treatment is optimised and health 
maintained over time. 
According to a holistic perspective what is especially interesting is the way that one 
type of variable interacts with another in the manifestation of mental disorder. For 
example there is an important relationship between the 'seW and socio-cultural factors. 
As discussed in Part II, whereas in the West the notion of 'seW has strongly 
individualistic connotations, in many Eastern communities it is seen as having a 
familial or communal component. This difference in the understanding of the 'self' has 
implications for the way that mental illness is experienced and expressed. For example 
a communal conception of the 'self' may allow a diffusion of responsibility for illness 
which may lighten the emotional burden for the patient and encourage the acceptance 
of support. Connections between socio-cultural variables and physiological variables 
are also important. Many medical conditions, such as heart disease and stomach ulcers 
are now believed to be influenced by psychological variables, and there is generally a 
growing acceptance of the interaction between these levels of phenomena. In mental 
disorder too, it is likely that such interaction plays a major role. 
Also central to a constructivist view is the possibility of alternative explanations; 
specifically the idea that different types of phenomena may require different types of 
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explanation. While all disorders involve a dysfunction with systemic consequences, 
different types of disorder may require varying emphases on different components of 
the system. For example, psychotic disorder due to a general medical condition clearly 
has a significant biological dimension, whereas dependant personality may be more 
socio-culturally based. Important here is the flexibility of the defmition which 
acknowledges the tremendous diversity of psychopathology. This approach may be 
contrasted with the bio-medical view which sees all disorders as consisting of identical 
fundamental elements. While the defmition which I have proposed also suggests that a 
number of elements are present across disorders, it also allows for the possibility that 
primary failure may be centred in different elements. 
This point illustrates one of the primary advantages of my proposed model of mental 
disorder - that research may be more carefully tailored to the dictates of prevailing 
theory and that the theory itself is made explicit. This means that if a disorder is 
theorised to have, say, a strong social' component then research should be aimed at 
establishing the social aspect of its origin and maintenance, rather than exclusively 
pursuing biologically oriented explanation. Such pursuance may detract from social 
need and draw funds away from areas where answers may be more forthcoming -
according to prevailing theory. By seeing mental disorders as differently composed of 
various constituents rather than as a homogenous group there is greater scope for 
understanding. This approach demands an analysis of theory and its application to 
practical science, because the way that a disorder is studied must be consistent with its 
theoretical representation. And this is exactly as Hempel would have it. 7 
Contemporary views consistent with a constructivist definition 
The model which I have proposed is consistent with Littlewood's (1990) approach to 
the understanding of mental disorder. He suggests that explanations of mental disorder 
lie along a spectrum, as depicted in figure 3. 
7 As discussed in chapter 2, many psychologists and psychiatrists have aspired to the incorporation of 
















Figure 3. The explanation for patterns of symptoms can be taken as 
lying along a spectrum.8 
Relatedly he states: 
"Conclusions of widespread generality are inappropriate in psychiatry where 
'psychopathology' includes patterns closely constrained by a discrete 
biological process as well as illnesses that can only be understood by paying 
close attention to individual personality, life experiences, and the symbolic 
meaning of the symptoms and the social response" (p. 318). 
Littlewood recognises the heterogeneity of psychopathology and suggests that different 
types of explanation may be better suited to different sorts of disorder. As depicted in 
figure 2, kuru and schizophrenia may be most appropriately explained by a biomedical 
paradigm, and tabanka and bulimia by a sociological one. Similarly, my constructivist 
model of mental disorder incorporates both of these paradigms, and in doing so 
acknowledges the various influences on psychopathology and the corresponding 
importance of allowing for different types of explanation. 
However with regard to the aforementioned distinction between the instantiation of 
disorder and the interpretation of that instantiation Littlewood is referring only to the 
latter. In other words he is not saying what a disorder is but rather what sort of 
explanations the various disorders require. Although the types of explanation should 
relate to the phenomena being explained. One can perhaps assume then that Littlewood 
sees mental disorder as consisting of both biological and sociological components. 
Also consistent with a constructivist approach to the understanding of mental disorder, 
is the analysis ofLilienfeld and Marino (1995) who argue that it is best understood as a 
'Roschian concept' which is characterised by unclear boundaries. They suggest that 
8 This is diagram is an exact copy (including the title) of the one found in Littlewood (1990). 
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mental disorder may not have any "clear-cut natural counterpart." They write: 
"Roschian concepts are organised around an ideal mental prototype that contains all the 
features constituting the category. Consequently, such concepts consist of both clear-
cut (Le., prototypical) and marginal examples" (p. 417). With regard to the controversy 
surrounding the question of whether conditions such as sadistic personality disorder and 
pre-menstrual phase dysphoric disorder are actually mental disorders, Lilienfeld and 
Marino propose that these disorders lie on the fuzzy boundary between disorder and 
nondisorder. This proposition rests on the argument that while concepts of disorder may 
be shaped by natural entities, they are not entirely dependent on them. They are highly 
critical of Wakefield's presentation of an entirely scientific analysis of dysfunction, 
because it assumes that mental disorders map directly onto entities in the physical 
world. 
To illustrate their point, Lilienfeld and Marino note, referencing Gorenstein (1992), that 
the concept of drug is similarly impreCise. The issue of whether substances such as 
caffeine and nicotine should be labelled as drugs, cannot be resolved with scientific 
criteria. However this fact does not undermine the reality of their physiological effects 
and nor does it imply that pharmacologists study fictional entities. Analogously, the 
symptom patterns which are labelled as schizophrenia, depression and panic disorder 
should properly be seen as objects of scientific enquiry, however the decision 
concerning whether they constitute disorders is a matter open to social discourse. Note 
that there is no attempt here to deny the very real manifestation of psychopathology. 
Rather, Lilienfeld and Marino want to emphasise the social embeddedness of the 
conceptual system which demarcates disorder from nondisorder and one disorder from 
another. Similarly, Klerman (1988) states that social constructs such as mental illness 
" ... are not myths, or false, or arbitrary, but rather they embody shared consensus, social 
conventions. They are not facts given in nature, but ideas developed by social groups 
and legitimised by consensual validation ... " (p. 74). 
Discussing particular disorders, Lilienfeld and Marino propose, citing Meehl (1977, 
1986), that most mental disorders display the properties of 'open' concepts, in that they 
are characterised by unclear boundaries, a lack of definitive indicators, and an 
unidentified inner nature. However they go on to say that this need not necessarily be 
the case. As noted by Meehl (1986) open concepts may later become closed if their 
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inner nature is revealed.9 What this means is that as more is learnt about the object or 
phenomenon, to which a particular concept applies, the concept itself will become more 
sharply defined. In this case the inner nature would be the etiology and pathology of a 
disorder. To illustrate this point Lilienfeld and Marino give an example of general 
paresis which was, in their view, an open concept prior to the identification of the 
spirochete which causes syphilis. So, while little is known about a specific mental 
disorder, the concept which demarcates it may have unclear boundaries and be best 
characterised as open, but it will become more sharply demarcated with the acquisition 
of new information regarding its etiology and its physiological and psychological 
manifestation. But the metaconcept of disorder, according to Lilienfeld and Marino, 
will always be an open concept as the boundary between normal and abnormal is seen 
as inevitably vague. This is because there is. no line delimiting normal psychological 
function and normal behaviour. Such discrimination is dependant not only on natural 
entities, but also on social value which responds to the vicissitudes of human endeavour 
and human need. 
Also consistent with my definition and model of mental disorder is what Stein (1991) 
refers to as a 'position of synthesis' with regard to positivist and hermeneutic 
philosophies (which were introduced in chapter 2). As outlined earlier, the positivist 
view is, within psychiatry, the bio-medical tradition which characterises mental 
disorder as dysfunction. In contrast the hermeneutic perspective sees mental disorder as 
a socially determined category. Arguing for an understanding of mental disorder which 
combines these two philosophical positions, Stein proposes that while it may be 
possible to conduct scientific inquiry into the underlying mechanisms and processes of 
some conditions, it is necessary to acknowledge the role of socio-historical factors in 
contemporary conceptions of disorder. He writes: "Concepts of what constitutes mental 
disease, while theory-laden and value-laden, are nevertheless open to scientific 
improvement" (p. 409). 
As Stein notes, although professionals are constantly revising their views on what 
constitutes a mental disorder, such revision is not arbitrary, but is rather.based on a 
combination of scientific and social considerations. For example, as psychiatrists 
9 A 'closed' concept is characterised by an explicit set of defining features, clearly demarcated 
boundaries and a thoroughly understood inner nature. 
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discovered the neurobiological underpinnings of Alzheimer's disorder they began to 
see senility as a disease rather than as a natural result of ageing. And as researchers 
realised that homosexuality is not linked with depression or personality disorder, there 
was a greater willingness to accept homosexuality as 'normal'. This ongoing process of 
revision and reclassification reflects the connection between social and scientific 
realms and emphasises the need for the representation of both explanatory paradigms in 
the understanding of mental disorder. 
As evidenced in the ideas of Stein and the other authors referred to above, a 
constructivist approach to the understanding of mental disorder is not incompatible 
with all contemporary thinking. Rather it brings together the views of a growing 
number of theorists who see the need for a reformulation of traditional conceptions. 
Constructivism provides an underlying theory and framework for this reformulation 
which can account for the complexity and diversity of mental disorder and which can 
hence facilitate the development of a more accurate definition. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter I presented a constructivist definition of mental disorder after first 
briefly restating the shortfalls of the contemporary alternative. Central to this definition, 
and contrasting sharply with the bio-medical view is the idea that mental disorders are 
not necessarily characterised by intra-organismic dysfunction. While such dysfunction 
may playa role in some mental disorders I argue that it is not an essential factor. The 
constructivist definition which I presented centres on the 'self', which due to its 
inherent uniqueness, makes every experience and manifestation of mental disorder 
different to some extent. Interacting with this are biological factors, psychological 
factors and socio-cultural factors, suggesting that different disorders may be variously 
influenced by these variables. Central to this approach is the flexibility of the definition 
which acknowledges the diversity of mental disorder and hence proposes that one rigid 
definition can not account for all types of psychopathology. Also important is the idea 
that there is a complex web of interacting variables all of which together co-constitute 
mental disorder. 
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Concluding this chapter I discussed some contemporary perspectives which are 
consistent with a constructivist account. The following chapter explores the 
implications of this definition of mental disorder for classification, diagnosis and 
treatment. As will be seen, the definition that one utilises has important and wide 
ranging implications for many areas of clinical psychology. 
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CHAPTER 9 
IMPLICATIONS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST 
DEFINITION FOR CLASSIFICATION, 
DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 
This chapter looks at the implications of a constructivist understanding of mental 
disorder for three important areas of clinical psychology: namely, classification, 
diagnosis and treatment. For each of these areas I propose some means of integrating 
this· understanding into current clinical procedures. The primary implication is the need 
to address contextual factors such as individual and cultural variables, which may be 
downplayed or overlooked by traditional approaches. The first section looks at how 
these factors may be addressed through the implementation of a dimensional 
classification system and some examples of such systems are outlined. The second 
section looks at incorporating context in diagnosis through the use of a context-
sensitive nosology and a culture-sensitive assessment procedure. And the last section 
discusses briefly some implications for treatment. 
CLASSIFICATION AND DIMENSIONALITY 
In the second chapter I discussed in detail the process of classification and the various 
issues surrounding the classification of mental disorders. As described therein, the 
DSM-IV uses a categorical system based on a probabilistic approach. According to the 
probabilistic view, categories are organised around prototypes or exemplars which 
typify the category by incorporating all of the essential features. Members of each 
category may have all or only a few of these features depending on to what extent they 
exemplify the prototype. In this sense categories and their boundaries are only loosely 
defined and members of categories may attain membership in a number of ways. For 
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instance, many mental disorders consist of symptom lists which may be variously 
manifest. For example, depression may be diagnosed if dysphoric mood or loss of 
interest occurs with any five of the other nine symptoms. So two people with the same 
diagnosis may have quite different symptom patterns and one person may be viewed as 
a more typical case than another with the same diagnosis. 
While this approach may sound flexible it is important to note that in many ways it is 
not. Although some categories allow for different symptom configurations there are 
typically clear boundaries between disorder and non-disorder. For instance diagnostic 
categories usually specify the number of symptoms which is required for category 
membership and a duration threshold. In other words, diagnosis usually depends on an 
individual having x number of symptoms for x number of days, weeks, or months. In 
this sense the DSM-IV provides a clear marker for pathology. And also disorders are 
seen as distinct from one another; that is, there are clear boundaries between disorders. 
An individual is either one thing or another, or both, but not a bit of this and a bit of 
that; although as mentioned in chapter 2 there are some mixed categories in the DSM-
IV. 
Considering the obvious diversity of mental disorder world-wide the categorical 
approach with its underlying bio-medical model and related thesis of ubiquity is 
arguably inappropriate. Constructivism clearly favours a dimensional rather than a 
categorical approach to the understanding of psychopathology because it allows for the 
inclusion and analysis of more contextual-oriented and idiosyncratic information. 
Through its flexibility, a dimensional system can provide a more individualised profile 
of a person's condition. This is made possible by the use of continuums which are used 
to evaluate different types of psychopathology yielding values which describe the 
extent and severity of symptoms. 
According to the dimensional VIew normality and abnormality lie on the same 
continuum and are hence seen as related, rather than as distinct and mutually exclusive 
groups. This means that mental illness is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but is 
instead something which can occur in varying degrees. Therefore, one of the primary 
goals of diagnosis would be, to ascertain the severity of a disorder rather than to decide 
whether or not a disorder is evident. So a person could be described as having mildly 
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depressive symptomatology which was not believed to require treatment, and there 
would be no need to decide whether or not the person's symptoms 'satisfied' diagnostic 
criteria of duration and severity. Admittedly, this type of diagnosis is sometimes carried 
out under the present categorical system, however it is often viewed as inferior, and as 
perhaps having less explanatory power, simply because the DSM-IV encourages the 
assumption that diagnoses should result in clear cut identification of categories and 
their prototypes. 10 
As well as the suggestion that mental illness lies on a continuum with mental well-
being, the dimensional view proposes that some disorders may be linked to each other. 
For example, Kendell (1968) posited that neurotic and psychotic depressions might 
occur at opposing ends of the same behavioural or mental spectrum. A classification 
system of mental phenomena which incorporated this type of assumption would have 
no difficulty in accounting for symptoms which fall somewhere between these 
variables. Such a case would be given a'rating designating the person's position on this 
scale, which would describe his or her predominantly neurotic or psychotic symptoms. 
According to a constructivist perspective one of the prunary advantages of a 
dimensional model of mental disorder is its holistic emphasis wherein a wide range of 
clinical features are considered in the formation of a comprehensive clinical picture. 
This picture allows for the inclusion of detailed information, with no one characteristic 
seen as more important than the others, as is the case with the categorical model 
(Millon, 1991). As noted by Millon this approach can deal more effectively with 
atypical phenomena. He states: 
Dimensional profiles facilitate the assignment of unusual or atypical cases. In 
categorical formats odd or mixed conditions are often excluded because they 
fail to fit the prescribed criteria. Given the idiosyncratic character of many 
clinical conditions, a dimensional system permits representation and assignment 
of interesting and unique cases without forcing them into procrustean categories 
for which they are ill-suited (p. 254). 
If persons from non-western ethnic or cultural groups are viewed simply as atypical 
cases, then the dimensional approach to classification might prove advantageous when 
10 Although a probabilistic rather than a classical view is utilised, this is not explicitly stated, and what 
is predominantly evident within the DSMs is the utilisation of quite clear markers for the delineation of 
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a western system is used in the diagnosis of such persons. Rather than failing to meet 
any diagnostic criterion and hence potentially being excluded from a 'real' diagnosis, 
the person falling in the middle of a particular scale, would be described according to 
their rating on that scale and all that it signifies. 
The typical diagnostic approach to psychopathology seems to stem from the 
classification system used in traditional medicine ( Carson, 1991; Widiger, 1992) which 
of course deals with predominantly observable and discrete subject matter. 
Psychological data, on the other hand, are rather more elusive. However, even 
traditional medicine utilises some quantitative scales. For instance, even though blood 
pressure is often described as high, normal or low, the actual numerical value is also 
recorded (Gunderson, Links & Reich, 1991). It is believed that the numerical value 
carries information which is not entirely captured by these labels. If blood pressure was 
recorded simply as high, normal or low then obviously less information would be 
passed from one clinician to another arid it may therefore be difficult for a physician 
unfamiliar with a patient to estimate the seriousness of that patient's condition. 
Relatedly, in discussing the classification of personality disorders, Widiger (1992) 
notes that it is unlikely that there is a particular cut-off point, signifying pathology from 
non-pathology, which is constant across all individuals and all situations. As he 
explains, an estimation of the degree of maladaptiveness of an individual's dependency, 
should consider the person's " ... social role ... situational context...comordid personality 
traits ... and other variables" (p. 297). Using a dimensional system allows for the 
differential rating of individuals according to their own unique set of circumstances, 
rather than indiscriminately applying a predesignated norm. 
Interestingly, although the categorical approach has again been used in the latest DSM, 
the dimensional model has wide support. In a review of relevant literature, Widiger 
reported that the vast majority of researchers favoured the dimensional model 
especially with regard to the analysis of personality disorders (Widiger, 1992). Despite 
this popularity however, the dimensional approach remains an attractive but 
underutilised proposition. Although there is agreement as to whether or not it should be 
diagnostic significance (Carson, 1991). 
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implemented there is little agreement on how this should be done. (Millon, 1991). 
Millon suggests that, furthermore, categorical systems can be used more swiftly in 
many situations allowing clinician's to diagnose more rapidly. Concentrating on a 
limited number of features, in terms of an all-or-none criterion may be seen to simplify 
the condition and render it more amenable to a speedy analysis. The categorical model 
also enables clear and straightforward communication about disorders, as it involves a 
standardisation of concepts and operational factors. 
Proposing a synthesis of categorical and dimensional approaches, Nelson-Gray (1991) 
suggests that the prototypicality of diagnostic criteria be used to develop quantitative 
measures of pathology. This would involve a numerical estimation of the extent to 
which individuals exemplified each diagnostic criterion. In this way, as Nelson-Gray 
outlines, the DSM-N could be adapted to include quantitative measures. Similarly, 
Skinner (1986) proposed a 'class-quantitative approach' which involves a synthesis of 
categorical and dimensional models. Such a synthesis would perhaps be a logical first 
step towards the use of dimensional approaches, and one which would not involve 
major changes to traditional diagnostic practices. And it would also avoid the problem 
of deciding what dimensions should be utilised. This issue on which there has been 
substantial disagreement, has been identified as one of the main obstacles to the 
implementation of dimensional models (Millon, 1991). For example, Eysenck (1960) 
suggested that three dimensions are required while Cattell (1965) proposed that at least 
thirty three are needed. 
Presenting a powerful argument in favour of a dimensional approach Buck (1990) is 
highly critical of contemporary diagnostic practices primarily because they focus on 
only a narrow range of individual measures. And typically these measures reflect 
negative aspects of psychological functioning; that is they depict deficiencies and 
inadequacies. Consistent with a constructivist metatheory, Buck favours a more holistic 
approach which includes the acknowledgement of strengths as well as weaknesses. As 
she astutely notes, traditional diagnostic systems often result in the ascription of labels 
which are equated with the 'total person' and that this seeks to diminish and devalue 
areas of ability and strength. Buck sees mental disorder as falling on a continuum 
ranging from maladaptive to successful, rather than delineating a phenomenon 
qualitatively different from that experienced and displayed by 'normal' people. 
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Discussing the strengths of those who are diagnosed with a mental disorder Buck gives 
this example of the poetry of a frequently hospitalised man who had been diagnosed 
with schizophrenia. She describes him as relatively uneducated and with no prior 
tuition in writing poetry. 
In Praise of Poetry 
How it changes the seasons and the stars, 
How it names things 
giving them meaning ... 




How it elevates the soul 
How it penetrates below the surface 
where the power is ... 
How it gives instant joy to both 
writer and reader. 
How it sometimes is more real 
than reality, 
bigger than life. 
How in poetly 
everything is possible ... 
... when poetry speaks, 
people listen 
and things happen. 
This sort of creative ability is not uncommon in individuals diagnosed with conditions 
such as schizophrenia and autism (Sacks, 1995). A number of theorists have linked 
such cases to the modularity of the mind (e.g. Gardner, 1993; Smith & Tsimpli, 1995). 
According to Gardner's well known and increasingly well regarded theory of 'multiple 
intelligences', intelligence is not a unitary phenomenon as assumed by traditional 
evaluative methods. Rather there are a number of quite different and distinct 
intelligences - such as musical, linguistic, and logical-mathematical - which can 
function quite independently of one another. As suggested by Gardner, a modular 
understanding of intelligence provides an explanation of the occurrence of one or more 
talents coupled with problems in mental functioning in other areas. 
Relatedly, Goodwin and Redfield Jamison (1990) in their comprehensive study of 
manic-depressive illness, discuss the connection between mood disorders and human 
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achievement. Taking issue with the traditional clinical focus on pathology they write: 
" ... a psychopathological approach to mood disorders has resulted in a psychiatric 
literature generally slighting the positive aspects of affective illness, especially manic-
depressive illness and its variants" (p. 332). Looking at the relationship between manic-
depression and creativity, the authors present an impressive number of individual cases, 
including such notable figures as Lord Byron, Virginia Woolf, and Schumann all of 
whom appear to have suffered from manic-depressive illness. They include at the outset 
this statement by Tchaikovsky (1872): "Schumann's greatness on the one hand lies in 
the depth of his spiritual experience and his striking originality ... With the shadow of 
his insanity already hanging over him, this inspired poet of human suffering seemed 
incapable offmding moments of tranquility" (p. 332). Looking in detail at Schumann's 
illness over time and his periods of productivity as a composer, it is apparent that the 
times when he would have been described as hypomanic, were his most productive. 
Goodwin and Redfield Jamison note that this pattern of creativity is consistent across 
many diverse cases suggesting that the inflated confidence, heightened sensitivity to 
external stimuli and the ready flow of ideas may enhance artistic functioning. 
It is Buck's view that traditional diagnostic practices undennine such positive aspects 
of mental disturbance by focusing too heavily on areas of disability or abnonnality. She 
suggests that ideally " ... each person would be assessed in tenns of the degree of 
interpersonal, creative and intellectual competence demonstrated with the expectation 
that weakness in one area is not inevitably connected with failure in all" (p. 187). Such 
an assessment, she proposes, would avoid the use of labels and instead evaluate various 
dimensions of existence along a continuum. These dimensions might include such areas 
as autonomy, identity and work. The primary advantage of this approach is that the 
assessment process would acknowledge people's strengths as well as their weaknesses 
rather than simply describing a person in tenns of one or other essentially negative 
label. 
An in depth analysis of the merit of dimensional approaches to the understanding of 
psychopathology is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Clearly it is a complex issue 
requiring further investigation before any finn conclusions can be drawn. However 
according to a constructivist metatheory, a dimensional model is superior because it 
enables a more detailed and individualised diagnosis which can deal more effectively 
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with contextual variables. And in this way a dimensional classificatory model would 
better serve the diversity of mental disorder and cultural diversity in particular. A 
dimensional approach to the construal of mental disorders may be particularly 
appropriate for cross-cultural diagnoses, insofar as ethnic and cultural differences can 
be accurately understood as simply atypical instances. A dimensional view allows for a 
greater scope of knowledge acquisition which inevitably enables a more thorough 
analysis of contextual information which is especially important in cross-cultural 
diagnoses. 
ADDRESSING CONTEXT IN DIAGNOSIS 
Discussing the 'contextual nature of psychiatric diagnosis' Rosenhan (1975) reflects on 
his well known experiment involving the admission of 'pseudo patients' into 
psychiatric hospitals. The patients, all of whom pretended, at initial assessment, that 
they were having or had had auditory hallucinations, reverted to normal behaviour on 
admission to various institutions. However despite the absence of any other 
abnormality all patients were diagnosed initially and at discharge with either 
schizophrenia or manic depressive psychosis. Rosenhan's primary argument is that the 
context of behaviour colours psychiatric diagnosis. Because the pseudopatients were 
evaluated in the context of a psychiatric hospital they appeared more psychologically 
disordered. According to Rosenhan all stimuli may be influenced by context but some 
more so than others. Context is particularly important when stimuli are ambiguous as 
demonstrated by this example from visual perception (see figure 4.). 
According to Rosenhan, most people read the top two words as THE CAT even though 
the two middle letters in both words are identicaL In contrast the bottom line is 
typically viewed as containing a spelling error. This demonstrates the importance of 
context in visual perception. Analogously, the data of diagnosis may be interpreted 
differently depending on contextual factors. illness inevitably occurs in a context, 
socio-cultural or otherwise, the understanding of which is important for accurate 
diagnosis. According to a constructivist position the context of disorder impacts not 
only on the diagnosis but also on the disorder itself. Hence diagnosis and treatment will 
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Figure 4. The influence of context on visual perception. ll 
The data gathered in the process of fonnulating a DSM-style diagnosis are drawn from 
a limited domain of infonnation (Poland, Eckardt & Spalding, 1996). Assessing the 
signs and symptoms of diagnostic categories typically involves observation of an 
individual in a clinical setting, self report, third party interviews and various 
longitudinal and historical analyses; for example, family history and duration of 
symptoms. Poland and colleagues contest the quality of such limited data and claim that 
the emphasis on pathology comes at the expense of a balanced view of individual 
functioning. They argue that the DSM approach fails to acknowledge the context of 
mental disorder and the 'massive' heterogeneity of individuals who receive the same 
diagnostic label. They write: " ... a DSM-oriented diagnostic assessment does not 
produce adequate infonnation on clinically important features of the individuals it 
classifies" and " ... a DSM-oriented assessment leaves the clinician in a weak position 
for effectively saying what is wrong with a given person, what is likely to be most 
effective in helping him or her, and what is likely to happen over time" (p. 250). 
These criticisms are made not only with regard to the lack of contextual material in 
diagnosis but also with reference to theoretical issues such as the DSM's lack of 
conceptual precision. However it is the 'context' of diagnosis which I will discuss 
herein. Diagnosis using a manual such as the DSM involves the assessment of an 
individual according to certain criteria. Hence much idiographic infonnation is 
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considered irrelevant. Poland et al. claim that this approach is problematic because it 
ultimately yields a one-sided interpretation of a person which is necessarily inaccurate 
because of its narrow, decontextualised focus. In response to such a claim one could 
argue that there is no alternative, for two reasons. Firstly it would be impossible to learn 
every detail of a person and secondly there needs to be some means of comparing 
clinically relevant data, as without such comparison it would be impossible to 
understand the phenomena. Very probably this is true however there may be alternative 
and superior approaches which take account of context without requiring a detailed 
account of ones life history and while still allowing communication of clinically 
significant information. 
Sadler and Hulgus (1994) claim that " ... the DSM-llI-R diagnosis tends to make 
biological conceptualisations of the patient primary and the psychosocial secondary',12 
(p. 263). And " ... having an acontextual diagnostic system perpetuates the hegemony of 
biological psychiatry" (p. 264). In support of this view they point out the biased 
approach of the DSM to the inclusion of explanations of etiology, which is supposedly 
dependent on scientific evidence. This is demonstrated by the fact that only biological 
etiologies are considered to have sufficient 'scientific' proof to warrant explanation in 
the manual. For instance Cannabis Delusional Disorder - which is subsumed under the 
class of Organic Mental Disorders - is traced etiologically to cannabis abuse. However 
in contrast 'functional' disorders are not considered to have sufficient evidence to 
afford the mention of etiology. However as argued by Sadler and Hulgus, a disorder 
such as Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has a very clear etiology. By definition 
it must be tied to a catastrophic life event. And the authors suggest, quite rightly I 
believe, that the evidence linking PTSD to a stressful life event must be, by now, rather 
substantial. 
This, Sadler and Hulgus claim is evidence of a double standard: Cannabis is considered 
to be causal, while catastrophic life events are not. Accordingly they argue that the 
DSM-III-R is less concerned with psychosocial variables than with biological ones and 
that hence, it is unable to deal with contextual - personal, historical and cultural -
11 Copied from Rosenhan (1975, p. 464). 
12 This article was written prior to the publication of the DSM IV hence it refers throughout to the 
DSM-lII-R. However I believe its ideas are equally relevant to the most recent manual. 
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information; such as inter-familial communication, life events, and occupational 
functioning. Such variables they claim may have profound effects on 'etiology, 
treatment and prognosis' yet they can not be included or even acknowledged by a 
DSM-III-R diagnosis. And this, the authors argue is a serious deficiency. 
In response to this deficiency Sadler and Hulgus present a 'nosology of context' which 
may be used in conjunction with the DSM-Ill-R. Their proposal outlines a significant 
change to what is presently Axis N. This axis allows for the evaluation of psychosocial 
and environmental factors which may have contributed, in some way, to the disorder. 
Sadler and Hulgus argue, in agreement with a number of other theorists (e.g. Williams, 
1985a, 1985b; Mezzich, Fabrega & Mezzich, 1985) that in its present form Axis IV is 
too vague and non-specific to be clinically helpful, as it provides only a global or 
general assessment of socio-environmental stressors. Sadler and Hulgus suggest that 
what is needed is a 'nosology of contextual syndromes' which would enable a more 
accurate and detailed assessment of .socio-environmental factors. In this regard they 
propose that contextual syndromes be divided into three general classes: "syndromes of 
personal history; of interpersonal environment; and of the extrapersonal environment" 
(p. 270). Figure 2 lists some examples of the syndromes which might be subsumed 
under each of these classes. 
Syndromes of Syndromes of the Syndromes of the 
Personal Interpersonal Extrapersonal 
History Environment Environment 
Earl y parental death Violent victimisation Catastrophe 
Incest Interpersonal Homelessness 
Childhood physical over involvement Loss of 
abuse Interpersonal employment 
Parental neglect in underinvolvement Socio-cultural 
childhood Divorce process transplantation 
Serial - extrafamilial Family scapegoating Cult influence 
placement of childhood Death of spouse Media influence 
and adolescence 
[Others] [Others] [Others] 
Figure 4. Sample diagnoses from each category of a nosology of context. 13 
13 This is an exact reproduction of the table provided in the aforementioned article. 
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The authors do not intend this as either a fInal or exhaustive list of possible contextual-
centred syndromes. Rather it is meant as a 'working' example of a contextual nosology 
which they believe meets standards of parsimony in classifIcation yet can also address 
the complexity of contextual information. They write, " ... the proposal here is 
emphatically a compromise between the twin goals of holistic understanding of the 
patient and having a user friendly nosology" (p. 275). This approach is innovative in 
combining nomothetic and idiographic approaches to classifIcation. 14 That is, they 
incorporate individual factors into the framework of a normative and categorical 
nosology. This novel approach is a good example of the way in which contemporary 
classifIcation systems might be modifIed to include contextual information. 
A constructivist approach to classification and diagnosis sees context as vital to the 
understanding of psychopathology. This is in part due to the socio-cultural 
embeddedness of meaning and in part to the signifIcance of context per se. 
Constructivism assumes that the personal and interpersonal meaning of disorder is 
inextricably tied to social factors such as language and customs which may not be 
included in a typical diagnostic situation. Such factors are particularly important in 
cross-cultural contexts, especially when clinician and client are from different cultural 
backgrounds; because as I have attempted to demonstrate in previous chapters and as 
Ahia (1991) points out: "Clinical features themselves have not been found to be 
impenetrable by socio-cultural indices or differences" (p. 38). Ahla states that the use of 
normative diagnostic tools such as the DSM series is problematic with individuals who 
fall outside the range of the norm group, in relation to which, the manual was 
developed; for instance those with non-western socio-cultural backgrounds. 
Ahia makes these comments prior to the publication of the DSM-N which, as revealed 
earlier, has been modifIed to enhance its cross-cultural applicability. But arguably the 
criticisms are still relevant and persuasive as the DSM-N has retained its bio-medical, 
universalist underpinnings. Ahla's statement above captures the heart of the problem: 
that clinical features vary across cultures and hence the various symptom confIgurations 
14 These tenns were coined by Wilhelm Windelband to describe two alternative approaches to science 
(Sadler & Hulgus, 1994). Nomothetic science describes objects and events in tenns of general laws, 
whereas idiographic science describes in tenns of the particulars of the objects and events themselves. 
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in the DSM may not be trans-culturally applicable. And Ahia notes also that it is the 
clinical features - namely symptoms - which form the back-bone of the DSM, not 
theories of etiology or underlying mechanisms. Addressing the need for more culture-
sensitive diagnostic techniques - especially in the treatment of immigrants - Ahia 
suggests three main methods for fostering an understanding of context, to be used as an 
alternative to DSM-style approaches or in conjunction with them. He calls these social 
interpersonal analyses, comparative behavioural and environmental analyses and 
consultation. 
Social interpersonal analysis involves an open-ended and unstructured investigation of 
an individual's psycho-social history with particular focus on those factors which 
appear to be related to the presenting problem. What is important here is how the client 
perceives the problem in relation to his or her cultural background. Comparative 
behavioural and environmental analysis involves the evaluation of different levels of 
adjustment. Many people who settle in countries with cultures which are radically 
different from their own, find the process of adjustment difficult and often stressful, 
leading to psychological problems. Such problems might be wrongly diagnosed if the 
issue of adjustment is overlooked. The last method suggested by Ahia is consultation, 
which refers to the need to at times obtain information from professionals who are 
knowledgeable about the language and practices of particular cultures, as often 
clinicians lack the cultural information to fully understand the problems of some 
clients. 
Ahia's social interpersonal analysis would be a useful addition to other more traditional 
diagnostic tools such as the DSM. It provides a systematic means of incorporating and 
evaluating socio-cultural variables in diagnosis and hence facilitates the development of 
an understanding of the impact of culture on the manifestation of psychopathology. As 
argued in previous chapters this impact is important not only in terms of its contribution 
to the initial presentation of the disorder but also its course and outcome. Therefore a 
greater understanding of these complex influences at the outset will allow the 
development of more appropriate and consequently, more effective treatment. 
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CULTURE-SENSITIVE TREATMENT 
A constructivist definition of mental disorder also has important implications for 
treatment. In particular, as in diagnosis, context and meaning are two dimensions of 
psychopathology that need to be addressed. If a mental disorder has a significant socio-
cultural dimension, this dimension needs to be considered in the planning and 
implementation of treatment strategies. This approach can be seen in contemporary 
practice in the use of family interventions, which focus not only on the individual 
concerned but also on their familial relationships and any problems which may lie 
therein. Such an approach may be particularly useful in cross-cultural contexts in which 
familial factors may be especially influential. This is highlighted in the following study 
carried out in Equador. 
This study by Price (1992) demonstrates the role of socio-cultural factors in the 
response to serious illness. Describing in detail two cases in Ecuador of peoples' 
meaning-making responses to affliction and loss, the author notes the importance of 
cultural and especially familial context in psychological copingY He proposes that 
" ... meaning based coping constitutes a pivotal factor in adaptation to misfortune for 
many individuals and families" (p. 153). Essentially what is being referred to here is the 
need for individuals to interpret and integrate experiences according to their own belief 
systems. Price states: "For many individuals and families, cultural meaning traditions 
enhance self-esteem and preserve a sense that those involved can affect the outcome of 
the illness situation" (p. 154). This sense of understanding and control enables more 
positive outcomes wherein individuals demonstrate greater acceptance of their situation 
and an enhanced ability to deal with it. 
As discussed earlier familial interpersonal relationships are particularly important in the 
course of schizophrenia. Lam, Chan & Leff (1995) provide a detailed account of their 
psycho-educational familial approach in the treatment of a young immigrant Chinese 
man diagnosed with schizophrenia. This approach placed a strong emphasis on the 
acknowledgement and understanding of cultural variables in the development and 
implementation of treatment. This was done through group sessions, conducted in 
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Cantonese, which encouraged each family member to express his or her views, giving 
the clinician insight into culture-centred issues. A number of important issues were 
identified, including: fear of losing face, overprotectiveness of the parents and the 
perceived loss of status for the family. The clinicians focused on assisting Peter (the 
patient) to become more independent, and on fostering more positive opinions of Peter 
among other family members alongwith providing general information on 
schizophrenia. The treatment programme proved successful. At follow-up Peter had 
been symptom free for one year. 
This is just one example of how the treatment of a major mental disorder can be 
tailored to meet the needs of individuals who corne from different cultural backgrounds. 
It is unlikely that a pharmacological intervention which took no account of the context 
of Peter's illness would have been as effective. Inter-familial relationships appeared to 
be one of the stressors which contributed to the manifestation of Peter's symptoms 
hence addressing these had major benefits for him. One of the primary aims of the 
clinicians was to identify and understand what the illness meant to Peter and his family, 
as the meaning of illness seems to form an important part of its course; that is the 
various interpretations and connotations of the disorder invoked by both Peter and his 
family, influenced the way that he experienced and expressed his symptomatology. 
SUMMARY 
As shown in this chapter, a constructivist definition of mental disorder has important 
implications for classification, diagnosis and treatment. The multi-faceted nature of a 
constructivist conceptualisation demands a number of substantial modifications and 
alternatives, to traditional techniques. A dimensional approach appears to be the best 
way of incorporating a constructivist philosophy in classification because, through their 
inherent flexibility, dimensional systems are necessarily more sensitive to both 
individual and socio-cultural variables. Accordingly I have discussed some of the 
advantages of dimensional nosologies over traditional categorical classification systems 
and introduced some of the arguments in favour of these. 
15 It is not possible to provide detail of these case studies here. If this is of interest refer to the 
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With regard to diagnosis, a constructivist approach requires the incorporation of factors 
such as meaning and context which are not always fully considered in contemporary 
diagnostic manuals. As shown, there are a number ways of adapting diagnostic manuals 
such as the DSM -N which would enhance their capacity to acknowledge and respond 
to these variables. Of particular importance here, is the suggestion that some of these 
methods may be used in conjunction with the DSM-N, allowing the capacity for 
greater depth and detail in diagnosis. And a constructivist understanding of mental 
disorder also has implications for treatment. I outlined just one of these, namely family 
interventions, which is particularly useful in cross-cultural contexts. The following 




RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND THEORY 
EVALUATION 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the implications of a constructivist approach 
for research on psychopathology. This discussion focuses on two main implications, 
each of which is addressed by way of a proposed alternative research methodology. The 
first of these is the need to acknowledge the heterogeneous nature of mental disorders. 
A diagnostic label such as schizophrenia can refer to a diverse mix of individuals with 
various symptom configurations. Yet many studies fail to control for this diversity and 
present findings which are claimed to represent a single homogenous group. According 
to the constructivist definition presented earlier, this investigative approach is 
problematic because it relies on a very general understanding of mental disorder which 
ignores individual differences. People may be considered diagnostically equivalent on 
the basis of only a small degree of commonality (and some individuals will have no 
symptoms in common) however many studies of mental disorder fail to address this 
issue. In line with the constructivist emphasis on individual differences and research 
programmes should ideally address the issue of heterogeneity of psychopathology. 
The other main implication for research is the requirement that methodologies take 
account of contextual information. The constructivist defmition of mental disorder 
outlined earlier, has a significant socio-cultural component which assumes that many 
syndromes are to some extent contextually embedded. According to this view research 
should attempt to understand mental disorders within the contexts that they occur rather 
than treating them as isolated entities. If familial and other social variables are believed 
to playa role in the manifestation and course of various disorders then these variables 
need to be addressed in research methodologies. 
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The second part of this chapter evaluates the constructivist understanding of mental 
disorder which I have presented including a short section addressing the limitations of 
this approach. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
There are a number of research related problems with the DSM approach to 
classification (Poland et aI., 1996). These include the p01ythetic nature of its category 
structure which allows for enormous heterogeneity of clinical attributes and underlying 
processes. And the pseudoscientific status of many of its concepts, which are a 
combination of lay-notions and traditional psychiatric terms. As argued by Poland and 
colleagues, these category characteristics result in a wide array of potential 
confounding variables and subsequent high likelihood of experimental error. For 
examp Ie, a person may be diagnosed with schizophrenia if they have any two ( or more) 
of five symptoms. So, one patient could receive a diagnosis of schizophrenia based on 
the presence of delusions and disorganised speech while another with the same 
diagnosis may exhibit disorganised or catatonic behaviour coupled with negative 
symptoms. Many other DSM categories allow for similar degrees of heterogeneity. For 
instance there are 93 different ways of satisfying the criteria for a DSM diagnosis of 
borderline personality disorder (Widiger, 1992). 
Discussing this within category diversity, Poland et al. write: "To the extent that this 
sort of variability is not measured and taken into account, the results of such research 
are uninterpretable and of questionable value (p.251). The central issue here is whether 
the many diverse presentations of say, schizophrenia are in fact the signs of one 
syndrome, or many more narrowly manifest ones. If the latter is the more accurate 
representation then research could be seriously hindered by the use of incumbent 
categories. Interestingly it is widely acknowledged that the validity of most DSM 
syndromes is poor (e.g. Poland et aI., 1996; Carson, 1991) and yet many research 
projects base their methodologies on the existence of these syndromes. Apart from the 
heterogeneity of the various conditions, as noted by Poland and others there is another 
reason also why a DSM-oriented approach to research is problematic; namely the 
context dependence of symptom presentation. 
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Clinical symptoms do not, and can not, occur in isolation from other personal 
characteristics and phenomena. They are interrelated with physiological, psychological 
and various external situational factors. Brain processes typically involve a complex 
interaction of locale and function which evades explanation in terms of one area or one 
level of activity. This complex mental milieu is realised in a number of ways, including 
the multifarious expression of cognition and emotion. In other words, pathology is 
mediated by and dependent upon the interaction of intra-individual and extra-individual 
factors which lead to differences in patterns of symptomatology. Arguably the failure to 
consider these factors in investigations of psychopathology provides a window for 
error, at least insofar as they may be considered extraneous variables. 
According to a constructivist approach to the understanding of mental disorder, 
research programs should address both of these issues. That is, they should 
acknowledge the heterogeneous nature of most diagnoses and they should take account 
of contextual information. Importantly, the meeting of these expectations would greatly 
enhance the efficacy of cross-cultural research programmes. As explained through the 
definition and model presented earlier, constructivism sees mental disorder as a many-
faceted phenomenon with several interconnected etiological components. Hence a 
constructivist approach to the study of mental disorder will require the implementation 
of methodologies which reflect this complexity of manifestation and diversity of origin. 
A constructivist metatheory requires also that the mutability of understanding be 
acknowledged. No theory should be taken as the last word or ultimate explanation of 
certain phenomena. As in science generally, the history of understanding and 
explanation of psychopathology shows many dramatic turning points, at which old 
ideas were demonstrated to be inadequate and were hence superseded by better ones. 
Research can promote such advancement (if one can be so bold as to assume that this is 
indeed what it demonstrates) by encouraging the creation and use of falsifiable theories 
thereby strengthening the links between theoretical and empirical arenas. 
Returning to the issue of the heterogeneity of mental disorder, the approach of Persons 
(1986) to the study of psychopathology may prove advantageous. Persons argues that 
research should investigate psychological phenomena rather than diagnostic categories. 
She states that " ... research efforts to understand the nature of the psychological 
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processes underlying such psychological phenomena as fonnal thought disorder, 
delusions, and hallucinations will be more successful if the phenomena themselves are 
studied directly than if diagnostic categories (e.g. schizophrenia) are studied (p. 1252). 
According to Persons, most studies of thought disorder involve the comparison of 
schizophrenic and nonschizophrenic individuals in tenns of theorised psychological 
processes. She suggests that this could be dubbed the "diagnostic category" 
investigatory method. As argued above, this method is problematic as it blurs the 
distinction between the various manifestations across individuals who have the same 
diagnosis. Using this method many different symptom configurations are lumped 
together under the one umbrella based on the assumption that there is a unifying factor 
at some level of explanation. This may confound results through the misgrouping of 
phenomena and hence through the introduction of uncontrolled variables. 
For instance, a diagnosis of schizophrenia does not require the presence of thought 
disorder and even those who do have tliis symptom typically fluctuate between periods 
of incoherence and lucidity. Yet most studies of thought disorder simply compare 
schizophrenic and nonschizophrenic individuals without reference to the presence of 
thought disorder at the time of inquiry. Moreover, as Persons points out, there are other 
diagnostic categories which may also exhibit thought disorder, for example, bipolar 
affective disorder. Hence a study comparing schizophrenic and nonschizophrenic 
individuals is not therefore a study comparing those with and without thought disorder 
as some researchers assume. Persons describes this as a problem of misclassification, 
which she argues would be avoided if thought disorder was studied directly without 
reference to particular diagnostic categories. 
As noted by Persons another important advantage of the symptom-oriented approach to 
research is the facilitation of theoretical understanding. As the object of inquiry is 
broken down into smaller units it is easier to tie these units to particular mechanisms. It 
is easier for example to detennine the mechanism underlying hallucinations than it is to 
detennine the mechanism(s) underlying schizophrenia. Bannister (1968) stated that 
schizophrenia involves " ... a multiplicity of behavioural criteria, and the attempt to link 
it directly with a specific biochemical agent leaves, between the two, an enormous gap" 
(p. 185). The symptom based approach makes the task of detecting underlying 
mechanisms easier by narrowing the breadth of the enquiry and looking at symptoms in 
208 
isolation from one another. Yet it can also allow for the examination of the 
relationships between symptoms thereby promoting the understanding of symptom 
configurations within syndromes. 
According to constructivism, a symptom-based approach to the study of mental 
disorder is advantageous because it can more easily incorporate and account for 
heterogeneity. Such an approach may be particularly appropriate in the area of cross-
cultural psychology where it is more likely that there will be syndromal differences. 
The study of symptoms may seek to identify these differences rather than overlook 
them in the process of generalisation. For example, the core symptom configuration of 
schizophrenia which has been widely used in the cross-cultural study of schizophrenia 
is aimed at the identification of a fixed number and type of symptoms to the exclusion 
of all other phenomena. If in this case symptoms were studied rather than the syndrome 
of schizophrenia, it would be possible to determine in what way the various symptoms 
differed across cultures which would' further the understanding of culture-specific 
presentations. Research at the level of symptoms allows for the gathering of more 
information and hence greater accuracy. 
Looking now at one means of addressing the context of disorder in research, Kleinman 
(1992) outlines an ethnographic method for the study of health and illness across 
cultures. He states that " ... ethnographic methodology means describing a particular 
social context and interpreting within it places, people, and other meaningful things" (p. 
127). He points out that while such an approach may seem "obvious and sensible" it is 
not the way that research in clinical areas is traditionally conducted. The traditional 
approach more closely resembles the core symptom approach outlined above which 
focuses on the presentation of universal forms of pathology. hI contrast ethnographic 
method focuses on what Kleinman refers to as the 'local world' which is essentially the 
socio-cultural context of experience. He sees experience not as entirely subjective and 
personal but as 'intersubjective' and 'interpersonal'. He states that " ... experience 
should be seen as a flow, a medium moving between and within persons that is the 
condition for, as well as the achievement of, actions and transactions" (p. 128). 
Kleinman proposes also that experience should be understood and interpreted according 
local morality. He wants to emphasise here, that local worlds consist of the beliefs and 
values that mediate and direct people's lives. 
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Kleinman claims that local worlds powerfully influence human illness and suffering 
and hence he proposes that in order to understand these phenomena it is necessary to 
firstly become acquainted with the local worlds in which they occur. He states, 
" ... suffering needs to be described and interpreted as part of the lived flow of 
interpersonal experience in local moral worlds" (p. 129). Central then to this approach 
is the social dimension of human existence which Kleinman sees as profoundly 
influential in the manifestation of illness. It is his view that research methods within 
medicine typically have a very narrow and superficial focus which excludes socio-
environmental variables and results in a comparatively small and limited data base. In 
contrast an ethnographic methodology demands a detailed and wide-ranging analysis 
with the aim of permeating and ultimately understanding another culture. Ideally this 
should be done with as much objectivity as possible. In other words the various aspects 
of the social world which is to be investigated should be analysed in relation to each 
other rather than compared to external measures. This process is based on the 
assumption that there are subtle yet deeply rooted interconnections between individuals 
and their beliefs, traditions and institutions and that an understanding of culture is 
dependent on an understanding of these interconnections. 
While Kleinman proposes that this ethnographic method be used for general medical 
research, it would be especially useful in the field of psychopathology wherein the 
social context of experience and behaviour is particularly important. Studies which 
utilise a methodology which centres around the imposition of Western conceptions on 
alternative understandings, risk the misinterpretation of data through the general 
disregard for context. Kleinman (1988) refers to this bias - of classifying illness in one 
culture according to the diagnostic categories of another (without prior testing of their 
cross-cultural validity) - as the 'category fallacy'. Such studies also have a limited 
capacity for attending to and reporting on the tremendous depth and complexity of 
socio-cultural data. Ethnographic approaches could be combined with the more 
commonplace universalist style studies yielding research methodologies which have the 
capacity to discover both cross-cultural similarity and diversity. A composite approach 
of this sort, which combines traditional medical and anthropological research methods 
is recommended by Lewis-Fernandez and Kleinman (1995). 
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EVALUATION OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO THE 
UNDERSTANDING OF MENTAL DISORDER 
The various suggestions and recommendations outlined above demonstrate the value 
and utility of a constructivist metatheory in the field of cross-cultural psychology. 
Constructivism provides a number of interesting avenues for the development of both 
theoretical and empirical research programmes in this area. Obviously most, if not all, 
of these proposals are relatively novel and only superficially explicated, however they 
nonetheless show that constructivism has much to offer the field both as a theoretical 
framework for conceptual u11derstanding and a guide for the modification and 
improvement of clinical and research methodologies. From the definition and 
classification of mental disorder to treatment and research, constructivism provides a 
guide for the facilitation and development of more culture-sensitive and hence more 
cross-culturally appropriate approaches~ 
I want to emphasise here the importance of theory within psychology and within 
science generally. As argued by Howard (1985), understanding within science is 
dependent on theoretical knowledge because empirical data may support a number of 
incommensurable theories. And moreover scientific observations are always dependent 
on theoretical understanding (Chalmers, 1976). So-called hard data are observed and 
interpreted according to a particular theoretical position Typically empirical research is 
carried out in order to test a theory - to confirm or disconfirm it. However as noted by 
Howard competing theories are not evaluated simply through scrutiny of the "brute 
facts", but rather through an analysis and comparison of the theories themselves. This 
process of analysis which is referred to as theory appraisal or theory evaluation, has 
been widely discussed within the philosophy of science. Central to this discussion is the 
question of what makes one theory better than another. If it is not simply a matter of 
evaluating the data of observation then there must be some other important criteria. 
I am going to discuss in detail, Kuhn's views on these matters because they have been, 
since their inception, influential, and because they are probably the most widely 
accepted. Kuhn (1977) suggests that there are five main criteria which are important in 
the evaluation of theories: accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness. 
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Accuracy refers to the rather obvious requirement that theories accurately describe and 
predict the phenomena which they seek to explain. Consistency proposes that all 
aspects of the theory should be consistent with one another and that the theory is 
consistent with other accepted theories in the same field and in science generally.16 
Scope refers to the criterion of broad application, meaning that the theory should have 
wide-ranging consequences, extending beyond the limited area to which it originally 
pertained. Very similar to this notion, and yet I think distinguishable from it, is what 
Howard (1985) terms unifying power, which he defines as 'the ability to bring together' 
previously unrelated and divergent aspects of knowledge. Also similar is the concept of 
explanatory breadth which to Thagard (1992) is quite simply the capacity to explain 
more phenomena. Simplicity describes the requirement that a theory brings order to 
otherwise arbitrary or inextricable phenomena and also that it does so parsimoniously. 
And lastly fruitfulness, which has also been referred to as fertility (Howard, 1985), 
proposes that a good theory is one that facilitates the development of research 
programmes and hence leads to hew dis·coveries. 
I will now evaluate constructivism according to each of these criteria in tum. It should 
be noted that constructivism is best conceived of as a metatheory rather than a theory 
per se, because it is a general perspective which may be applied to a number of 
different fields. For instance it has implications for epistemology on the one hand and 
clinical psychology on the other. Put simply a metatheory is a theory about a theory. In 
other words a metatheory is similar to a research program (as referred to by Lakatos, 
1974) and a paradigm (As referred to by Kuhn, 1977) or it might also be described as a 
global theory. 
Firstly accuracy, which might perhaps be considered the most important - even if in all 
other respects a theory is satisfactory or even excellent, it is utterly worthless if it is 
inaccurate. A constructivist understanding of mental disorder is a more accurate 
representation of the relevant phenomena than the traditional biomedical approach. 
Research findings indicate that there is a significant interplay between physiological 
and socio-cultural forces. Constructivism, with its equal emphasis on, and interactive 
conception of, these dimensions, provides a more accurate account of mental disorder 
16 Howard refers to these two criteria as internal coherence and external consistency, respectively. 
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world-wide. This accuracy is in part a product of constructivism's inherent flexibility 
which allows it to incorporate diverse phenomena. For example the definition of mental 
disorder proposed earlier, allows for varying etiologies depending on the nature of 
specific disorders. Considering the apparent heterogeneity of psychopathology across 
cultures and the complex array of causal factors, this constructivist definition provides, 
particularly by way of its mutability, an accurate analysis of the relevant phenomena. 
Secondly, constructivism also meets the criterion of consistency which has two quite 
different aspects: internal and external. The theory is internally coherent in that no 
element is incompatible with any other. From its application in a defmition of mental 
disorder through to its use in the development of research methodologies, it is in all 
respects consistent with itself. And it also demonstrates external consistency - that is, it 
is compatible with other theoretical and empirical approaches. As noted in the previous 
chapter a constructivist definition of mental disorder is consistent with a number of 
other theoretical perspectives and as shown in this chapter it is compatible with some 
clinical approaches. Broadly speaking constructivism is consistent with conceptions 
and methodologies within anthropology, and within psychology it can be likened to 
what Littlewood refers to as the new trans-cultural psychiatry. Obviously the 
constructivist ideas which I have outlined are not consistent with the traditional bio-
medical view of mental disorder as it is intended to challenge this, however there are 
nonetheless some areas of commonality. For instance constructivism also 
acknowledges that biology plays a role in mental disorder - but the extent and nature of 
this role is differently interpreted. 
The third criterion for discussion is scope or explanatory breadth which refers to the 
capacity for bringing together or including a broad array of diverse and even disparate 
phenomena. Compared to the bio-medical universalist understanding of mental 
disorder, constructivism can account for more data. Specifically it can explain and 
incorporate the cross-cultural findings which demonstrate marked differences across 
socio-cultural groups. It also brings together what might otherwise be seen as distinct 
and unrelated phenomena in that it involves a synthesis of physiological and socio-
environmental variables, with emphasis on the important interaction between them. 
Basically, constructivism can explain more of the data within the field to which it has 
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been applied. This is data which would have been anomalous according to the 
traditional purely biological explication of mental disorder. 
Fourthly, constructivism also shows simplicity in that it bestows order on what are 
otherwise inextricable data. Research in cross-cultural manifestation of mental disorder 
reveals both similarities and differences between various ethnic and social groups, 
suggesting that there are probably multiple etiologies and numerous variables which 
impact on its manifestation. Through the application of a constructivist view some 
degree of order is evident in these findings - they are no longer incomprehensible. And 
moreover constructivism is parsimonious in that it is a clear and concise theory with a 
small number of central tenets. This criterion is often connected with explanatory 
breadth forming the condition that a good theory explains a wide array of data with the 
least possible amount of general laws or propositions. Basically, the more parsimonious 
the theory and the broader its application then the better it is. 
The fifth and last of Kuhn's criteria is fruitfulness or fertility which is essentially a 
measure of the contribution of the theory to future research. Ideally a theory should 
contribute to the development of research programmes leading to new and important 
findings. As shown in this final chapter constructivism proposes a number of innovative 
research techniques including Person's symptoms-based approach and Kleinman's 
ethnographic method. These techniques are just a few of the many ways in which 
constructivism can contribute to the development of more culture-sensitive clinical 
practice and research methods. Obviously it was not possible to explore all of these 
avenues however the ideas which have been presented indicate the diverse and wide-
ranging application of constructivism in these areas. Constructivism has much to offer 
both theoretical and empirical research through its alternative definition of mental 
disorder and its broader more pragmatic application within clinical psychology. 
Maxwell (1984) proposes that another important criterion used in the evaluation of 
theory is value. In Maxwell's view intellectual inquiry should aid human kind in 
dealing with the problems of existence and in determining what is most important in 
life. So science should have general benefit for humanity, providing solutions to 
existential questions and providing guidance for dealing with day to day issues. While 
the notion of value may not at first glance have much to do with science, on inspection 
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it clearly plays a crucial role. For example consider the vast amount of time and money 
which is devoted to developing treatments for cancer. There is no doubt a plethora of 
research projects which are aimed at the discovery of cures for this disease. According 
to Maxwell these research projects are justified by the potential benefits which they 
offer - it is in this sense that they are valued. Arguably constructivism may be seen as 
valuable in that it has the capacity to enable and foster greater understanding of 
diversity. Rather than imposing a Western framework on all of human experience and 
human behaviour, constructivism encourages the development of alternative 
philosophies with the goal of a more rich and sophisticated understanding of human 
kind. This would be beneficial for all concerned but particularly for non-Western 
groups who are more likely to have their beliefs and values acknowledged and 
respected by researchers. 
Limitations 
The constructivist definition of mental disorder which I have presented may be 
criticised on the grounds that it lacks detail and perhaps precision. Essentially I have 
proposed that a mental disorder is a breakdown in a complex system of interconnected 
variables with different components of the system playing a more important role in 
different disorders. At the centre of this system is the 'self' - the active processor and 
interpreter of events and experience - which imposes upon this system a degree of 
uniqueness. Hence there will be individual variation in the manifestation of mental 
disorder. Similarly, as there is a social component, psychopathology will vary across 
socio-cultural environments. In this sense there is no 'core' of disorder as there is 
according to the bio-medical model. A mental disorder is seen rather as a phenomenon 
with unclear boundaries which responds to changes in social value. 
One might argue that acknowledging social factors to the extent that this 
characterisation suggests is appropriate, renders a rather unscientific account of mental 
disorder. To understand this criticism it is helpful to look again at Wakefield's 
approach to the definition of mental disorder. It was detail and precision that Wakefield 
hoped to add to definitions such as those found in the DSM-N, which also relied on the 
concept of dysfunction to sharpen the boundary between normality and abnormality. 
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According to Wakefield the DSM's use of the concept of dysfunction did little to 
sharpen this boundary because it failed to explicate the concept. In response to this 
perceived deficiency in the definition, Wakefield provided an evolutionary explanation 
which centred on the notion of adaptive function. The primary reason for this 
explanation was to enable a more scientific and precise account of mental disorder. 
According to this view, for a phenomenon to be a genuine mental disorder it must 
involve the breakdown of psychological mechanisms. This is the heart of problem; the 
crux of the matter; the core of disorder. And moreover Wakefield provided a way of 
establishing normal from abnormal function; namely adaptation. While there are a 
number of important problems associated with this approach one can appreciate its 
purpose - to add precision to an otherwise imprecise understanding. One could argue 
that the constructivist account which has been presented fails on the grounds that it 
provides no definitive marker for abnormality. There is not necessarily any natural 
counterpart for each disorder as some disorders are delineated primarily by social value. 
While this may seem problematic it is also unavoidable because, as argued, mental 
disorders are by their very nature imprecise and a definition of a phenomenon must 
reflect the phenomenon in question. 
Relatedly it may be argued that a strongly social definition of mental disorder may be 
used to manipulate individuals. Disorders may be socially embedded leaving 
abnormality in the hands of socially ascribed value. Some might see this as a dangerous 
and therefore unsatisfactory position in that the delineation of disorders may be used 
for purposes of social control. In response to such a criticism I would argue that the 
definition I have proposed is simply describing the relevant phenomena accurately, and 
is not therefore encouraging the misuse of labels of psychopathology. It is rather like 
providing a definition of a word in a dictionary. There may be a strict original meaning 
which for some reason is considered favourable, however if one is to perform the 
lexicographers task effectively one must include all of the various defmitions which 
have at one time or another been used. It is a rather loose analogy but a nonetheless 
effective one. A defmition of mental disorder must accurately describe the phenomenon 
in question whether or not that definition proves to be acceptable on other grounds. 
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SUMMARY 
In this final chapter I have critically evaluated the proposed constructivist definition of 
mental disorder and have argued that it has a number of important strengths. However I 
do not see it as a grand or sole approach to the understanding of mental disorder. 
Rather, I view it as a stimulant or catalyst for developing new directions within the field 
of cross-cultural psychology and perhaps psychology as a whole. As noted and 
discussed by Howard (1985), as a science, psychology has some unique facets, most 
important being the agency of the object of study. This agency has both individual and 
social characteristics which impinge significantly on behaviour. In my view 
constructivism captures and explains these variables in a way that few theories can. 




Mental disorder, like many other aspects of human experience and behaviour is a 
complex phenomenon involving a variety of diverse factors. One can conclude from the 
examination of the cross-cultural literature that the socio-cultural environment of 
human existence plays a particularly important role in the manifestation and course of 
mental disorder. However this dimension is not fully addressed by the traditional bio-
medical view of mental disorder which continues to exert a significant influence on 
contemporary diagnostic manuals. While the DSM-IV has made some important 
modifications in the direction of cross-cultural understanding it nonetheless continues 
to utilise and uphold the bio-medical view which sees mental disorders as discrete 
entities which are often culturally immutable. This underlying philosophy is 
inconsistent with the superficial acknowledgement of social factors which if fully 
explicated would demand a quite different theoretical basis. 
In response to this inconsistency and inadequacy I have offered an alternative 
understanding of mental disorder which I argue has a number of important advantages. 
In particular it exhibits greater explanatory breadth in that it can explain a wider and 
more diverse range of phenomena than the traditional view. The constructivist 
definition which I presented, provides a multidimensional understanding of 
psychopathology which allows for different types of mental disorder, acknowledging 
that there may be varying degrees of social and biological influence in different 
disorders. While some mental disorders are essentially the result of neurological 
degeneration others are dependent on socio-cultural variables. One of the central 
features of the proposed constructivist definition is that mental disorders are not seen as 
being adequately represented by one rigid set of characteristics but rather as varying 
combinations of several. And departing significantly from the bio-medical approach 
they are not seen as distinct entities with sharp boundaries but rather as conceptually 
mutable phenomena, the boundaries of which change with the vicissitudes of both 
social and scientific thought. 
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I discussed in the final two chapters the clinical implications of this alternative 
understanding of mental disorder. While many of the suggestions therein are rather 
underdeveloped and perhaps controversial they nonetheless demonstrate how change at 
the theoretical level can lead to changes in many other diverse areas. In developing a 
theory one must attend to empirical phenomena and likewise when a theory has been 
developed it is then tested through its application to the relevant phenomena. The test of 
a constructivist approach to the understanding of mental disorder will involve its 
application to all those areas which rely on and utilise this understanding. It should 
accurately predict phenomena; it should lead to the development of fruitful research 
programmes; and it should enable effective treatment. A theory can not exist in 
isolation from that which it seeks to explain. Rather, as Hempel suggested, there must 
be a continuous process of reciprocal interaction between theoretical and empirical 
analysis. Hence the constructivist approach to mental disorder must be explicated and 
tested through its application to various relevant domains. 
Clearly such testing is beyond the scope of this thesis. While I have argued that my 
constructivist definition of mental disorder meets the numerous criteria for a 'good' 
theory, as with many novel theories, it must be subjected to the test of time. I propose 
though, that at this time, a constructivist definition of mental disorder provides a more 
satisfactory account of psychopathology than its rivals. 
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